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 1
1.  Introduction  
1.1  Context and key questions  
This study is about disparities of poverty and wealth. Disparities have always existed between 
regions and people. It has been a conventional task for (national) governments to alleviate 
them. Alongside recent globalisation processes, people and space are pushed together towards 
increased interaction. As a result, differences and distances between people and regions seem 
to blur. Somewhat paradoxically, an all-embracing insecurity evolves at the same time; which 
in turn causes space and societies to further differentiate. In other words, differences and 
distances between people and regions, here disparities also increase (again).  
Similarly, poverty and wealth turn into concepts that are more intricate. They are mobile 
positions as global liberalisation opens up opportunities to people and regions to advance their 
quality of life. However, the risk to ‘fall down the ladder’ is equally high as to ‘move up the 
ladder’. In fact, multi-facetted vulnerabilities and insecurities grow as much as opportunities 
for improvement arise. Consequently, regions and people must engage in a continuous 
struggle against poverty, and thereby are compelled to consider its numerous dimensions and 
risks. 
In this context, the identification of disparities of poverty and wealth, on the one hand, and the 
agenda setting and implementation of governmental policy responses, on the other hand, 
become ever more complex and challenging. Scholars analytically (re)focus on the classic 
task of the (national) government to promote stability, security, and equality by reaching out 
to the peripheral regions, marginalised people, and most problematic issues of disparities of 
poverty and wealth. Yet nowadays, national government’s steering and outreach capabilities, 
firstly, are impeded by liberalised market forces, and secondly, face increasing competition by 
local government and governance initiatives between state, market, and societal stakeholders. 
This new setting, however, also bears chances for improved, complemented, and more 
effective governing by enabling state-society interactions and partnership. In fact, policy-
makers’ comparative power and capacities rather than formal political accountabilities 
determine the effect(iveness) of policy on disparities of poverty and wealth.  
This study investigates how governmental policy intervention encounters and (re)produces 
disparities of poverty and wealth in the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines are a 
particularly interesting case because, firstly, they are geographically and ethno-linguistically 
extraordinarily scattered and diverse, and therefore specifically prone to disparate 
development. Secondly, the country is assumed to be disproportionately exposed to global 
developments due to its historical links to the Malay, Melanesian, Arab, Chinese, Spanish 
(colonial power 1565-1898) and US American (colonial power 1898-1946) orbits. Thirdly, 
governmental policy-making in the Philippines has been decentralised since 1991, potentially 
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giving way to strengthened regional balance and improved policy outreach to the 
marginalised and peripheral.  
More precisely, I analyse the multiple expressions of disparities of poverty and wealth in the 
Philippines at inter- and intra-provincial scales, and then focus on the effect(iveness) of 
governmental policy targeting them. I aim at elaborating a theoretical framework and 
empirical answers to two research questions 
I. What features, patterns, and dynamics do disparities of poverty and wealth have in 
the Philippines? 
II. How are these disparities of poverty and wealth (re)produced through governmental 
policy?  
I examine these ‘faces’ of disparities focussing on three aspects. Firstly, the emphasis is 
foremost on spatial disparities that point at the unequal incidence of poverty indicators among 
provinces, regions, municipalities, and/or the rural-urban scale (Stiens 1997: 11-12; 22-24; 
Sommers & Mehretu 1998: 140-141). Secondly, this study focuses on disparities of poverty 
and wealth and it follows that “if there are major differences in the quality of life between 
different people or groups [or spaces] within a single society, one can speak of disparities” 
(ESCAP 2001: 5; note by A.C.). This implies, thirdly, that spatial disparities of poverty and 
wealth always cohort people-related imbalances in spatial aggregates of provinces and 
regions. In other words, “…spatial disparities are spatially structured social imbalances” 
(Grundmann 2002: 1; compare Urry 1995: 71). Fourthly, disparities of poverty and wealth do 
not only stretch across ‘spatial matrixes’. They may also stem from social structures such as 
class, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc., and are then termed social inequality (Johnston et al 
2000: 389). Social inequalities are only considered in this study when interacting and/or 
related to spatial disparities.  
 3
1.2  Objectives, structure, and organisation of the study 
Key question I of this study deals with disparities mainly as spatial, territorial structures and 
undertakes a form of 'earth-writing' – and thus points to traditional geography in its Greek 
meaning. Hence, the first objective of this study is  
To identify the geographical manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the 
Philippines.  
Disparities (as well as poverty) usually carry a negative connotation, are multi-perspective, 
highly contentious, yet popular issues in academia, politics, and the public alike, which are 
difficult to grasp analytically (compare for example the dissimilar approaches by Sen 1992; 
Solimano 2000; Smith 1999; Diez 2003; Sibley 1995; Bathelt & Taylor 2002; Birdsall 1998). 
The first reason for why disparities (of poverty) have “such a prevailing presence in the 
literature is because it [they] can be conceived of in so many overlapping ways, from the 
culture and politics of social exclusion through to the economics of lagging region” (Rigg 
2003: 89; note by A.C.). Secondly, socio-spatial transformations alongside globalisation have 
extended the topic’s multi-dimensions and multi-scales. Thirdly, debates on disparities and on 
poverty both trail the discourse on even more controversial development processes (ESCAP 
2001; Thiel 2001). Fourthly, the Philippines’ status as developing country and related 
limitations in data resources further complicate the acquisition of an encompassing 
understanding of its disparities of poverty and wealth. 
Such complexity necessitates this study to examine the meanings and problems spatial 
disparities of poverty (in the Philippines) encompass and to arrange them into an analytical 
and operative framework. Thereby I connect and mark off the concepts of disparities and 
poverty with neighbouring and overlapping concepts denoted by terms of  ‘differentiation’, 
‘distance-proximity’, ‘boundary’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘centre-periphery-relation’, ‘marginal(ity)-
elite’, ‘exclusion-inclusion’, ‘(in)equality’, and ‘development’. I organise and combine 
analytical approaches of various academic disciplines including Development Geography, 
Political Geography, Social Geography, Regional Studies, Development Studies, Sociology, 
Ethnography, Social Anthropology, and Politics. Such interdisciplinary analysis corresponds 
with the general turn in Human Geography towards working in the spaces between theories 
and sciences (see Aufhauser & Wohlschlägl 1997). 
In the Philippines societal and political transformation is characterised by a focus on persons 
and rhetoric rather than ideologies and programmes (see McCoy 2002; Mulder 1999; Coronel 
et al 2004). This setting suggests withdrawing from an emphasis on the ideological 
standpoints that run through the majority of discourses on disparities. Therefore, this study 
uses publications from various ideological corners in order to elaborate a comprehensive 
analytical framework meeting the Philippine environment. 
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In contrast to the ‘earth-writing’ structures highlighted by key question I, key question II 
more strongly considers human agency – or traditional ethnographies in terms of the Greek 
'people-writing' – which contemporary streams of Human Geography have incorporated since 
the cultural turn of the discipline in the 1990s (Cloke et al 2004: 189-200).  
I specifically presume that “policy can make a difference” (CASE 2002) upon the state of 
disparities of poverty and wealth. In other words, when disparities of poverty and wealth 
prevail or deteriorate despite operating policy schemes this may indicate a policy failure or 
mislead. At the same time any assessment of specific policy approaches requires the 
knowledge of how poverty is concentrated geographically, socially, and sectorally (i.e. key 
question I; Smith 1999: 5). Figure 1.1 schematically relates these two major themes in focus. 
Figure 1.1: Simplified scheme of the study’s analytical foundation 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the second objective of the study relating to key question II asks 
To explain and understand the effect(iveness) of (governmental) policy intervention 
upon disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines. 
In other words, I analyse the power geographies of government’s policy-making for their 
impact on disparate developments. Thereby I neither intend to give an encompassing 
overview on the effect(iveness) of selected policy approaches nor to discuss tested policy 
models that may possibly be appropriate for the Philippine setting. Instead, I aim at 
illuminating typical features, and particularly those impediments and constraints that prevent 
policy and policy-making upon disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines from 
being effective. Implicitly prospects for transformative governmental policy are analysed, that 
means policies, which build on closer state-society interactions and stakeholder partnership – 
rather than old-established governmental political hierarchy – to bridge Filipinos’ differences 
and diversity, and steer them towards a more balanced development.  
Vitally, this study considers (policy of) disparities of poverty from a situation-, context-, and 
place-sensitive perspective. The analysis inter alia refers to typical Filipino socio-culture that 
has evolved throughout history. It ought to be noted that most of the traits that are 
internationally cited as ‘typical’ Filipino refer to the lowland Christian-educated, Tagalog-
speaking Malay-Filipino majority in the country (and even they are far from being a 
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homogenous group, compare chapter 5.1). Because this study is dependent on the literature, it 
similarly discusses the majority’s socio-culture, however points out to minority cultures 
where possible and relevant (see chapter 9.1; below). Generally, I do not envisage to illustrate 
Philippine sociology, but rather assume socio-culture to constitute a framework in which 
disparity production and policy-making are embedded, and which characteristically enable, 
constrain, prevail, or alter state-society interactions in policy-making (see Schweizer 1999: 
17-20). In addition, this approach guarantees the relevance of my research to Filipinos 
themselves (see Strubelt 1997: 5).  
This study then provides insights into broader developmental problems and prospects in the 
Philippines through a policy lens. This task becomes even more crucial given the country’s 
enduring developing status – and turns more interesting when considering that in the early 
post-colonial period (after 1946) the Philippines used to be among the socio-economically 
most developed countries in Southeast Asia (see Hutchcroft 1998). Besides, by the means of 
this approach the study meets the call for a profound turn and re-orientation in Human 
Geography towards policy-led research on disparities and poverty (see Martin 2001; Dorling 
& Shaw 2002).   
A key to the identification (and alleviation) of disparities is the chosen unit and scale of 
analysis, as illustrated in table 1.1 (compare Bigman & Deichmann 2000: 52-60; Tunstall & 
Lupton 2003: 17-25). This study concentrates on the provincial scale to analyse spatial 
disparities as well as respective policy. The national, regional, municipal, and local (barangay 
and purok) scales are organised around the provincial focus and occasionally used as 
supplements when contextually reasonable. The choice of the provincial scale is most 
appropriate, because, firstly, it is the level on which the highest aggregated data are available 
for all 79 Philippine provinces. Secondly, the decentralisation process since 1991 has made 
provinces the largest local government units and, therefore, the meso-level that specifically 
interacts and channels national and local policy. Thirdly, given the diversity of Philippine 
regions and people, a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the entire Republic would exceed 
the scope of this study. Therefore, I conduct a case study on the island province of Bohol set 
in its decentralised policy framework to answer key question II. 
The analysis of key question I takes an integrative approach, considers manifold 
manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth, and seeks to identify crucial factors of 
their production in the Philippines. As for key question II not all of these factors can be 
examined. Therefore, three specific and selected policy fields are chosen as ‘subclasses’. The 
choice is based on findings from key question I. These subclasses, like the entire case study, 
provide an ideal channel for a focussed, precise, and well-contextualised investigation on 
explanatory factors for a multi-facetted phenomenon such as the production of disparities 
(compare Yin 2003; George & Bennet 2005). Clearly, the findings on Bohol are not 
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necessarily representative for the entire Philippines. Comparative assessments are supported 
and facilitated by field research findings in Cebu province and Metropolitan Manila, expert 
interviews, and an intensive literature review. It is attempted to provide tentative insights into 
certain socio-political dynamics, which may, to some extent, exist and operate similarly in 
other regions of the country (compare approach by George 1998; chapter 4.1). 
Emphasis is put on the present day situation reviewed against processes of change mainly 
since the mid 1980s – the date of both, the political birth of Philippine democracy and the 
strong upheaval of globalisation. If necessary for a comprehensive understanding I also draw 
back on earlier developments in Philippine history. Table 1.1 summarises and provides an 
overview of the organisational structure of this study.  
Table 1.1: Organisation of research study 
Key research questions Approach Objective Scale …in chapter 
I. What features, patterns 
and dynamics do disparities 
of poverty and wealth have 
in the Philippines? 
Structure 
 
'Earth-
writing' 
Identify 
disparities of  
poverty and wealth 
16 regions 
entire Philippines 
 
 
79 provinces 
 
 
Bohol province 
Municipalities 
Theory: 2 
 
Research:  
5, 6, 7 
II. How are these disparities 
of poverty and wealth 
(re)produced through 
governmental  
policy ? 
Agency 
 
'People-
writing' 
Explain & 
Understand 
the (effect)iveness 
of policy 
intervention upon 
them 
 
Puroks 
Barangay government 
Municipal government 
 
 
Provincial 
government Bohol 
 
 
National government 
Theory: 3 
 
Research:  
 8, 9 
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2.  Disparities of poverty and wealth: Theoretical faces 
2.1  From disparities to differentiation: Introducing analytical multi-
dimensions  
‘Disparities’ are an academic subject with multiple analytical perspectives. This chapter aims 
at presenting and arranging these perspectives into an operational framework. Firstly, from 
the ‘earth-writing’ perspective I perceive disparities as the momentary ‘snapshots’ of 
structural imbalances that can be depicted geographically. Disparities describe dispersedly 
distributional patterns, which may appear in isolated or associated forms with different and 
changing intensities. They produce patterns and trends, and can be projected on the earth 
surface (compare cartographic visualisation in chapters 5, 6, 7). Therefore, 
“It is possible to think of uneven development simply in terms of […] income levels, in 
unemployment, in cultural resources – between different regions or communities. […] 
And such measures of the geographical inequalities within and between countries are 
certainly important (Massey & Jess 1995: 224). 
Simultaneously and secondly, disparities are dynamics, which in fact combine description and 
analysis, structure and agency. I comprehend spatial (social) disparities as the central 
elements of the process of spatial (social) differentiation. Differentiation is, generally 
speaking, defined as becoming (mutually) distant, complex, and separate into independent 
entities (Nassehi 1997: 619). Spatial (social) differentiation, specifically, means the 
progressive division of space (society) into separate entities, which may occur and interact at 
global, national, regional, provincial, local, rural-urban, or else scales. Spatial (social) 
disparities, like space (society), are inherently dynamic and alterable. They remain in the 
process of ‘becoming’, being constantly re-produced, corresponding to social, contextual, and 
spatial contexts (Paasi 1996: 3, 7-15). Disparities are a product of ‘people-writing’, here 
human agency and interactions. I prioritise the explanation and understanding of disparities of 
poverty (in the Philippines) through policy agency – see chapters 1 and 3 for reasoning. Thus, 
disparities always evolve out of historical differentiation; they are ‘path- dependent’ (see 
Miggelbrink 2002: 62-65). This implies, thirdly, that disparities themselves often provide the 
sources for further differentiation and fragmentation (see chapters 3.1, 8). 
Fourthly, disparities are no ‘objective’ notion. The relative cognition of imbalances between 
spaces and/or people is a prerequisite for the awareness (and image) of – in the case at hand – 
a ‘poorer’ or ‘wealthier’ status (Romanowski 1998: 74; ESCAP 2001: 4-5; Schmidt 1998: 
58). Such comparisons are enabled above all through the ‘global’ media and migrants who 
distribute information about and imaginations of strange orbits. Through such representative 
‘windows’ into the world, Filipinos realise their own more deprived or more privileged living 
situation, and the developmental gap between them and others. The same processes work at 
international as well as sub-national scales (compare Appadurai 1996: 3; 1998: 21). Literally, 
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disparities present manifestations of socio-spatial consciousness (Paasi 1995: 43). Such socio-
spatial consciousness changes with the channel of social construction –as subsequent chapters 
elaborate – for example, differ between (a) illustrations of quantified data projected into 
figures and maps, (b) ‘subjectives’ created by local people, (c) public opinions as conveyed 
through civil society or political processes, and (d) various academic perspectives (compare 
Strubelt 1997: 7). However, socio-spatial consciousness is naturally shaped in socio-cultural 
and political-economic contexts, and, therefore, takes on heterogeneous and contentious 
forms. As such, for example, map illustrations of disparities always communicate the 
viewpoints, motives, and targets of those who have profiled them (see chapter 4; Deichmann 
1998: 103).  
In summary, disparities are simultaneously (a) material ‘earth-structural imbalances’, (b) the 
product of people’s (policy) agency, (c) the source of fragmentation, and (d) politically and 
socio- culturally covered, interpreted and imagined constructs (compare Bohle 2004: 22; 
Massey 2003: 32-36; Gebhardt, Reuber, Wolkersdorfer 2003: 21; Läpple 1991: 41-43). 
Hence, this study analyses and relates the manifestations of disparities in territorial as well as 
in social space. I emphasise the analytical perspectives (a) and (b), as shown in figure 2.1, and 
consider and incorporate (c) and (d) where relevant.  
Figure 2.1: Analytical multi-perspectives on disparities 
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2.2  Relational distribution of proximity and distance 
2.2.1  Spatial disparity and social inequality 
As mentioned in chapter 1.1, spatial disparities (of poverty and wealth) refer to the unequal 
geographic incidence of (poverty) indicators among provinces, regions, municipalities, the 
rural-urban or else scale. As noted, disparities also exist in form of ‘inequalities’ since any 
“distribution is also, of course, structural, for individuals are born into pre-existing positions 
in a social and economic hierarchy and the structures they will enter will significantly shape 
their future lives” (Phillips 1999: 17). Generally, in this study social inequalities are only 
considered when interacting to spatial disparities. They do not necessarily correspond, 
however often do so. For example, Ricketts (2002: 11) finds evidence that populations, which 
are underserved by public health services, are usually located at a greater physical distance 
from the (often urban) headquarters of service delivery. Intrinsically, there is “… a certain 
reciprocity between ‘the social’ and ‘the spatial’ – while we in a spatial discipline accepted 
that the spatial was always socially constructed so too, we argued, it had to be recognized 
that the social was necessarily also spatially constructed” (Massey, Allen, Sarre 1999: 6; 
compare Mehretu, Pigozzi, Sommers 2000: 96-98). 
Disparities of poverty and wealth create a parameter from the region1 or people/social group 
with the lowest indicator of poverty/wealth to the region or people/social group with the 
highest indicator. The remaining regions or people/groups are positioned in-between the two 
extremes (compare Romanowski 1998: 67). Clearly, the greater the distance between the two 
‘ends’ of the parameter is, the more heterogeneous the regions/ people with regard to poverty 
and wealth are, hence the deeper is the level of disparity and vice versa (Bathelt & Glückler 
2002: 48-50). The depth of distance is, as mentioned above, also relative to social cognition 
and construction. Hence, disparities refer essentially to the relative relationship of distance 
and proximity between the poor(er) and wealth(ier) spaces and people/social groups under 
investigation (compare Steinbach 2004: 27-29).  
Obviously, the issue of inequality is more likely to pose moral questions about ‘right’, 
‘wrong’ and ‘what is just’. The moral, philosophical, and ideological values and motives of 
those who advance them are rather difficult to disentangle. In other words: “The idea of 
equality is perhaps the defining feature of modern political thought […] Nevertheless, few 
political principles are as contentious as equality, or polarizes opinion so effectively” 
(Heywood 2004: 284). For reasons of the Philippine context as noted in chapter 1 this study is 
situated at the intersection points of ideologies, and discusses only selected moral motives 
within the framework of spatial disparities and of relevance for the Philippine case. 
                                               
1
 In the theoretical chapters I use the term ‘region’ more broadly as a synonym for any sub-national spatial unit 
between the local and the national. Only in the empirical chapters I, as noted in chapter 1, specify to examine 
spatial disparities between Philippine political and administrative provinces, regions, and municipalities.  
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2.2.2  Consequences: Boundaries in space and society  
As the relative distances between regions and people grow, fragmentation into ‘wealthier 
centres of power’ and ‘weak, poorer peripheries’, and into ‘socially marginalised’ and ‘social 
elite’ groups may occur2. In other words, the distances in space and society may evolve into 
more clear-cut – material and/or conceived – boundaries in space and society. These 
boundaries may correspond with (but can also cross) already existing natural-environmental, 
social, cultural, political, economic, or else boundaries (Paasi 1995: 49-52; see chapters 5, 6, 
and 7).  
For example, peripheral regions are said to suffer from ‘the poverty of remoteness’ (Rigg 
2003: 122-125). The boundary of peripheries is identified by poverty due to isolation from the 
main centres of economic activity and political decision-making, and due to remote and/or 
disadvantageous natural-environmental location including lack of infrastructure, water 
scarcity, steep slopes, or rough terrain (compare Parnwell and Rigg 1996; Sommers & 
Mehretu 1998). Mountainous areas are often characterised as peripheries for they face related 
problems such as difficult accessibility, extensive (agricultural) economies, out-migration, 
scarce resources, and rough natural conditions (compare the Philippine case in chapters 6, 7).  
Similarly, “generic marginality is a condition of a community […] that has been adversely 
affected by uneven development” (Sommers & Mehretu 1998: 1363). Specifically, marginal 
people lack integration and participation in the dominating (social, economic, political) 
structures and processes, generating a feeling – and a boundary – of non-belonging to the 
political, economic, and socio-cultural centres of decision-making (Schmidt 1998: 49,59; 
Tesitel, Kusova, Bartos 1999: 40; Leimgruber 1998: 27). Logically, the vulnerability to 
marginalisation is larger for those people that are already at the bottom end of the disparity 
range, in the case at hand, the very poor (Romanowski 1998; Böhnke 2001).  
At the upper ends of the social disparity range, some groups may dispose of 
disproportionately more resources, and eventually become outstanding social elites. This 
study deals with elites only as a consequence and mean of the production of social disparities; 
I do not discuss extensive elite theory in detail4. Important however, social elites often 
represent the political and socially powerful and governing elite, which resides in – and in fact 
contributes essentially to the status of – the centres of power (compare Sauer 2000: 63-64). 
This implies that any analysis of disparity production should consider the impact of elites. In 
this context Das (2000) and the World Bank (2003) highlight issues of elites’ inherent societal 
                                               
2
 Other scholars relate the concepts differently or not at all (see Böhnke 2001; Sommers & Mehretu 1998; Smith 
1999; Tunstall & Lupton 2003). 
3
 Note that the authors apply the term marginality to social groups as well as to space. In order to keep a 
consistent theoretical framework I use it only in its social reference. 
4
 See Bellamy (2004) for further reference.  
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responsibility to engage in the alleviation of disparities of poverty and wealth – which, 
however, often remains unmet.  
In case a region or a social group are entirely incapable of or denied access, membership 
and/or participation to political, economic, and socio-cultural systems, they are called 
‘excluded’5. ‘Exclusion’ draws a sharper boundary between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ than 
peripherality or marginality. However, I reject an extremely polarising understanding of 
exclusion. Those ‘excluded’ usually still belong (at least formally) to the society in one way 
or another because disparities – in their nature of being parameters of distances – are not just 
gaps but literally represent ‘gaps in connections’. In other words, “distance demands 
communication and interaction. Its very possibility depends on communication or interaction. 
It depends on joining things up within – and thereby making – a single space” (Law 2003: 6). 
Therefore I ascribe exclusion as a possible consequence of disparities in form of progressive 
accumulation of boundaries instead of a final ‘out-stage’. The above quote’s emphasis on 
‘interaction to make a single space’ again highlights the role of human action upon relations 
of distance and proximity, centre and periphery, marginalised and elites, and socio-spatial 
exclusion (see Massey & Jess 1995: 225).  
2.2.3  Re-organisation of space, scale, and society through globalisation  
Globalisation is claimed to be one major force behind contemporary socio-spatial 
development (Reuber & Wolkersdorfer 2001: 1). I introduce it briefly here and elaborate 
individual issues in subsequent chapters. Globalisation is generally defined as the worldwide 
increasing networking that takes place simultaneously at various levels and dimensions. Most 
importantly it jeopardises the traditional understanding (a) of space as the ‘container’ of 
territoriality and social actions, (b) of scale, and (c) implicitly of social (including policy) 
actions in space and scale. Thereby, globalisation sheds new light on the subject of disparities. 
Forwarded by progressing information and communication technology (ICT) since the 1980s, 
globalisation implies the detachment of socio-economic contexts from their traditional 
localised settings and reinforces interactions between economies, cultures, and societies. ‘The 
global’ influences formerly purely national, regional, and local issues, which, in turn, are 
redefined according to global contexts. Comparisons, interactions, and competition between 
scales increase (see chapter 3.3; Clausen 2001; Beck 2000; Robertson 1998). 
Thus, globalisation means compression of space, time, scales, and people – the so-called 
process of deterritorialisation. The very distant becomes proximate and the very proximate 
                                               
5
 The present study does not intend to give an overview on the extensive topic of exclusion but to introduce the 
concept as related to disparities. The major schools elaborating the concept of exclusion are (a) sociological 
poverty and inequality research, (b) system theory, and (c) policy-related analyses. Not even within these schools 
definitions are clearly set; see Göbel & Schmidt (1998), Stichweh (1997), Böhnke (2001), Kronauer (1998); 
Askonas & Stewart (2000); CASE (2002). 
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becomes distant. As a result, differences and distances between people and regions seem to 
blur and homogeneity seems to spread. Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time spatial and 
social differentiation, fragmentation and exclusion take place more rapidly, condensed, and 
alterably. An all-embracing insecurity evolves which in turn causes space and societies to 
further differentiate. In other words, differences and distances between people and regions, 
here disparities, increase (again) (see Appadurai 1996; Giegel 1998; see chapter 3.3 for 
impacts of globalisation on policy-making settings).  
More precisely, globalisation tends to operate spatially selective in favour of large 
agglomerations (like Metropolitan Manila in the Philippines) and, thereby, reshapes and 
reinforces centre-periphery relations. Cities become the major locations of competition 
between the global, the national, and the local as they represent the junctions and political 
controlling centres of globalisation streams and offer the required infrastructure and global 
connections (Sassen 2002: 15-17). In contrast, rural regions are often neglected by 
globalisation, and their peripheral status and exclusion are deteriorated or introduced (Scholz 
2004: 216-253). 
In analysis one always has to consider that 'the' globalisation process is commonly applied to 
almost every contested contemporary issue and is sometimes (arguably) merged with other, 
overlapping debates. It however also ought to be noted that globalisation is only one, yet 
surely an important historical period to shape disparate developments (compare Clausen 
2001). Disparities represent the condensed layering of past, present and future configurations 
of multi-facetted and multi-contextual spatial and social relations.  
Globalisation also has an explicit consequence for research, including this study: The forces 
of globalisation operate similarly (if with different outcomes depending on different pre-
conditions) in industrialised and developing countries like the Philippines. Therefore, 
academic approaches to its impact on (disparate) development overcome the gap, which has 
long existed between those theories focussing industrialised and those exclusively referring to 
less advanced countries. In other words, academic concepts on relations between globalisation 
and disparities turn ‘global’. 
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2.3  Indicators for disparities of poverty and wealth  
2.3.1  The disparity – poverty nexus   
Poverty and disparities are not identical concepts. Public and academic circles sometimes tend 
to reduce disparities to the ‘poor’ and/or the ‘rich’ regions and/or people (compare Weller & 
Hersh 2002). However, disparities point to differences in the quality of life between different 
regions (people) and, as mentioned, create a parameter between those regions (people) that are 
worst and best off. Poor (or wealthy) regions or people, in contrast, literally represent distinct 
positions on, but never the whole parameter of disparity. 
Similar to disparities, the concepts of poverty and wealth have become more complex 
alongside globalisation. They are now more mobile positions in flux, and the chances for 
regions and people to ‘move up’ the ‘quality ladder of life’ are equally high as the risk to ‘fall 
down’. Regions and people must engage in a continuous struggle against poverty and are 
compelled to constantly consider its numerous dimensions, risks, and their interrelations 
(compare discourse on vulnerability and poverty; Alwang, Sigel, Jorgensen 2002). Such 
situation also complicates the analytical identification of (disparities of) poverty in this study.  
Accurate, relevant, and reliable indicators for poverty faces of disparities (in the Philippines) 
are essential information for appropriately responsive and targeted policy-making; the 
methodology of data generation considerably affects resulting quality of data (and possibly 
policy) (Tunstall & Lupton 2003: 25-26, 32; EU-Directorate General for Research 1998: 9-11; 
NEDA 2001: 240). There are more practically used indicators to identify the poor than there 
are to explore the gaps between the poor and the wealthy. Often, disparities are detected by 
comparing poverty indicators between different regions or population groups (compare Green 
1994).  
As a direct indicator of poverty, absolute poverty is defined as non-fulfilment of basic bodily 
needs or subsistence in terms of nutrition (inadequate minimum daily calorie intake and the 
per capita income to spend on it), clothing, or housing. Analyses from an absolute poverty 
perspective focus on poverty incidence. In contrast the concept of “relative poverty means 
that people lack the resources to live a life that their society considers adequate” (ESCAP 
2001: 4). For it incorporates a comparative aspect, the concept of relative poverty stands 
closer to the analysis of disparities. Relative poverty lines are typically set at a certain cut-off 
point of income/consumption/nutrition intake, derived from comparing lower and upper 
segments of society. Consequently, lines of relative poverty (and thus the disparate patterns 
they form) reflect local conditions and living standards of the people/region under 
investigation. They differ from region to region, community to community, and from time to 
time – and pose a difficult definition task to their technical developers (Mia 2001: 5-7; 
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Gwatkin 2000: 6-8; Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: 23-24). Investigations on relative poverty are 
more likely to stress the depth of poverty besides its incidence.  
Developmental problems and prospects  
The debates on disparities and poverty both follow the more general discourse on the theory 
and practice of development – which, in turn, “is one of the most complex words” (Johnston 
et al. 2000: 166; see Thiel 2001) and discussed controversially. Disparities are the markers of 
development which do not benefit all areas and people equally, whereas poverty is claimed to 
result from underdevelopment that is the inadequate capability of societies to provide their 
population with the basic requirements of goods and services. However, ‘equal development’ 
is difficult to define in a meaningful way because geographical location, morphology, natural 
and environmental conditions6, city system, and to some extent, ethno-linguistics always lay a 
base for social and spatial imbalances. They can be altered by human agency only in the long 
run (Finke 1997: 30-31; ESCAP 2001: 8-11; Bigman & Fofack 2000: 1-3; Schmidt 1998: 47).  
Generally, ‘the poor’ are assumed to pose greater developmental problems than ‘the wealthy’. 
This study intends to provide theoretical and empirical insights into (obstacles to effective 
policy for) developmental problems and prospects in the Philippines. Accordingly, I highlight 
the issue of poverty over wealth – with the mentioned exception of wealthy elites’ 
responsibility for engagement in the alleviation of disparities and poverty.  
2.3.2  Identification paths of the poor 
Indirect indicators define the poor and thus disparities between the poor and wealthy through 
(a) the fundamental differentiation as elaborated in chapter 2.3.1 and, primarily, through (b) 
various dimensions of human agency. One major discourse among scholars (and policy-
makers) exists on whether to approach disparities of poverty and wealth one-dimensionally as 
a mainly economic phenomenon and process, or by integrating economic, social, cultural, 
connective, political and else perspectives (Maier & Tödtling 2002: 19-24; Thiel 2001: 30-32; 
Schmidt 1998: 53-59). Conventional approaches since the 1960s have preferred a one-
dimensional economic perspective. Integrative indicators have strongly entered the poverty 
discourse since the late 1980s. They may involve so-called ‘objective’, quantitatively 
measurable variables – a popular example being the Human Development Index (HDI) 
composed of life expectancy at birth, educational attainment, and adjusted measure of real 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita – as well as self-assessed, ‘subjective’ indicators by 
the people concerned. For example, poverty may be defined qualitatively by indicators of 
vulnerability, powerlessness, stability, regularity of employment, dependency, food deficit, 
                                               
6
  I do not argue geo-deterministically here but simply presume that certain topographical and environmental 
features pre-condition certain economic and social characteristics of the region and its inhabitants’ livelihood. 
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housing situation, or household relations (Rigg 2003; Civit, de Manchon, de Villanueva 
1999).  
For the study at hand I assume that “poverty has been the major problem confronting the 
Philippines for decades. Thus, various administrations have declared the fight against 
poverty as the centrepiece of their development agenda” (DILG et al 2002: 1) – however so 
far have not found effective and sustainable policy responses, because, generally, “poverty 
has a thousand faces and generates a thousand policy responses, all of them least than 
perfect” (Cunha 1999: 38). Therefore, I call for an integrative and explorative approach in 
order to grasp and understand the multi-dimensional manifestations of disparities of poverty 
and wealth in the Philippines – and later identify the obstacles to effective policy 
interventions for the most crucial factors (see chapter 8; Umehara & Bautista 2004: 5).  
Through the lens of current globalisation economic aspects of disparities of poverty are not to 
be neglected. They can be, among others, assumed to offer an interesting insight into the 
interactions between liberalised market forces and political control (see chapters 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2). In addition, the combined deductive-inductive research in the Philippines (chapters 6 
and 7 mainly) suggests the present study to understand disparities of poverty and wealth (in 
the Philippine setting) to be inherently economic, yet not exclusively: Every economic 
process has a social notion and roots in a political and cultural context. This is in fact 
especially true in times of globalisation when the economic, social, and political spheres 
increasingly blend and interact. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the relevant indictors and 
analytical themes, which are chosen by the deductive-inductive research design as elaborated 
in chapter 4.  
Table 2.1: Indicators for the identification of disparities of poverty and wealth 
   Direct measurement:      Absolute and relative poverty 
   Indirect measurement:   Integrative approach  
Economic Social Connective 
Income vs labour 
Competitive sectors 
Education & Health 
Population & Migration 
Infrastructure 
Technology  
Spatial relations      Rural-urban interactions        City system   G
lo
ba
lis
at
io
n 
Ethno-linguistics & Socio-culture 
P
olicy-m
aking
*
 
   Morphology & Resources & Environment 
  *dealt with in chapter 3                                                                                                                                     Clausen 2005 
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Income, labour, and economic sectors in times of globalisation 
Income and labour are ‘the’ classic factors of production and typically applied to discern 
disparate developments of poverty and wealth, and to target alleviation policy. For instance, 
the income-based Gini-coefficient is a popular statistical indicator on disparities (for income-
focussed analysis see Kakwani, Prakash, Son 2000; Weller & Hersh 2002; Person & Tabellini 
1994; Sala-i-Martin 2002; Li & Zou 1998; Chakrabarty 2002; for labour focus see Elmhirts & 
Saptari 2004; Smith 1999; Böhnke 2001; Bhalla & Lapeyre 1997).  
Both, income and labour have been highlighted by economic globalisation, which comprises 
increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) and world trade, the global integration of capital 
markets, and an expanding international division of labour. Economic globalisation pushes 
neo-liberal capital-based development, which is, on the one hand, claimed to work as a 
catalyst for poorer people and regions to catch up with and balance development. Specifically, 
production sites are relocated to cheaper, less developed sites, export-oriented markets are 
enlarged, employment is created, and technologies transferred (Bürklin 2000: 31-35, 38; 
Gundlach & Nunnenkamp 1996: 36-38; also Dollar & Kraay 2002; Nunnenkamp 1998). On 
the other hand, constraint-free neo-liberal market principles reduce political intervention and 
thus social protection, and turn labour markets, income relations, and economic sectors ever 
more competitive and volatile. Employment becomes uncertain and temporal; the 
responsibilities for socio-economic security, socio-spatial development, and balance are 
shifted to the individual (Dore 2003; Ashley, Boyd, Goodwin 2000). 
Parallel, economic sectors transform through globalisation. Specifically, the future of 
agriculture – the traditional economic base of most developing countries like the Philippines – 
is uncertain because globalisation tends to operate sectorally selective to the advantage of 
services and industries, and to the detriment of agriculture (Clausen 2002; forthcoming B). In 
turn, particularly tourism as the ‘largest global industry’ receives more attention. 
Globalisation enables many developing countries including the Philippines to emerge as 
popular newcomer destinations. Consequent economic impacts of tourism can include (a) 
wages earned from formal employment, (b) earnings from (informally) selling goods, 
services, and casual labour (c) profits arising from locally-owned (often small and medium-
sized) businesses (SMEs), and (d) collective income through land rental pay or dividends 
from a private sector partnership etc. (Ashley, Boyd, Goodwin 2000). Moreover, it is hoped 
that “although tourism is closely linked to the travel and hospitality trade, it is more than 
merely a major economic activity. It is a powerful environmental, social, cultural, and 
institutional force” (Poh Poh 2003: 409), which can potentially become a development 
catalyst specifically for the peripheral and marginalised (Scheyvens 2002).  
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Human resource development and education 
Human resource development has long been a prime theme in (disparate) development.  
Especially education is valued to generate positive impacts on economic production, levels of 
fertility, health status, and attitudes towards political participation (UN 2003; Case 2001). 
Education provides income and employment opportunities for the peripheral and 
marginalised. Basically, education is a means to knowledge which, in turn, entails innovation, 
qualification, and the efficient distribution of information – as such the starting point of any 
socio-economic development.  
Health-related human resources   
Health is another ‘traditional’ human resource, which, like education is affected by human 
agency, however also depends on individual bodily conditions. Usually, disparities of health 
are either looked at in terms of health status (mortality, diseases etc.), health outcome, or 
service delivery. Generally, research has shown that “increasing inequalities in health […] 
are associated with widening social and material disparities between the wealthiest and the 
poorest areas (Hayes 1999: 290). Hence, the greater the depth of disparities of poverty is, the 
greater the health inequalities, and vice versa (compare Gwatkin 2000: 6-10; Gatrell 1997: 
142-151).  
Population and urbanisation 
High population growth exacerbates already existing socio-economic problems. Although 
population growth is an ‘old hat’ of the international discourse, it remains relevant in many 
developing countries like the Philippines (Jones 2005: 8). Often fertility is highest among the 
poorest people and in the peripheries – leading to large-scale out-migration of the 
economically active population towards ‘globalising’ centres. Large-scale urbanisation 
processes are the result, as well as growing gaps between ‘megacities’ with more than 5 
million inhabitants like Metropolitan Manila on the one hand and peripheries with elderly and 
youngsters on the other hand. In many cases, the megacities struggle with an accumulation of 
so far unknown dimensions of quantitative extension and high concentration of population, 
infrastructure, economic power, financial capital, and decisions, whereas those in the 
peripheries face – if out-migration and urbanisation pertain – cumulative exclusionary 
processes (see Coy & Kraas 2003; Rigg 2003; Clausen forthcoming A). 
A note on culture and ethno-linguistics  
The ‘cultural turn’ in the Social Sciences has put new emphasis on the cultural and ethno-
linguistic manifestations of inequality of poverty and wealth since the 1990s (Gebhardt, 
Reuber, Wolkersdorfer 2003; Bohle 2004). For example, Mehretu, Pigozzi and Sommers 
(2000: 92) argue that in developing countries ethno-cultural factors to marginality (and 
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peripherality) operate through (a) the polarisation of colonial and indigenous populations, and 
(b) internal tribal cleavages based on claims for self-determination. I also generally 
acknowledge, “where ethnic identities coincide with economic/social ones, social instability 
of one sort of another is likely – ethnicity does become a mobilising agent, and as this 
happens the ethnic divisions are enhances” (Stewart 2002: 33). However, some debates on 
ethno-cultural inflictions of conflicts miss out that the actual conflict base is often socio-
economic in nature (Ehlers 1997). 
In contrast to this conflict-focused view, Capella-Miternique & Font-Garolera (1999: 89-90 
92-97) show that cultural links can help to correct spatial and social imbalances: A culturally-
linked population shares a common identity, similar interests, and thus bears greater 
development potentials (compare chapter 3.1). Cultural-ethno-linguistic links are also 
involved when migrants send back remittances to their families and places of origin (Clausen 
2001), and when communities do not turn uniformly ‘global’ through globalisation but 
instead widen their reference points and become ‘glocal’ without losing their local uniqueness 
(Robertson 1998).  
Above and beyond certain, culture and ethno-linguistics always essentially affect the 
cognitive dimensions of disparities: Disparities essentially “refer to the extent to which 
culturally valued material and social rewards are allocated disproportionately” (Peoples & 
Bailey 1994: 301). Such perspective highlights once again the necessity to embed this study’s 
investigation in the context of Filipino’s socio-culture. 
Access, infrastructure, connectivity, and ‘the distance to care’ 
One indicator which can positively affect all others is ‘access’ such as access to public goods, 
infrastructure and services like education, health, roads, electricity, and water facilities, access 
to labour, capital, credit, and technology markets or else (compare Bhalla & Lapeye 1997: 
424-428). The ICT- ‘revolution’ has been claimed to particularly improve access(ibility) by 
potentially offering worldwide inexhaustibly available, easily and quickly accessible 
information and knowledge pools (compare Weel 1999). However, as technology enables 
development, it simultaneously bears risks for disparate development. Nath (2000) puts it 
strongly: “The info-technological revolution […] is restructuring the global social economic 
equations – shifting from income divide to knowledge divide”. This knowledge divide is 
related firstly, to people’s educational status, and secondly, to exclusionary processes of ‘gaps 
in connectivity’ or, as they are commonly called, digital divides. 
In many developing countries like the Philippines, the access from and to the very remote and 
naturally disadvantaged regions still remains a question of adequate infrastructure and 
transport by roads and bridges, electricity, and else. Bigman & Fofack (2000: 3) point to “the 
critical role that distance – to and from the sources of raw materials, main transport routes, 
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seaports, and large population centers – plays in determining the division of production 
between industrial and primary-producing regions” (see also Scholz 2004; ESCAP 2001). 
No matter which perspective is taken, issues of access always also relate to questions of legal 
and socio-cultural entitlements7. In other words, access opens up material, imagined, and 
socially constructed modes for ’re-connecting’ the peripheral and marginalised with the 
centres; it is a key for determining exclusionary processes (Böhnke 2001: 1). Logically, such 
‘access(ibility)’ can be enhanced for the marginalised and peripheral also by increasing the 
‘outreach’ from those in elite and central positions. For example, Ali & Pernia (2003) note 
that the effects of road construction on poverty alleviation are improved if complemented by 
governmental ‘outreach’ in terms of social service provision. Hence, access is also a matter of 
the “distance to care” (Ricketts 2002: 10), here specifically the distance between 
governmental services and the peripheral and marginalised. The subsequent chapter centres 
on this distance to case and related socio-political indicators.  
To conclude, figure 2.2 schematically summarises how this study approaches and 
operationalises the identification of the manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in 
the Philippines. 
 
Figure 2.2: Identification paths to disparities of poverty and wealth 
 
 
                                               
7
 These notions are connected with the development discourse on ‘ownership’ and Sen’s capability approach 
which are not to be elaborated in detail in this study. For further reference see Thiel (2001); D + C (2005); Sen 
(1992); Stewart & Deneulin (2002).  
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3.  Policy intervention and disparity production  
3.1  Disparities, politics, policy: Interrelations  
3.1.1  Why do disparities matter politically?  
Disparities and exclusionary processes between regions and people harm social and national 
cohesion. Social cohesion defines “the strength of social relations, shared values and 
communities of interpretation, feelings of a common identity and a sense of belonging to the 
same community, trust among societal members as well as the extent of inequality and 
disparities” (Berger-Schmitt 2000: 3). From a political perspective, such cohesion is 
fundamental to the ‘imagined communities of nationality’ (compare Anderson 2003). 
Disparities challenge such feelings of inclusion in a national community or a state. In 
developing countries formerly colonised countries like the Philippines, it has since 
independence typically been the task of the state government(s) to engage and achieve such 
building of a cohesive and inclusive nation and create homogeneity out of heterogeneity (see 
Horvatich 2003). Not only bears the successful accomplishment of this task important 
development impetus (see chapter 2.3.2), it is also seen as a crucial element to guaranteeing 
global competitiveness of a country and its people. 
Growing disapproval with their marginal, peripheral and/or excluded situations may lead 
people to search for responsible actors to blame. The state government – as the classic agent 
of the vulnerable – is usually the first to be addressed. If the government does not manage (or 
care) to alter the situation, the people may support opposition movements for ‘redistributive 
and recognitive justice’ (Fraser 1998) and, possibly, inflict armed conflicts and/or civil wars 
(compare conflicts in Northern Ireland, Indonesia or Mexico; see Kraas 2004: 46-49). 
Alternatively, if the politically dominant belong to an ethnic or social group that is at the same 
the economically deprived, political instability may arise when government encroaches upon 
economically privileged (group) as it happened in the Rwanda and Uganda cases (Stewart 
2002: 33-37). As a matter of fact the unequal distribution of socio-economic and political 
resources and of opportunities and rights represents the root causes for armed conflicts in 
developing countries (see chapters 5.2, 6.3, and 8; Lund & Mehler 1999: 47). 
It is partially for those reasons that disparities usually carry a negative connotation, are a 
widely discussed matter of political discourse, and are usually targeted by policy aiming at 
their reduction or redistribution. Governments and administration in disparity-torn countries 
fear for their legitimacy and autonomy. Then, policy towards the deprived people and regions 
becomes vital not only in terms of reducing disparities of poverty and alleviating conflict, but 
also for the survival of the political actors, usually the government itself (Scott 1998: 13; Rigg 
2003: 87).  
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3.1.2  Conceptualising disparities as a product of policy-making 
This chapter elaborates an analytical framework for disparities as products of policy; single 
aspects are specified in subsequent chapters. In brief, policy is able to transform distances in 
space and society (Bebbington 2004: 725-726, 732). Finding the adequate policy on 
disparities has become increasingly difficult in the face of their growing complexity. None the 
less, the political is the only sphere of human agency that operates to find collectively binding 
decisions for other spheres. Thus, policy-making is ascribed an outstanding regulation and 
steering potential (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1988). Prevailing or deteriorating 
disparities of poverty may, in turn, indicate a policy failure or mislead. Hutchcroft asserts for 
the context of this study: “A major source of obstacles to sustained development in the 
Philippines lies in the political sphere” (1998: 3). Going one step further, this study 
particularly examines the reasons for policy failure and misleads, here typical impediments 
and constraints for effective policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth in the 
Philippines (see chapter 1 and 8). 
Policy process 
Policy is here broadly defined as  
¾ A label for a field of activity (e.g. a broad statement about a social or economic policy); 
¾ An expression of general purpose or desired state of affairs (e.g. to combat poverty and 
inequality, to guarantee primary education); 
¾ Specific proposals (e.g. to halve the poverty incidence by 2015 by 50%);  
¾ Resolutions of government (officially announced decisions); 
¾ Formal authorisation (e.g. acts of parliament or statutory instruments); and 
¾ A programme or project (e.g. defined, specific spheres of policy activity such as poverty 
reduction strategy or land reform programme) (compare Turner & Hulme 1997: 57-60). 
Policies and policy-making are dynamic and involve a decision-making process ranging from 
problem identification, agenda setting, implementation, to evaluation – see figure 3.1. It is 
important that “policy is less a set of rational choices than a complex, unpredictable and 
above all political process” (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 8). Policy action is purposive and 
subjective, including cognitive viewpoints of their makers. The process of knowledge 
generation, communication during, and the means of decision-making and execution reflect to 
some extent what policy-makers want to know, their motives and objectives, use of 
information, and degrees of commitment and reflection – which then concomitantly affects 
the outcome of policy (on disparities of poverty) (Koob 1999: 151-153; Gauld 2000: 231-
232).  
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Figure 3.1: Idealised stages of the policy process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classic policy-maker: National state government and administration 
Policy-makers determine outreach, process and, thus, effect(iveness) of policy on disparities 
of poverty. The classic principal actor involved in policy-making for a more balanced 
development is the national state government. Its responsibility for the distribution of 
resources, the rule of law, and the provision of social protection and services is often 
normatively justified by failures in ‘equality’ of the market economy and social justice 
arguments (chapter 3.2.1; Conway & Norton 2002; World Bank 2003; Solimano 2000). The 
state stands for the common good, the inclusive political association that acts upon the needs 
of its citizen within its defined territorial borders. One could say that it is the classic arena 
while the national government is the traditional mode through which authority of the state is 
brought into operation: To govern means to rule or control with authority.  
The administrative machinery of the state, here the officials who carry out governmental 
business, is referred to as bureaucracy. Its functioning is essential for effective governmental 
service delivery, as these are the people effectively implementing policy and thus, 
determining its ultimate impact (World Bank 2003: 17; Bird & Rodriguez 1999; compare 
chapter 3.2.3).  
Classic governmental policy-making operates in form of top-down, (national) state-centred 
decision-making channelled via authoritative exchanges through the bureaucracy to the 
people. Citizens are regarded as the recipients of governmental service, as ‘policy users’ 
(Cornwell & Gaventa 2001; Kjaer 2004). Chapter 3.3 contrasts this model with decentralised 
local government and multi-stakeholder alternatives. 
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Policy effect(iveness): Boundary inscription and outreach  
One central assumption of this study is that the performance of policy on disparities of 
poverty and wealth depends on their – and their makers’ – uneven presence across space, 
society, time, and context. The subsequent quote on non-governmental organisations equally 
accounts for governmental policy-making: 
”The flows of knowledge, resources, ideas, values and power that sustain and are 
channelled by NGOs ‘touch ground’ unevenly. To understand the nature of this 
unevenness and how it is generated is critical to understanding NGO as a phenomenon, 
but also – perhaps more important – to understanding their place in the reproduction 
and change of patterns of uneven development” (Bebbington 2004: 732; see also 
Sommers & Mehretu 1998: 135). 
Central to this thought is that policy-makers and the content of their policy literally “inscribe 
the territory over which they operate” – and thereby shape disparities. “The inscription is 
twofold, relating not just to describing the boundaries of the space over which they claim 
competence, but also to describing the economic, social, political and cultural nature of that 
space” (Edwards et al 2001: 293; see Allen 2003). In other words, policy inscriptions define 
the geographic and social ‘boundaries’ of disparity parameters, as well as their multi-facetted 
poverty/wealth- dimensions. It has been observed, for instance, that “many of those [policy 
stakeholders] involved in development themselves come to be part of the problem of 
inequality, rather than contributors to its solutions” (Kelly & Armstrong 1996: 246; note by 
A.C.). Another example, an elementary ‘boundary’ is set already by the political system 
differentiating itself into political/administrative units: These subsequently provide specific 
conditions (in the sense of a ‘domain’) for stakeholders’ socio-spatial agency and 
consciousness (Gren & Zierhofer 2003: 627). Sectoral policy-making – purposely or 
unintentionally – may inscribe different boundaries when they target a certain peripheral 
region or marginalised group. For example, in many countries the geographic boundaries of 
health service areas do not correspond with political/administrative units (Rogers 2000: 79).  
Hence, the outreach of policy to the peripheral, marginalised and most problematic poverty 
issues determines where and how spatial and social boundaries are inscribed, which regions, 
people, and issues are included in policy-making, and thus where and how chances exist to 
reduce disparities of poverty, in short the effect(iveness) of policy. Literally, outreach means 
to include spaces, people, and issues in socio-political interaction and communication 
processes (see Nassehi 1997: 620). Policy outreach can re-connect lagging regions and people 
to the social, economic and political centres and enable them to advance their quality of life 
(Bebbington 2004). More precisely, spatial policy outreach to the peripheries is a means of 
territorial development administration (Smith 2000) and about the “spatial sphere of 
influence of a project” (Bigman & Fofack 2000: xiv), while social outreach to the 
marginalised means that the “maximum program benefit should be directed to the population 
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group with the highest poverty” (Balisacan 1997: 18; compare Das 2000). Accordingly, 
specific programmes should tackle the very relevant issues to disparities of poverty. 
It follows, firstly, the more effective policy outreach is the less relational distances and 
boundaries exist between regions and people. And secondly, the more congruent the outreach 
of different policies, either the less disparities exist or the deeper/exclusionary is the single 
one boundary constructed by all policies together. Policy (outreach) effect(iveness) is 
expressed by (a) its completeness (i.e. what proportion of the targeted peripheral and/or 
marginalised are reached), and by (b) its efficiency (i.e. what proportion of the totally reached 
are marginalised and/or peripheral) (Tunstall & Lupton 2003: 1-2; Thys 2000: 7). Essential 
for pursuing policy with high levels of completeness and efficiency is (c) the policy cycle. 
This implies policy-makers’ initial objectives, contingent administrative execution, and 
learning from experiences, all set in order to be ‘subjective’ towards reaching the envisaged 
objectives: “Policy discourses, and the categorization, problem definitions and administrative 
procedures which develop within and from these discourses, promote and justify particular 
concerns, strategies and solutions at the expense of others” (Gauld 2000: 231). 
In addition, policy can only effectively reach out when it (d) considers the outreach 
capabilities of their makers. Policy-makers possess an individual capacity and capability to 
‘touch down’ and inscribe (balanced) development. As “policy is about decisions“, having 
the capacities for these “decisions are about power” (Turner & Hulme 1997: 58). This study 
does not intend to give an extensive overview on power theories8 but assumes, broadly 
speaking, that policy-makers’ power depends on their financial, knowledge, networking, and 
representative resources (see chapter 3.2.3). These capacities and capabilities enable them to 
remove or constitute disparities of poverty: “Power in its various guises takes effect through 
distinctive relations of proximity and reach” (Allen 2003: 2; compare also Gauld 2000). 
Policy should (e) ideally take into account the context and actors of disparate development 
and of political decision-making in the setting at focus. As Bebbington’s above citation 
indicates, non-governmental policy-makers enter the policy arena. They – as well as 
liberalised markets – pose challenges or potential partnerships to governmental policy 
(outreach). This study examines whether and how such changing state-society power relations 
in policy-making, here multi-stakeholder policy environments affect disparities of poverty in 
the Philippines (see Massey, Allen, Sarre 1999: 169-170). The focus is on meso-level policy 
settings and interactions in the Philippines as well as on micro-level concrete policy 
programmes and projects on the case of Bohol. However, these issues are understood to be 
embedded in the macro-level backgrounds of the character of the (Philippine) state and its 
societal peculiarities (compare Das 2000; Moore & Putzel 1999; Hauck 2004).  
                                               
8
 For further reference see Haugaard (2002); Allen (2003); Stewart (2001), Heywood (2004).  
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Intensified state-society interactions can facilitate (f) the acceptance of policy, if the people, 
media, academia, and others are addressed and, ideally, actively ‘empowered’ to participate in 
decision-making. In other words, “the development of the political capabilities of the poor 
should be an important objective of anti-poverty policy” (Moore & Putzel 1999: 7), because 
broad-based societal acceptance of and inclusion in policy-making are essential factors for 
success (compare chapter 3.3; Rauch 2003: 39). Notions of ‘formal equality’, that is 
declaration of equal political status to cultural, ethnic or else minority groups through state 
government institutions enhance the minorities’ acceptance of policy, and thus strengthen 
policy outreach (compare chapter 5.2). Such a ‘justice of recognition’ (Fraser 1998) 
guarantees the right of all population groups to be included in policy-making (Cornwall & 
Gaventa 2001: 6). If not integrated, the neglected regions, people, and issues become further 
disconnected, non-accessible and distant to the (actions by the) (state) centre of decision-
making. Allen (2003: 1) describes these situations: “Then there are those unsettling moments 
when you find yourself on the receiving end of a blunt decision or insensitive instruction taken 
by some far-off government agency”. Such experiences may fuel further fragmentation and 
opposition movements, as the case study of Bohol in chapter 8 demonstrates.  
The elaborated analytical framework for disparities as products of policy is schematically 
overviewed in figure 3.2. As noted, this study uses this framework to essentially discern 
typical impediments to effective policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth in the 
Philippines. Individual aspects of the framework are elaborated in more detail subsequently.  
Figure 3.2: Analytical framework on the (re)production of disparities through policy-making9 
                                               
9
 Note that statement (a)-(f) in text and figure differ.  
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3.2  Policy outreach to disparities: On policy effect(iveness)  
3.2.1  Distinguishing motives, ‘talking equality’ 
‘Grand’ organisational motives to engage in uneven development implicitly point to issues of 
responsiveness and responsibility, and comment on intrinsic political economic relations 
between state government and market forces. In brief, motives may shift from (a) the 
interventionist ‘equality of outcome’ to (b) the (neo)liberal market-oriented ‘equality of 
opportunity’, and (c) a middle path of what I term the ‘equality of outreach’.  
‘Equality of outcome’ implies that disparities never disappear as the market allocates 
resources unequally. Government must control the market to distribute its benefit across 
regions and people. Yet, even if they obtain an (unlikely) equal socio-economic status, 
experience shows that there might be little to re-distribute when economic growth comes to a 
halt.  
The (neoliberal) notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ has arisen with globalisation. The state 
withdraws from the economy but attempts to open up equal opportunities to people and 
regions particularly through social policy10 (Philipps 1999; Bhalla & Lapeyre 1997). With 
regard to reducing disparities of poverty, “what matters are life chances, not equality here 
and now […] and its consequent view of social indicators as measuring the means available 
to people to construct good lives” (Esping-Andersen 2000: 16). Relevant policies focus on 
balancing opportunities for the poor and non-poor to earn a decent living through, for 
example, investing in their human resources or access to markets. People are perceived as 
policy ‘choosers’ from or ‘competitors’ for services (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001). Yet, while 
the rules in this ‘equality of opportunity’-game may be equal for the poor and non-poor, the 
starting-points from which they enter the game and the circumstances in which they operate 
are never equal. Competition between people and regions for benefits and the gaps between 
the ‘winner’ and the ‘losers’ are likely to grow. And it becomes an issue of “at what point 
poverty and disparities become morally unacceptable and what balance to strike between 
freedom and equality” (ESCAP 2001: 12; compare also chapter 3.2.2). 
One lesson learned from the above discourse is that “development is about providing 
conditions which facilitate people’s ability to lead flourishing lives” (Stewart & Deneulin 
2002: 62). Yet, in the face of the complexities and fluidities of globalising lives, these 
conditions are not satisfied by free market competition alone but require political mediation of 
state, societal and market preferences. Classically, government is asked to find (policy) 
answers and ways of “how [Filipino] citizens can deal with difference and still live in an 
organised civil society” (Mohan 2002: 68; note by A.C.). In this context I introduce the 
                                               
10
 Note that ‘social’ in this study refers to (a) social outreach to the marginalised people, as well as (b) social 
policy in terms of policy targeting social dimensions of disparities of poverty and wealth, e.g. human resources. 
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‘equality of outreach’-approach. So far, the concept of outreach has been particularly popular 
with scholars working on social policy and micro credits. Being an essentially geographic 
concept, however, it can be appropriately and suitably transferred and applied in the wider 
context of this study’s focus on (spatial, social, and sectoral) disparities of poverty and 
wealth. Further, it is understood to comprise both, social and economic policy aspects. 
Consequently, the ‘equality of outreach’-approach prioritises remedial policy action by those 
who govern, particularly issues of service delivery, socio-economic protection and the 
relationships between service provider and clients (compare Conway & Norton 2002; Smith 
2000; World Bank 2003; Das 2000; Bird & Rodriguez 1999).  
3.2.2  ‘Pros and cons’ of targeting policy  
In the context of this study, policy outreach inherently implies geographic targeting of spaces, 
social targeting of the marginalised and sectoral targeting of the most problematic issues. In 
other words, targeting means the identification and tackling of certain areas, people, and 
sectors specifically affected by and/or the various dimensions of disparities of poverty and 
wealth. One of the major benefits of targeting policy in a developing context is cost-
effectiveness. Moreover, specifically “area-based targeting can be an effective way of 
reaching poor individuals, offering high levels of ‘completeness’ and ‘efficiency’“ (Tunstall 
& Lupton 2003: 4; compare chapter 3.1.2).  
Yet, there are certain obstacles to effective policy targeting. Firstly, as chapter 2 exemplifies, 
the adequate identification of area clusters or pockets of the poor and peripheral and of factors 
crucial to disparity production is complex and complicated. Similarly, when spaces and 
places, social groups, and sectoral matters have been defined to be targeted, their definition 
must be of some continuity over time – a complicated task especially in times of globalisation 
(Stewart 2002: 6). And logically, policy outreach to the most problematic developmental 
issues equally depends on the applied definition of (disparities of) poverty, specifically (a) 
whether absolute or relative poverty, and (b) ends or means of poverty are tackled, (c) which 
quantitative and qualitative indicators are chosen to label the poor and the wealthy, (d) which 
factors are assumed to be most influential, and (e) moral and ideological underpinnings. 
Moreover, when applied, targeting measures have to (f) be sustainable and contingent in both, 
their operation and outcome.  
Secondly, (policy on) the peripheral areas should be linked with those on the marginalised 
population in a most complete and efficient way. Yet, “inevitably, however, there are also 
some not-so-poor people in poor regions and a lot of poor people in ‘rich’ regions” (Bird & 
Rodriguez 1999: 305; see also Bigman & Fofack 2000; Tunstall & Lupton 2003).  
Notwithstanding these objections, spatial, social, and sectoral policy outreach can be linked 
towards mutual beneficial outcomes. For example, Thys (2000: 7, 11) observes with regard to 
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micro-finance poverty reduction schemes that “a more conscious product-led approach to 
deepening outreach yielded a greater social output by increasing the share of very poor 
borrowers being served while achieving similar results in terms of breadth of outreach and 
financial sustainability than a more incidental approach”. Moreover, dynamic externalities 
may result from geographic and/or social targeting for broader organisational and sectoral 
environments. For instance, investments in infrastructure in a remote region are likely to 
reinforce private investments, allocate labour and technology, upgrade education and 
knowledge levels, and contribute to the region’s socio-economic development base (Balisacan 
& Fuwa 2004).  
The chances for comprehensively beneficial policy outcomes are enhanced when policy-
makers and people bundle their resources and tackle together the problems at hand (see 
chapter 3.3). In this context, Rauch (2003) points to the significance of scale, indicating that 
the local, regional, national, and global arenas should pursue differently targeted, yet 
systematically related policy tasks. One could equally argue, however, that a targeted policy 
approach may cause an increase in competition for the directed intervention and conflict 
among the area representatives, people, and their organisational advocators.  
How to best tackle disparities of poverty sectorally? An excursus on two 
ongoing debates  
This study cannot give an extensive review on numerously existing sectoral policy approaches 
and is not understood as a policy-content specialists’ investigation. The debate around the 
most crucial factors of disparate development is contextually situated in the discourse 
between market force and government control. The following sections introduce two related 
ongoing international debates. 
There is, firstly, ongoing discussion on whether to alleviate disparities of poverty and wealth 
more effectively by targeting economic growth or redistribution (Dagdeviren, Hoeven, Weeks 
2002; Balisacan 1997; World Bank 2003). The former theme emphasises absolute and the 
latter relative poverty and disparity aspects. Since economic liberalisation in the 1980s, 
policy-makers have believed that “growth itself would be the vehicle for poverty reduction, 
achieved through ‘trickle-down’ mechanisms not always clearly specified”. Obviously, free 
markets and individuality rest uneasily with notions other than the equality of opportunity.  
However, driven by experiences of boom-and-bust, socio-spatial exclusion, and political 
conflicts in the 1990s the international community and many governments have moved to 
recognise that “to reduce poverty, growth is not enough, nor is redistribution enough. What is 
required is a growth policy that incorporates equity as a forethought, rather than an 
afterthought” (Dagdeviren, Hoeven, Weels 2002: 383, 405). The statement signifies a shift 
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towards the ‘equality of outreach’-approach. Chapters 8.1 and 8.2.1 discuss the Philippine and 
Boholano courses between growth and redistribution. 
A second theme questions whether to target growth and redistribution by economic or social 
policy. The international community currently seems to favour social sector approaches 
embedded into a (neo)liberal economy and equality of opportunity frame (see chapter 3.2.1). 
For example, the World Development Report 2004 understands ‘making services work for 
poor people’ to include “those services that have the most direct link with human 
development – education, health, water, sanitation, and electricity” (World Bank 2003: 1). 
Such social sector approaches are transferred into national and regional ‘poverty reduction 
strategy papers’ which “attempt to build inclusive public social policy around a basic neo-
liberal framework, and to position it as a new way forward which transcends ideological 
divides, while including diverse interests, from the poor to global capital” (Craig & Porter 
2001: 3).  
In contrast to social sector approaches, there are voices that call for a stronger focus on 
economic issues as part of development, for example, for so-called ‘pro-poor’ strategies. 
These voices demand a role for economic policies in sustainable socio-economic development 
and instruments, which bundle business, anti-poverty and, -disparity interests (compare 
Ashley, Boyd, Goodwin 2000; Rodolfo 2003; Thirlwall 2002). This debate essentially faces 
the dilemma that dealing with economic sectors from a pro-poor perspective always needs to 
consider that “the private sector deals with their clients: customers and shareholders. 
Development professionals deal with theirs: poor people and donors. Traditionally the two 
worlds have been separate” (Ashley & Roe 2003: 4). In other words, if government is to 
steer, for example, tourism policy, it then deals with a sector, which is largely driven by the 
private sector and is likely to dispose of somewhat few policy instruments only. This obstacle 
can be assumed aggravated in the environments of developing countries such as the 
Philippines, where administrative instruments are often weak (compare chapter 3.3.1). 
Apparent from these accounts, the significance of ‘access and outreach’ in policy-making 
processes cannot be underestimated. Policy access and outreach can, however, only be 
successful and effective in sustainable poverty (and disparity) reduction if, as Bigg & 
Satterthwaite (2005: 1-25) point out, policy ‘touches down’ to local contexts, integrates local 
pro-poor policy-makers, and encourages locally affected people to participate in all policy 
stages.  
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3.2.3  Outreach capacity and capability: A question of power  
The previous chapters have elaborated on externally provided preferences from which 
governmental policy-makers can choose. At the same time, every government (policy 
stakeholder) possesses specific internal capacities and capabilities to accomplish its tasks. As 
noted in chapter 3.1.2, its power resources affect how effectively government addresses the 
peripheral, marginalised, and problematic poverty issues. Specifically financial, knowledge, 
networking, and representative resources and their interaction constitute this power. 
Financial assets essentially relate to the level of governmental spending (potentials) which 
should ideally cover at least the administrative costs of establishing a multi-scalar data 
information basis on disparities and poverty as well as setting up adequate policy responses, 
and their monitoring and evaluation. Bird & Rodriguez (1999) point to the importance of 
local salary bills of public employees as an incentive for high-quality policy administration, 
because the administrative staff is in charge of delivering the services within any disparity- 
and poverty alleviation strategy. Another factor to consider in developing contexts like in the 
Philippines includes (a) that governments (and non-governmental actors alike) often heavily 
rely upon donors for budgetary support – a situation that shifts power balances in policy-
making (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: viii-ix). Moreover, (b) financial sectors and funding 
resources are likely to involve corruption incidences with adverse consequences: “There is 
now a broad consensus on the deleterious impact of corruption on economic growth, 
equitable wealth distribution, and the legitimacy and efficiency of governing institutions” (Le 
Billon 2001: 1; see also Das 2000: 645). 
Human or educational capital is, as mentioned, a crucial and competitive factor to policy-
makers, business, and people alike in the contemporary ‘knowledge society’. Policy outreach 
can be enhanced through the combination of ‘global’, internationally applied knowledge and 
local expertise. Ideally then, policy-makers go ‘glocal’ (compare chapter 2.3.2). Thereby, as a 
positive side effect, they also strengthen local participation in and acceptance of policy 
(Neubert & Macamo 2002: 12-17). Again, the skill level of the local bureaucracy is important 
to guarantee precise identification of disparities of poverty and adequacy, relevance, and 
appropriateness of responsive policy. Further of relevance, foreign consultants and/or NGOs 
are often asked to fill in lacks in governmental human capital with respect to specific projects.  
Social capital points to the ability to gain access to resources by virtue of social linkages 
(following Bourdieu) and to guarantee the observance of norms (following Coleman). Social 
capital forms the fundament of any social network, here formal or informal assortments of 
individuals or institutions who maintain recurrent contact with one another and channel and 
interpret information and resources on, in the present case, disparity and poverty alleviation 
(compare Portes & Mooney 2000; Fernandez-Kelly 1995).  
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With respect to ‘inscriptions of disparities’ it is important to consider that “networks […] 
make space not only through the properties of presence, but also through those of absence” 
(Ash 2002: 390). Social networks are based on the inclusion-exclusion principle and thus, can 
potentially deepen the boundaries of disparity parameters (compare chapters 2.2; 3.2.3). At 
the same time, networks can enable different (policy) stakeholders to bundle their resources 
towards achieving greater impact (Clausen 2001; 2002). The findings of Portes and Mooney 
(2000: 27) in migrant communities are assumed to account similarly for stakeholders’ policy-
making circles: “When other material and institutional resources are present, social capital 
can bring about sustained community development”. The quote also points at the interactions 
between the various power resources. 
Symbolic capital and authority point to informal power relations, representation, and 
reputation that are based on society- and cultural context-specific norms and values. Such 
informal power systems are usually not visible at first sight but they co-exist with official 
business or politics-related power positions. They often represent a crucial factor for the 
success or failure of the administrative coordination of policy, and specifically, for its 
acceptance and participation among the local people (compare Kraas 2003: 65-73). Moreover, 
when symbolic capital determines the formation of social networks, so-called ‘cronyism’, the 
risk of corruption, and of less effective policy-making rise (Kraas 2000: 113-114). Turning 
the perspective, if government is not aware of specific symbolic authorities in their target 
areas, respective governing and policy-making (at a distance) may become ineffective and 
problematic as well (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: 6; compare chapter 9). 
To conclude, (a) financial and partly knowledge resources can equip government with ‘power 
over’, here domination over, the conditions framing disparate development as well as over 
some other policy-makers and the local people. At the same time, however, (b) government 
equally embodies the capacity to enable policy as participatory ‘concerts in action’, by using 
its networking, symbolic, as well as some knowledge resources to ‘empower’ other policy-
makers and the local people to participate and support policy interventions together (Stewart 
2001; compare also Rauch’s account in chapter 3.2.2). Besides the powers to dominate and to 
empower, government (c) should also possess the power to minimise internal abuses through 
corruption or cronyism. This is explicitly what is implied by the term governmental 
‘accountability’11: 
“Power, and the need to control it, define the basic bargain between those who govern 
and those who are governed […] When accountability fails – when the state breaks its 
bargain with citizens – many things can go wrong. Public fund may be misappropriated 
or stolen, public officials may routinely demand bribes, public contracts and public 
post may be unfairly awarded, public services may be poorly delivered (or not 
delivered at all)” (Schucter 2000: 1, emphasis by A.C.).   
                                               
11
 For further reference on accountability see, for example, Gloppen, Rakner, Tostensen 2003. 
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Put differently, government’s power capacities affect the (uneven) presence of policy 
performance on disparities of poverty across space, society, time, and context, here affect the 
(re)production of disparities through their external as well as their internal use and abuse.  
3.3  Transformative politics: Contextualising alternative policy 
arenas, actors, and agency  
3.3.1  Politics of scale: Regionalism or ‘bringing the state back in’? 
A by-product of globalisation is the scalar re-configuration of national government’s policy 
(service) delivery. As mentioned, deterritorialisation and the liberal turn cause the competition 
between the sub-national and national to grow. Particularly regions (administrative or non-
administrative units) experience resurgence to self-determine their own path of development. 
Regionalism defines ”both the emerging importance of regions as territorial units in global 
competition and the increase in co-ordinated actions within regions to improve competitive 
position compared to other areas” (Agnew 2000: 103). Regions are claimed to become the 
basis of economic and social life, the focal point of knowledge creation, the key arena for 
promoting a plural society based on participatory politics and identity, as well as a functional 
space for socio-economic policy intervention (Jones 2001: 1186; MacLeod 2001: 805).  
Because of regionalism, the previously dominating national arena of policy-making, here the 
state, is claimed to be ‘be hallowed out’ and unable to uphold its traditional tasks for the 
distribution of resources and the provision of social protection. This weakness of the classic 
policy arena is feared to deteriorate exclusionary processes and socio-political tensions.  
However, exactly these fears of losing state control have also resulted in claims for a re-
emphasis of re-strengthened ‘big government’, especially since the 11 September 2001-
attacks on the U.S.A, and therefore for a reinforced role of the state in steering (balanced) 
development (see Lake 2002). In fact, many scholars and think-tanks, including Huf (1998), 
Moore & Putzel (1999), Rigg (2003), Stewart (2001), and the World Bank (2003), reassert 
that disparities of poverty, especially the exclusion of people and spaces, should be dealt with 
from the ‘top’ or ‘centre’ of power, which is, in their view, equivalent, with the state arena, 
national government and administration authority.  
Others argue that the above ‘New regionalism’-approach fails to explain the linkages between 
the regionalisation of competition, business, and the changing role of the state realistically 
(see Peck 2003: 222-223). In short, even under a neo-liberal regime  
“the free market requires the state or cognate institutions if it is to work. Free markets, 
in short, do not just happen […] the development of free markets depends crucially 
upon the extension as well as the intensification of specific forms of state power” 
(Harvey 2000: 178).  
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Harvey relates here to the ‘equality of outreach’-approach of chapter 3.2.1 and explicates that 
state politics are driven away from performing some of their conventional functions, however 
have to maintain a certain regulation of markets. This is specifically important in developing 
countries like the Philippines where state government is often needed to jump-start economic 
growth sectors (Rodolfo 2003). While doing so, national government has to share tasks with 
the sub-national, international arenas and actors. Then, the major role of (national) 
government in times of globalisation implies to rearrange the scalar and sectoral organisation 
of policy-making to reduce disparities of poverty effectively (Edwards et al 2001; Stewart 
2001). 
3.3.2  Re-arranging governmental policy-making I: Decentralisation 
The leading governmental political institutions at sub-national scale are local government 
units, which comprise in the Philippine case provincial, municipal, and barangay 
(neighbourhood-organisation) governments (see chapters 5.2 and 8). In the course of re-
arranging governmental power and tasks, local governments are strengthened and partly gain 
more autonomy in policy-making from national governments through decentralisation 
reforms. Although there are many different definitions to it, decentralisation generally 
“involves a transfer of authority to perform some services to the public from an individual or 
an agency in central government to some other individual or agency which is ‘closer’ to the 
public to be served” (Turner & Hulme 1997: 152). Authorities are decentralised either within 
(a) formal political structures (devolution), (b) public administrative structures 
(deconcentration), or (c) from state to private sectors (privatisation). Especially by devolution 
and deconcentration national governments aim at negotiating the internal organisation of state 
politics in order to ‘keep the state in’. However, when decentralisation is not successfully 
implemented, for example if a simultaneous transfer of responsibilities and resources does not 
accompany the transfer of authority, or if decentralisation disproportionately involves 
privatisation, it may also adversely contribute to ‘hallowing out’ the state (Turner & Hulme 
1997; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001). 
The key argument justifying decentralisation directly relates to greater policy outreach: 
“Decentralized government is closer and therefore more accessible to the people it is meant 
to govern” (Lake 2002: 817; compare Mahal, Srivastava, Sanan 2000). Through their more 
direct contact with the ‘field’, local governments can improve policy effectiveness, reduce 
costs, mobilise more resources, strengthen links between policy-makers’ and empower 
peoples’ participation and acceptance – all means to a successful alleviation of disparities. 
Sceptical assessments, however, claim “there is no reason to expect that decentralisation will 
be pro-poor” (Moore & Putzel 1999: 1). Instead, local governments’ lack of power, 
particularly of institutional, funding and knowledge resources, and persistent discrepancies 
between citizens’ preferences and political can impede pro-poor and anti-disparity impacts of 
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decentralisation. Moreover, Rüland (1998: 181-183) observes for Southeast Asia the tendency 
among central governments to apply ‘pseudo’ decentralisation measures to enhance the 
effectiveness of their central decision-making. In theses cases what is officially called 
decentralisation is de-facto deconcentration (compare also Kraas 2000: 133).  
Notwithstanding this controversy, above and beyond decentralisation “does not occur in 
general but rather in a particular context – in a country with its own history and traditions 
and its own specific institutional, political and economic context (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 
300). Then, decentralisation has a distinguished appearance in the Philippines, which is to be 
examined in chapters 5.8 and 9. 
3.3.3  Re-setting governmental policy-making II: State and society in 
interaction 
As mentioned, globalisation helps to establish non-governmental policy-makers. The ‘rising 
stars’ in the political arena comprise market and civil society stakeholders such as (a) 
(transnational) businesses, (b) specific societal lobbyists and interest groups, (c) 
intergovernmental organisations, (d) non-governmental organisations (NGOs)12, and people’s 
organisations (POs) as community-created economic entities with a legal personality 
(Valaskakis 1999: 155-156). Therefore, all spheres of life are politicised and all sections of 
society are requested to become political partners and contribute towards a more balanced 
development (see Beck 2000: 1; Giddens 2000: 85-121). This diversified setting of policy-
making is called ‘governance’ and it  
 “…refers to something broader than government. The new use of governance does not 
point at state actors and institutions as the only relevant institutions and actors in the 
authoritative allocation of values […]. They all, to some extent, focus on the role of 
networks in the pursuit of common goals; these networks could be intergovernmental 
or inter-organizational […] or they could be networks of trust and reciprocity crossing 
the state-society divide” (Kjaer 2004: 3-4).  
Political steering and policy-making through governance operates differently from the 
governmental and market alternatives. Table 3.1 overviews and contrasts the three 
approaches. In theory, governance emphasises ideas of (local) participation, state-society and 
public-private partnership, and multi-stakeholder network formations across scales and 
institutions. It especially focuses on community accountability, here sees the people as policy 
‘shapers’. Thus, it opens up opportunities for political steering by multi-stakeholders across 
scales including the marginalised and peripheral themselves.  
                                               
12
 NGOs are organisations, which operate external to the government but in the public sphere; they usually 
advocate the interests of specific social groups. 
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Table 3.1: Three alternatives in policy-making  
Policy-maker Government Market Governance 
Basis of relationship Prestige, power and 
employment 
Contract and property 
rights 
(Local) participation, 
resource exchange,  
co-operation 
Degree of dependence Dependent Independent Interdependent 
Medium of exchange Authority Prices Cooperation  
Means of conflict 
resolution/ coordination 
Rules and 
commands 
Haggling and the courts  Diplomacy  
Culture  Subordination Competition Reciprocity  
Role of targeted people  Policy user Policy chooser/competitor Policy shaper 
Organisational structure Hierarchies Markets Multi-stakeholder 
networks 
Source: adapted from Kjaer 2004; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001 
Conflict or cooperation? Implications for policy effect(iveness) 
The diversification of policy-making surely “alters geometries of power, empowering some 
actors while disempowering others” (Edwards et al 2001: 290-291), and thus challenges 
government’s classic role as the ‘number one’- policy-provider as well as its ‘classic’ policy 
outreach (effect(iveness)). Voices of the development discourse typically emphasis the new 
role and power of the local people and peoples’ organisations in shaping decentralised, 
governanced policy environments. Calls for neo-liberal free markets and less state control 
explicitly promote the participation of stakeholders from the private sector in policy (see Mani 
2001: 87- 90).  
In whatever composition, state and societal policy-makers can conflict, which may impede or 
at least not benefit policy outreach. In case they operate parallel to each other without 
cooperating, they may cause policy redundancies and/or multi-coverage of areas, issues, and 
social groups. Depending on the comparative status of an organisation and its capacities to 
deliver effective policy, specific policy-makers could be gradually replaced altogether. This 
can imply that multi-stakeholder governance replaces ‘classic’ government models (Bigg & 
Satterthwaite 2005: x).  
In contrast, intensified cooperation and partnerships between state and societal and market 
actors can complement and improve policy outreach and effect(iveness) and lead to a merging 
of governmental, market and governanced policy-making characteristics:  
“Partnerships, it is claimed, can offer a blending of resources from the public, private, 
and voluntary sectors which adds up to more than the sum of parts, can provide a 
forum in which local communities can make their voices heard, and, as agencies for 
delivery, can help foster a shared sense of objectives and direction at a local level” 
(Edwards et al 2001: 289). 
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Partnership can be used to extend the outer reaches of governmental policy-making to become 
more responsive and effective in the alleviation of poverty and disparities. Particularly when 
the relation is institutionalised, it can empower people’s political involvement, strengthen 
policy acceptance, decrease administrative costs, and diversify resources and organisational 
capacities. Smith (2000) thereby stresses the essential function of government to initiate, 
negotiate, and de-facto lead the course of such partnerships – also across spatial scales 
(compare Balgos & Batario 1999; Harvey’s argument in chapter 3.3.1).  
Popular models in institutionalised state-society partnerships usually focus on local 
governments. They include (a) contracting where the identification and formulation of policy 
remain governmental tasks while their implementation is issued to private and civil actors or 
to specific specialised governmental agencies or foreign consultants. (b) Community planning 
means that government holds encompassing competences but must consider community needs 
by conducting community surveys, launching a community plan, and strategically planning 
thereafter. (c) Community leadership implies that local government persuades private and 
civil stakeholders to achieve prescribed objectives and creates all kinds of partnerships with 
them, including direct provision, grants-in-aid, advocacy, consultation, coordination etc.. (d) 
Self-help refers to local government building up voluntary, self-help organisations through 
training, tax relief, administrative support or low interests loans (adjusted after Smith 2000; 
Mani 2001; World Bank 2003; Edwards et al 2001; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001).  
I infer from the above discussion that nowadays the multiple actors and arenas of policy 
intervention not necessarily operate as mutually exclusive or competing geographies “but 
rather as densely superimposed, interdependent forms of territorial organization” (MacLeod 
2001: 815). It follows that any analysis of policy interventions on disparities of poverty and 
wealth must consider existing multi-reference systems and thereby aim at “a balanced 
assessment of the respective scales and potentials of the externally – and internally-oriented 
sectors” (Lovering 2001: 351; see also Hill 2000; Agnew 2000).  
Finally, following the line of the theoretical argument, key research questions I and II can be 
broken down to empirically answer six sub-questions for the Philippine case, as identified in 
table 3.2. Table 3.2 equally presents a summary and complementation of the organisational 
structure and the empirical tasks set for this study. 
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Table 3.2: This study’s structure and tasks in complemented perspective   
 
Key research 
questions Ap
pr
o
ac
h 
 
Objective 
 
Analytical 
focus 
 
Sub-questions 
I. What features, 
patterns and 
dynamics do 
disparities of 
poverty and wealth 
have in the 
Philippines? 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘e
ar
th
-
w
rit
in
g' 
Identify 
disparities of 
poverty and 
wealth 
Structures of 
distance and 
proximity 
Spatial, social 
and poverty-
sectoral 
disparities 
What spatial (and social) patterns and 
trends of disparities of poverty and 
wealth are inscribed into and between 
Philippine provinces? 
What are the main developmental 
problems and prospects in the 
Philippines? Do they alter their 
presence at different scales? 
II. How are these 
disparities of 
poverty and wealth 
(re)produced 
through 
governmental 
policy? 
Ag
en
cy
 
 
'pe
op
le
-w
rit
in
g' 
Explain &  
Understand 
the  
effect 
(iveness) of 
policy 
intervention  
upon them 
Policy outreach 
(to regions & 
provinces,  
population 
groups,  
problematic 
poverty issues) 
Focus on 
impediments 
and constraints 
of effective 
policy-making 
Case study of 
Bohol 
What, whom, and where do 
governmental policy intervention 
tackle disparities of poverty and 
wealth in Bohol? 
Which constraints impede 
effective governmental policy? 
What role do partnerships with 
and participation of societal 
stakeholders in a decentralised 
setting play in enhancing policy 
effect(iveness)? 
How do socio-cultural Philippine 
peculiarities affect the processes 
at hand? 
 
 38
4.  Research design and paths of operationalisation 
4.1  Methodological setting: Combining quantitative and qualitative 
research  
The study is planned, organised and put into practice as an independent investigation 
including three months of empirical research in the Philippines (April 2003; January to March 
2004). It is embedded in the project 'Socio-economic regional disparities and globalisation in 
Southeast Asia' at the University of Cologne, Germany. Little theory-led publications exist on 
the study’s central themes for the Philippines. Therefore, I deductively developed some 
theoretical concepts as 'starting points' and inductively refined them as the research 
proceeded. My research approach is for most parts explorative, combining theoretical and 
empirical findings to constitute the reality of the subject matter as seen in this study.  
For a coherent and consistent investigation the research methods must be able to (a) identify 
the 'thousand faces of poverty across space' (key question I), and (b) to assess the mechanism 
and effect(iveness) of policy interventions upon them (key question II). This setting suggests 
to complementarily utilising quantitative and qualitative research approaches in a way they 
can best unfold their respective analytical strengths (compare Brannen 2004). Overall, the 
idealised polarisations between quantitative and qualitative research are negotiated and 
integrated. Thereby, a more comprehensive and realistic view on the topic is developed and 
the reliability, validity, and preciseness of findings are increased (compare Sale et al 2002; 
Mayring 2001; Kelle & Erzberger 2000). 
Key question I 
Table 4.1 presents the mix of methods and highlights the principal analytical tools for each 
key question. I utilise mainly quantitative and cartographic tools to identify disparities of 
poverty and wealth, in particular statistics visualised in provincial and regional maps for the 
entire Philippines, and intra-provincially for the case study of Bohol province. I focus on 
cartographic analysis because of its descriptive, explorative, and analytical strengths: 
“Maps are used to show locations, distances, directions and the size of areas. Maps 
also display geographic relationships, differences, clusters and patterns. Maps are 
used for navigation, exploration, illustration and communication in the public and 
private sectors […] Maps summarize large amounts of information concisely. It would 
be hard to match a map’s ability to represent not only huge quantities of numbers but 
also information about the spatial relationship between observations”(Deichmann 
1998: 2, 103).  
Depending on the data quality I use the information in the maps not as hard-facts but – and 
here quantitative and qualitative methods intertwine – as qualitative indicators on disparities. 
Such analysis is comparative for thematic maps. Comparisons between (a) areas on the same 
 39
map, (b) maps, (c) different variables for the same area, and (d) maps on various periods are 
enabled. In order to improve my interpretative work – and this is another aspect where 
quantitative and qualitative paradigms interweave – I have asked selected experts and 
publications for their qualitative interpretations of the quantitative illuminations of the maps. 
 
Table 4.1: Research methods to analyse key questions  
 Scale Quantitative Cartographic Qualitative  
Key 
question 
I 
79 provinces 
Ö 16 regions /  
entire Philippines 
Ö Bohol province / 
Municipalities 
Secondary 
statistics 
to identify ‘faces’ 
of disparities 
Exploratory map 
series 
to identify ‘faces’ 
of disparities 
Expert interviews 
to support 
interpretation of 
quantitative and 
cartographic 
findings 
Key 
question 
II 
Case study: Provincial 
government Bohol 
Ö Puroks / Barangay & 
Municipal governments 
Ö National government 
 
Map series to 
illuminate policy 
outreach  
Expert interviews 
Ethnographic 
field observations 
and participation 
Policy profiles  
Lite
ratu
re review
 
   
Key question II  
As noted in chapter 1, governmental policy effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty is in-
depth investigated for the island province of Bohol in its decentralised setting. A case study 
approach is most adequate here because firstly, I research for explanations for a contemporary 
multi-facet phenomenon in a real-life context, and secondly, because these explanation are 
guided by the question of ‘whether’ and ‘how’ governmental policy has an impact on 
disparities rather than by ‘how much’ it matters (see Yin 2003: 1, 13; George & Bennett 
2005: 25).  
As noted in chapter 1, in order to allow for a better focussed and in-depth investigation key 
question II concentrates on three specific and selected policy fields as ‘subclasses’ which are 
chosen after research findings of key question I. The respective choice of Bohol is reasoned 
firstly, because of its ‘typical’ patterns and trends in disparities of poverty (see chapters 6 and 
7 for details) and, secondly, because of its innovative anti-poverty policies (see chapter 8). 
Thirdly, Bohol neighbours the second largest metropolitan area in the country, Cebu-
Mandaue, and offers good research opportunities on spill over effects from centre to 
hinterlands. Put in theoretical terms, Bohol represents an ideal case study because it shows 
both, unique and typical features in the Philippine context of the set research question. 
Policy is affected by the perspective, cognition, and background of their makers and 
recipients. Accordingly, research methods are required to recognise and explain multiple 
interpretations and constructions of ‘truth’ (compare Cloke et al 2004: 150; 169-200). 
Therefore, I primarily carried out qualitative in-depth expert interviews, ethnographic field 
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observations and participations, and collected policy documents. Policy outreach is visualised 
by thematic maps – once again intertwining quantitative and qualitative methods – because 
“in policy-oriented analysis, maps can play an important role by presenting complex 
relationships in a way that is easy to interpret, and by identifying the spatially relevant policy 
alternatives”(Bigman & Fofack 2000: 27).  
Although the findings for Bohol are limited in scope, they address important problems 
associated with the research question in a Philippine context. It follows that “its 
generalizations are more narrow and contingent than those of the general ‘covering laws’ 
variety than some hold up as the ideal, but they are also more precise and may involve 
relations with higher probabilities” (George & Bennett 2005: 78). With the support of 
research in Cebu and Metro Manila, an intense review of academic literature and policy 
documents it is attempted to distinguish certain obstacles to effective policy intervention on 
disparities of poverty and wealth, which may, to some extent, exist and operate similarly in 
other regions of the country (see approach by George 1998). 
4.2  Statistic and cartographic exploration of disparities of poverty 
and wealth in the Philippines 
4.2.1  Data compilation: Taking administrative hurdles 
I select the indicators illustrating the manifestations of disparities of poverty to meet goals of 
research feasibility and data relevance as accounted in theoretical and Philippines-related 
publications, and qualitative research. Limited data availability restricts the selection. 
Sometimes qualitative data fill in the gaps. I retrieved some data online and the majority 
during field visits. Data inconsistencies and multiplicity of sources13 suggest focussing on 
data published by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) and National Statistical 
Office (NSO) in order to guarantee a comparable and coherent identification of disparities. 
Changes in political and administrative classifications of regions and 
provinces 
Figure 4.1 displays the political/administrative divisions of the Philippines from 1998 to 2001, 
which is the basis to most of the data I use. Then, the Republic of the Philippines consisted of 
79 provinces, grouped into 16 regions14. To allow comparisons over time the data is adjusted 
to the changing political/administrative classifications since the 1970s. Table 4.2 displays 
these changes and the various political-administrative classification periods. Although notes 
in the respective figures indicate when an alternative classification to the 1998-2001 one is 
applied, comparisons over time and maps remain complex. 
                                               
13
  The Philippine statistics system is organised decentrally; http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sitelinks/index.html.  
14
 In 2001, another 110 so-called “chartered cities” existed. These, however, are usually not depicted separately 
from provincial data. Therefore I neglect chartered cities; see http://www.statoids.com.  
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Records on intra-provincial Bohol 
Comprehensive, spatially aggregated statistics on intra-provincial Bohol are only limitedly 
available (see chapter 7; expert interview 15). I am significantly restricted not only in finding 
variables on Bohol that are comparable to the provincial/regional scale, but also in enabling 
their comparisons across space and time. Several maps are compelled to vector-based 
information or plain, sometimes non-spatial statistics. Figure 4.2 shows the contemporary 
political/administrative division of the province: It consists of 47 municipalities, the City of 
Tagbilaran (the provincial capital), and 1118 barangays (villages). The province is subdivided 
into three congressional districts. The administrative/political boundaries have not altered 
during the period of relevance. While regions are administrative subdivisions under the 
national government, provinces, municipalities, and barangays compose separate political 
local government units (LGUs). Puroks (or sitios) are semi-formal neighbourhood 
organisations that are not incorporated in formal politics and administration (chapters 8, 9). 
Table 4.2: Changes in administrative classifications of Philippine regions and provinces  
Admin. 
Period 
 
Date 
ratified 
Change of region Change of province 
07/11/1975 Creation of National Capital Region (NCR)   
23/10/1989 Organic Act to create Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR), 
plebiscite => final creation in 1997, functionally reduced to 
administrative region 
 
Pre-
1992 
01/08/1989 Organic Act to create Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM), plebiscite => inauguration in 1990 
 
16/03/1992 
 New: Sarangani splits from South Cotabato 
22/05/1992 
 New: Guimaras splits from IIoilo 
1992 
1992 
 New: Biliran splits from Leyte 
1994 25/07/1994  New: Kalinga and Apayo provinces split from Kalinga-
Apayo 
23/02/1995 Creation of Caraga 
(split from Northern & 
Southern Mindanao) 
Agusan del Norte, A. del Sur, Surigao del Norte split 
from Northern Mindanao 
Surigao del Sur split from Southern Mindanao 
1995 
23/02/1995 
 Sultan Kuradat moves from Central Mindanao to 
Southern Mindanao  
1997 1997  Sultan Kudarat moves from Southern Mindanao to 
Central Mindanao, reverse change of 1995 
1998 07/03/1998  New: Compostella Valley splits from Davao del N. 
23/02/2001 
 New: Zamboanga-Sibugay province splits from 
Zamboanga del Sur 
2001 
19/09/2001 Western Mindanao is 
Zamboanga Peninsula 
Southern Mindanao is 
Davao Region 
Central Mindanao is 
SOCCSKARGEN 
Basilan moves to ARMM 
 
 
South Cotabato and Sarangani move to 
SOCCSKSARGEN 
Lanao del Norte moves to Northern Mindanao 
2002 17/05/2002 Southern Tagalog 
splits into MIMAROPA  
and CALABRAZON  
MIMAROPA: Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental and 
Oriental, Palawan, Romblon 
CALABRAZON: Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Quezon, 
Rizal; Aurora is transferred to Central Luzon 
Source: http://www.nscb.gov/ph/factsheets; various years  
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Figure 4.1: Political and administrative classification of the Philippines 1998-2001 
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Figure 4.2: Administrative and political classification of Bohol province 
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4.2.2  Data processing and evaluation: A question of data quality 
Table 4.3 overviews the quantitative and cartographic research chronology at provincial (and 
regional) scales. It shows that data processing and evaluation are closely interwoven, and 
presents encountered problems and undertaken countermeasures. A Geographical Information 
System (GIS) was established to administer the statistical database and map series. To assure 
(a) a realistic identification of disparities, and (b) comparativeness in and between maps, I 
illustrate most indicators as choropleths and classify them by quartiles (compare Brewer & 
Pickle 2002; Theodosakis 1990; Evans 1977). Distorting outliers are selected prior to quartile 
classification and displayed separately (see Bigman & Fofack 2000). I often illustrate absolute 
values as well in order to (c) discern additional information of the individual variables. I apply 
the same paths of procession to Bohol data, however, simplified and shortened: I am not able 
to establish neither a statistical database nor a GIS, but use choropleths of quartiles and 
outliers where possible. 
To increase the validity and reliability of my findings on patterns and trends of disparities in 
the Philippines, I subdivide all indicators into three quality classes according to the following 
factors:  
¾ Obvious mistakes or deviations? 
¾ Incomplete, inconsistent data, missing values, exceptions? 
¾ Notes on data generation and definition available? 
¾ Is variable constantly updated? 
¾ Additional qualitative assessment, if relevant. 
Table 4.4 summarises the 
factors of the subsequent 
classification procedure: 
The data quality of 
variables suggests whether 
their interpretation (1) 
refers to quantitative ‘hard 
facts’, (2) uses the 
quantitative ‘hard’ facts yet 
considers conceptual 
restraints (e.g. respondents 
to income surveys may not 
inform about their real income), or (3) relates to qualitative patterns and trends. A white 
colouring of the map legend points at data quality 1, yellow and orange indicate data quality 2 
and 3 respectively.  
  Table 4.4: Quality and respective interpretation of variables  
Data 
quality 
Degree of data 
reliability* 
Interpretation of 
quantitative data… 
Legend 
colour  
1 reliable as ‘hard-facts’ white 
2 reliable yet doubts 
whether generation of 
data in fact recognises 
all relevant aspects/ 
can obtain realistic 
results 
as facts under 
consideration of 
general conceptual 
constraints 
yellow 
3 semi-reliable quality only as qualitative 
trends and patterns 
orange 
   *taking into account the natural limitations of quantitative data analysis  
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In the face of recurrent imperfect data accuracy, I withdraw from analysing causal relation-
ships, statistical correlations, or econometric analyses. Instead, I evaluate the individual 
characteristics of each variable, scale, region, province, and municipality, and subsequently 
compare, contrast, and relate them within and between maps. With regard to Bohol, I 
determine its ‘place’ in Philippine (disparate) developments by combined inter- and intra-
provincial maps and statistics (chapter 7). A ‘hard’-fact, quantitative comparison between the 
inter- and intra- provincial scalar manifestations of disparities of poverty is made impossible 
by limits in data availability and quality. However, the information provides an adequate basis 
for a qualitative comparative portray of developmental problems and prospects and for 
subsequent policy analysis (key question II).  
Hence, I literally lay numerous maps documenting different indicators on poverty and wealth 
over each other in order to discern concentrated pockets or clusters of poverty or of wealth 
(compare Hentschel et al 2000). Such additive and comparative approach is claimed to have 
the advantage of specifically revealing difference and diversity, here disparities (May 1997: 
201-202). The spatial patterns caught in the maps represent simultaneously the situational 
'snapshots', means, and consequences of disparities of poverty and wealth (compare theory in 
chapter 2).  
On the whole, the explorative map series enables me to (a) inductively identify qualities and 
quantities of disparities in the Philippines, (b) partially detect explanatory factors to prior 
findings, and (c) to a minor extent, discern arguments to falsify or verify some deductive 
theses (compare Deichmann 1998). In order to improve my interpretation I use experts’ 
opinions, field visit observations, and published accounts. As the final product, I develop 
qualitative themes of (spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines to be 
illustrated in chapters 6.3 and 7.3. 
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Table 4.3: Chronology of quantitative and cartographic research process  
Procedures Problems encountered with … Countermeasures and solutions 
Establish a statistical data base and a GIS as cartographic foundation  
Digitalisation and 
classification of 
national, 
regional, 
provincial 
administrative 
boundaries  
over time  
(table 4.2) 
Confusion over boundaries: No uniform classification of boundaries; 
agencies apply different classifications (e.g. NEDA Ù NSO, NSCB15) 
Some cities are confusingly classified to belong to different 
provinces (e.g. Marawi City and Cotabto City) 
Sources use different boundaries even for data referring to same 
year 
=> comparisons over time and across variables become problematic 
Focus on data published by NSCB and NSO, as based on 
same boundaries (NSCB Fact sheets and Philippine 
Standard Geographic Code (PSGC)16 
Marawi City belongs to Lanao del Sur; Cotabato City to 
Maguindanao province) 
1998 -2001 boundaries defined as ‘standard’ classification 
Comparisons across time made possible by map series 
Data compilation   
Screening of 
statistical system 
for desired 
variables: 
Internet and field 
research  
Data availability: Various statistical agencies exist; responsibility 
between institutions not set; different institutions – even agencies within 
one institution – publish dissimilar data on the same subject; some 
desired variables (e.g. on political processes) are not surveyed 
Spatial aggregation: Variables are rarely provided as spatial aggregates; 
provincial level most detailed level available; limited rural/urban coverage 
(often missing values for specific provinces in Mindanao and the NCR) 
Focus on data published by NSCB and NSO  
Personal visits at NSCB headquarter in Manila to request 
for specific data 
 
Data procession I  
Setting up a data 
bank and an 
explanatory file 
on variables  
Format of variables: Varies between absolute/ relative, % change, 
related to population (total, per capita, age-group-specific), families or 
household (total, age-specific), labour force, area, specific indices, ratios  
Data quality: Wrong, controversial data, reference groups (e.g. age) not 
adjusted to international standard, exceptions, redundancies, 
incompleteness, lack of technical notes/updates, inadequate 
differentiations “missing and “0-value” 
 
Standardisation: All variables are included in data bank 
with (a) their absolute and (b) any kind of relative value 
Cross calculations and re-inquiries: Always check data 
credibility, try to identify mistake, use technical notes on 
specific surveys (by NSCB and NSO) to sort out some 
confusion, otherwise exclude entire variable  
 
                                               
15
 NEDA = National Economic Development Authority; NSO = National Statistical Office; NSCB = National Statistical Coordination Bureau 
16
  See http://www.nscb.gov.ph. 
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Evaluation I: Exploratory data analysis on individual variables 
Exploration of  
features of 
individual 
variables 
Distortion by outliers: Extreme outliers distort distributional 
characteristics of variables and thus their visualisation in maps 
Identify outliers: Use descriptive statistics, histograms, 
stem-and-leaf plots to (to be visualised separately in maps) 
Data procession II: Visualisation for comparison 
Establish a map 
series  
Type of map: Which meets the targets of analysis, data availability, and 
visualisation best? 
Technique of classification: Exploratory data analysis shows that 
distributions of variables are multiform, no single classification method 
suits optimally Ù target of comparison requires to choose an uniform 
technique of classification (even if not meeting all individual variable 
characteristics equally) 
Choropleth maps: Standard to display relative values as 
they enable comparisons between and within maps  
If necessary for individual characteristics absolute values 
are displayed in an extra map  
Quartile classifications (plus outliers): Meet overall aim 
of comparison between and within maps best, and equally 
acknowledges the individual features of variables through 
selection of outliers 
Evaluation II: Comparison and contrast spaces, scales and variables  
Comparison, 
interrelation and 
contrast of 
regions, 
provinces, 
scales, and 
variables 
 
 
Subjectivity in perspective 
Contextual distortion: Statistics do not register all important aspects of 
variable; e.g. informal sector, seasonal work, childrens’ work are not 
registered under ‘labour’ (compare table 4.4; data quality class 2) 
Minimisation through above processing, evaluation, co-
reading, qualitative interviews 
Research is always subjective to some extent  
Quality classes: Individual variables are classified into 
three ‘quality classes’ which suggest the preciseness of 
their analytical use (see table 4.4) 
No econometric analysis: Causal relationships and 
correspondences are not examined 
Evaluation III:  Typical themes of (spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines 
Ö Inductively discern qualities and quantities 
Ö Explain prior findings 
Ö Assess deductive theses, if possible 
     Clausen 2005
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4.3  Qualitative research on policy-making in the Philippines 
4.3.1  Investigating policy effect(iveness): An overview  
While thematic maps provide information on the state of disparities, I apply four research 
tools to explain and understand the effect(iveness) and typical mechanism of respective 
policy-making in the Philippines: (a) expert interviews; (b) compilation of policy profiles; (c) 
ethnographic observation and participation during field visits and; (d) qualitative maps on 
policy outreach of individual policy-makers.  
More precisely, (a) I carried out expert interviews assuming that experts have an assured 
knowledge on the topic, yet critically bearing in mind their subjectivity (Köhler 1992). I 
specifically interrogated the motives, contents and means, accomplishments, problematic 
dimensions and features of policy-making, and asked for subjective assessment of and 
explanation for its success or failure. Interviews with foreign experts who work for the 
governmental agencies in focus specifically help to attain substantial information that are less 
influenced and restricted by Philippine socio-cultural peculiarities (and thus, highlight those; 
compare chapter 9). (b) I inquired policy-makers of written information on their policy 
programmes, monitoring and evaluation. During interviews I also asked the interviewees to 
portray his/her organisation’s policy activities in more detail. (c) Field visits to policy sites 
helped me to foster research findings on policy features, catalysts, and constraints, specifically 
on the integration levels of the local people and other policy partners/competitors as well as 
on policy makers’ outreach capabilities. In addition, I intensified qualitative observations of 
the state of disparities, of inter-and intra-organisational behaviour, interaction, and 
communication among policy-makers and between them and the local people. (d) Above and 
beyond, I am provided with sufficient information to qualitatively map certain aspects of 
spatial and sectoral policy outreach and understand their explanatory background in chapters 
8 and 9.  
4.3.2  Expert interviews and the significance of informality in the 
Philippines 
In total I conducted eleven formal and guided expert interviews of which seven were recorded 
(see appendix A1). Nine interviews deal mainly, yet not exclusively, with the Bohol context 
while two interviews that were held in Manila focus on the entire Philippines. In the 
Philippines a great part of 'formal' life takes place informally or as one interview partner 
expressed it: “Coffee table talks are more fruitful than official meetings” (expert interview 9) 
(see chapter 9). Therefore, Filipino experts' information policy is significantly influenced by 
the place of interviewing. I followed the suggestions of Elwood & Martin (2000) and asked 
the experts to choose the location of our conversation, and put more emphasis on my 
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observations on the location and the implications it may have had on course and content of the 
interview.  
Broadly speaking, the informants were most open at their private homes or in closed-door 
offices, and more closed up when their colleagues, or worse, their superiors were present. 
This relates to the issues of social hierarchies (analysed in chapter 9; see also photo 4.1). 
Officials distribute information only when they feel assured to be expressly entitled to. In this 
context it was difficult to conduct and 
record efficient formal interviews. I 
had to meet the majority of experts 
several times to give them time to get 
to know, trust and assess my 
'hierarchical' position towards them 
before they would talk to me sincerely 
and frankly. In addition, the most 
interesting topics were discussed only 
after working hours in an informal 
atmosphere when the recorder was 
turned off. Five of the formal interview 
partners rejected to be recorded at all. One interviewed expert explains: “I think they are 
afraid of be quoted. I mean they are afraid to be quoted making these comments or not and it 
will be something that will be used against them in the future” (expert interview 1). I took 
memos of these interviews instead. None the less, I had to consider that conversation partner 
“don’t want to appear too critical of the government or the local leaders and so. So they 
cannot express their own opinions openly” (expert interview 1). Such environmental 
conditions suggested focusing on informal conversations. I conducted and memorised another 
nine informal interviews (compare appendix A2), which often provided the more useful 
information. In analysis, I integrate the information derived during both, formal and informal 
conversation to increase the validity of my interview data and to obtain a much richer and 
intimate understanding of the significant issues. 
Interview style 
Prior to conducting the interviews I transferred some of the theoretical concepts into an initial 
interview manual containing the major aspects of investigation17 (see table 4.5). The 
employed interview style resembles what Lamnek (1995) and Mayring (1996) define a 
'problem-centred interview' supplemented by certain elements of a 'focussed interview'. More 
precisely, the guiding elements of the interview style are 
                                               
17
 The interviews were tested with selected officials of Montebello Hotel in Cebu City. 
Photo 4.1: Interview at expert’s private home  
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¾ Explorative research, here openness and flexibility towards the subject matter, the 
research design, the situation of investigation, the employed methods, and the course of 
research; 
¾ Informal communication between the researcher and the interview partners (if possible); 
¾ A holistic approach, meaning the integration of the daily context and history of the 
interview partners in the investigation. 
Another principle of problem-oriented interviews suggests to remain passive and to let the 
interview partners make their own points. However, in the described Philippine setting I 
would not have received much useful information, if I had pursued this principle. Instead, I 
explicitly asked for information, repeated my questions using different phrases, and thus more 
strongly guided the course of the interviews. I varied the interview contents and style 
depending on the hierarchical position, thematic focus, and background of my conversation 
partner, and according to the findings compiled during the deductive-inductive research 
process. 
 
Table 4.5: Central themes in guided interviews (adopted individually) 
What ? 
¾ What are main problems in Bohol / respective project area of interviewee? 
¾ (Spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth: Issues and conception 
¾ General portray of policies  
Who ? 
¾ Policy-makers involved  
¾ Partnerships in policy-making? Characterisation of interaction 
¾ Participatory approaches? Outline 
How ? 
¾ How do respective decision-making and policy-making processes work?  
¾ Policy process stages 
¾ Resulting practices of cooperation and conflict, participation 
Outreach ? 
¾ Area targets? Why? Experiences? 
¾ Sectoral outreach? Explanations and experiences  
¾ Social outreach? Explanations and experiences 
Effects ? 
¾ Impact analysis of (policy) actions; Subjective and hard-fact assessment 
¾ Impediments (e.g. political, social, economic, cultural or else) 
Why ? 
¾ Enabling and constraining factors /explanations offered by  
• Actors’ interests, motivations, targets, and constructions? 
• Cooperation and conflict between actors? 
• Participation of local people? 
• Solution finding process? 
¾ Any recommendations for better? If adequate, ask for potentials of 
globalisation  
¾ Future expectations? 
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Institutional and professional background 
The interview partners were selected by their institutional and professional backgrounds (table 
4.6) in order to catch a great variety of perceptions. With the exception of the private sector 
(whose representatives were reluctant to be interviewed), I met representatives from the major 
institutions involved in policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth.  
¾ As noted, I concentrated on Provincial Government Agencies (four formal and three 
informal interviews at various agencies of the Provincial Government of Bohol). 
¾ In order to complement these insights into policy-making at local governments, I 
interviewed consultants from International Aid Organisations who are employed with 
local governments in Bohol (two formal and one informal interviews with two consultants 
from the German Development Service (DED) and one informal interview with a 
consultant from the British Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO)). 
¾ For purposes of comparisons and analysis of state-society interactions I interviewed 
representatives of the ‘governance’-counterpart to governmental policy, here of Non-
Governmental Organisations (three formal and three informal interviews). 
¾ For additional information partly beyond the Bohol context, I talked to representatives of 
Academic Institutions (two formal interviews at de la Salle University Manila, one 
informal at Holy Name University, Tagbilaran, Bohol, and one informal with a foreign 
researcher based in Manila). 
Table 4.6 and appendices A1 and A2 overview the interview partners by their institutional 
background, date, duration, status, and place of interview.  
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Table 4.6:  Experts’ background: Professional and personal interaction with topic  
Inter-
view 
Nation-
ality 
Sex Socio-cultural 
background 
Professional operation 
level 
Interaction with topic 
1 Filipino female “Westernised” 
Filipino/Non-Boholano 
International, national Research (policy-oriented) 
2 Filipino male Filipino/Non-Boholano International, national,  
regional Research (policy-oriented) 
3 Filipino female Boholano Provincial and local Bohol  Planning & administration; Technical support & service delivery 
4 Filipino male Boholano Provincial and local Bohol  Planning & administration; Technical support & service delivery  
5 Filipino male Boholano Provincial and local Bohol  Planning & administration  
6 Filipino female Boholano National, regional, Bohol  Marketing & sales; Consultancy & promotion 
7 &17 Filipino male “Westernised” (lived 
overseas), Non-
Boholano but spent 
half his life there 
Provincial and local Bohol  
 
Planning & administration; Advocacy; Technical support & service 
delivery; Consultancy & promotion; Research (policy-oriented) 
8 Filipino male Boholano Regional; Local Bohol Advocacy; Technical support & service delivery; Consultancy & promotion 
9 &16 Filipino  male Filipino/Non-Boholano National; Local Bohol Advocacy; Technical support & service delivery  
10 German female “Westernised” Local Bohol Planning & administration; Consultancy & promotion; Technical support 
11 & 19 German female “Westernised” Provincial and local Bohol Planning & administration; Consultancy & promotion 
12 Filipino female Boholano National; Regional; 
Provincial and local Bohol 
Research 
13 Filipino  female Boholano Provincial Bohol Planning & administration; Technical support & service delivery 
14 Filipino male Boholano Provincial Bohol Planning & administration 
15 Filipino male Boholano Provincial Bohol Planning & administration 
18a Filipino male Boholano Provincial and local Bohol Technical support & service delivery; Research 
18b British male “Westernised” Provincial and local Bohol Planning & administration; Technical support & service delivery; 
Research 
20 German male “Westernised” National, and local Manila Research 
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4.3.3  Field visits: Ethnographic participation and observation  
I visited thirteen field sites in Bohol, Cebu, and Manila to acquire more intimate insights into 
(a) the disparate developmental situation in Bohol and the Philippines with regard to poverty, 
agriculture and tourism, (b) the sites of policy implementation, (c) the de-facto policy 
activities of the government, especially their (d) interaction with and the responses of local 
people and policy partners and 
competitors, and (e) various ‘political 
and societal truths’ of policy 
intervention. I was able to access and 
participate particular, local Boholano 
(Cebuano and Manila) worlds as well 
as to observe local practices of political 
consultations (see photos 4.2 and 4.3). 
As such my ethnographic findings are 
not “realities extracted from the field 
but are 'intersubjective truths' 
negotiated out of the warmth and 
friction of an unfolding, iterative 
process" (Cloke et al 2004:170; see Schweizer 1999). These ‘truths’ are indicators for the 
‘socio-spatial consciousnesses’ that were discussed theoretically earlier.  
Obstacles and countermeasures encountered during field visits 
Table 4.7 lists the field visit sites. The fact that I am a foreigner, whether I participated or 
observed, and whether I was by myself or accompanied by experts of other organisations, 
significantly affect the insights I gained and sometimes even evolved into obstacles. If 
possible, I undertook countermeasures, which are enclosed in italics following every listed 
obstacle (see also figure 4.7). 
Culture gap: Being German I was not personally familiar with Philippine socio-culture. 
Interpreting the observations was sometimes difficult. I read and discussed the findings with 
experts from the PPDO, Local Development Foundation Bohol, a Filipina Professor from 
Manila, and foreign researcher who have lived or still live in the Philippines. 
Language barrier: Particularly the inhabitants of rural, non-touristy areas in Bohol and Cebu 
spoke limited English and were shy towards foreigners. I was tied to other organisations to 
translate by which presumably some information was lost and contextual modifications made. 
I repeated my questions many times and used different phrasings. I intensified my 
observations, took memos, and asked friends and experts for their interpretation. I tried to 
Photo 4.2: Participating a purok meeting in 
Baclayon (field visit 3) 
 
                                                                                    Clausen 2004 
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relax the atmosphere and relieve people's shyness by joking, chatting and laughing. Speaking 
a few sentences Cebuano eased the atmosphere, too. 
Dependency on assisting organisations: I was to some extent dependent on assisting 
organisations to participate in local meetings and access non-published, confidential 
information sources. These field visits were usually scheduled more tightly and thus my 
observations were restricted in terms of duration and intensity. Generally, the insights I gained 
during the field visits varied considerably depending on the assisting organisation’s policy 
approach. For example, during my stay on Pamilacan island (see figure 4.7; field visit 11) I 
spent two days talking to many local people of different backgrounds and status, and to 
consultants of several development aid agencies who engage on the island. In contrast, the 
visits to the municipalities of Inabanga, 
Clarin, Tubignon and Loon together 
with the PPDO (field visit 5, photo 
4.3) involved almost exclusively 
formal meetings between municipal 
and provincial governments. Here, I 
was limited to talk to the higher ranked 
officials whom I had been introduced 
to. Often their superiors stood close by 
and our conversation was therefore 
constrained. A third example, I 
attended two different purok meetings 
in the barangay of Laya, Baclayon 
(field visit 3). My participation and observation was less restricted at the first meeting than at 
the second meeting where the barangay captain was present (compare chapter 8.4.4). On other 
occasions, such as in Guindulman municipality of Bohol (field visit 4) and Malapascua island 
in Cebu (field visit 7), I did not present myself as a researcher but as a tourist and was 
astonished to be treated completely differently and to gain once again new impressions.  
As a tackling measure I reinforced efforts to collect information on the background of the 
settings. I purposely visited, if possible, some sites various times, either accompanied by 
various organisations, by private persons or being by myself. Direct observation of the 
behaviour and communication among the local people as well as towards the staff of the 
organisations provided additional information.  
 
Photo 4.3: Discussing with the mayor of Tubigon 
and PPDO officers (field visit 5)  
 
 Clausen 2004 
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Table 4.7: Overview over field visits  
Accompanied by My role was No Location Date 
in 2004 Foreign 
or local 
Expert or 
local person 
Participating 
researcher 
Observing 
researcher 
Tourist / 
incognito 
researcher 
1 Cebu City 31 Jan - 5 
Feb; 17 Feb / /  X  
2 Mactan 
Island 
4 Feb; 22-
23 Feb Local Local person  X  
3 2 puroks in 
barangay 
Laya, 
Baclayon 
7 Feb  
Local + 
foreign 
Government 
+ NGO + 
Consultant 
X X  
4 Barangay 
Basdio, 
Guindulman 
8 -10 Feb 
/ / X X X 
5 Inabanga 
Clarin 
Tubignon 
Loon 
11 Feb 
Local 
Government 
+ 
NGO 
X X  
6 Bogo 14 Feb / /  X  
7 Malapascua 
Island 
14 - 16 Feb / /   X 
8 Metro Manila 18 -21 Feb; 
15-25 April 
2003 
Local Academic  X  
9 Tagbilaran 
City 
25 - 29 Feb / /  X X 
10 Panglao 
Island 
2 March Foreign Consultant/ Government X X  
11 Pamilacan 
Island 
3 - 4 March Foreign Consultant/ Government X X  
12 Sierra 
Bullones 
7 March Local NGO X X  
13 Carmen 
Loboc 
7 March / /   X 
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4.3.4  Qualitative processing and evaluation   
I pursue a contextual, subject-oriented qualitative processing and evaluation approach. 
Chapter 8 portrays seven specific policy initiatives in Bohol, which are all selected to belong 
to the three sub-class policy fields. These initiatives are analysed for their effect(iveness) in 
the context of their decentralised setting. Basically, chapter 8 and partially chapter 9 represent 
the essence of findings as derived from the following procedures. 
Firstly, I produce qualitative maps on their policy outreach from the compiled multi-source 
information (see chapter 4.3.1). The maps compare policy makers’ ‘inscriptions’ of spatial, 
social, and sectoral disparities in the three relevant policy fields. In addition, when added as 
literal ‘layers’ to the ‘pockets of poverty’ in Bohol detected earlier, the policy maps illuminate 
whether and how the selected policy reach out to the peripheral, marginalised and most 
significant problems.  
Secondly, for explaining and understanding these results, I refer mostly to interview 
information and field visit observations. Each interview is transcribed or memorised, and 
afterwards thematically structured into a categorical system. The categories are derived from 
the initial interview guide and inductively extended in accordance with the interview contents. 
The memos on the field visits are similarly processed so that they are valuable for analysis. 
Then, I analyse the statements, perceptions, and observations as articulated for each category 
for hints and explanation models on obstacles to effective policy-making. If the data allows, I 
also compare these accounts between policy fields. Thereby constant consideration of the 
contingent situation and context at hand, the locations, and the background of each interview 
partner and policy in focus are important. 
Thirdly, I deduce a general assessment of outreach accomplishments of the particular policies 
in their policy fields and a list of constraints thereon, as well as diverse patterns of how 
specific governmental – and ‘governanced’ – policies conceive, explain, tackle, and 
(re)produce disparities of poverty and wealth. I specifically distinguish those obstacles and 
problems in policy-making, which are typically related to Boholano or Filipino socio-culture 
(compare chapter 9.1). The outcomes are sets of typical policy-making behaviour and 
processes in Bohol, which, with the help of an intense literature review, expert interviews and 
ethnographic observation, can partially be authenticated for more general features of policy 
effect(iveness) upon disparities of poverty in the Philippine setting. 
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5.  Basic differentiations of Philippine nature, people, and 
politics 
This chapter literally portrays those factors, which represent an inherent base for disparate 
development in the Philippines and which can be modified through human agency only in the 
long run (compare chapter 2.3). In other words, this chapter deals with the basic natural 
conditions and basic societal and political differentiations in the Philippines (a) with regard to 
morphological and climate hazards and natural resources, (b) population distribution and the 
city system, (c) ethno-linguistics, and (d) political decentralisation.  
5.1  Foundation for spatial divides? Diversity of Philippine nature and 
people 
On morphology, natural hazards, and resources  
The Philippines have an extremely scattered morphological shape, which facilitates certain 
disparate developments. The country is a geographically fragmented archipelago of 7107 
islands, which are commonly subdivided into three greater regions as illustrated in figure 5.1: 
Luzon in the North, the Visayas in the Centre, and Mindanao in the South. The interior of 
most islands usually consists of mountains rising steeply behind a narrow coastal strip. They 
are the product of a complex intertwining of converging and diverging tectonic plates between 
which the Philippine plate is ‘sandwiched’. Greater plains only exist in the biggest islands of 
Luzon (e.g. in Cagayan Valley) and Mindanao. The Philippines inhibit about 200 volcanoes. 
22 are considered active, of which 12 alone are located in Luzon (plus 56 inactive ones). 
Weak earthquakes are daily phenomena, 44 very strong earthquakes exceeding 6.5 in 
magnitude took place within the last 400 years. Again, Luzon is the hardest hit region. 
Besides seismological turbulences, the Philippines are worldwide among the countries most 
prone to climatic hazards. They have a generally tropical monsoon climate (summerly 
Southwestern and winterly Northeastern monsoon). Already monsoons may cause flooding, 
storm waves, erosion and landslides, however, these are exacerbated by an average of 6 
typhoons per year. Especially Luzon and the entire East-facing regions are most frequently hit 
by typhoons. Mindanao is the least frequently affected region (Fuchs 2002: 16-19).  
These natural and morphological environments condition certain features of the economy. For 
example, the country, especially the Mindanao region, is rich in natural resources including 
mineral, forest, and fishing grounds. The tropical climate and volcanic soils benefit the 
growth of diverse agricultural products. Lowlands are generally more fertile sites for 
agriculture than uplands (Riethmueller & Schoenwaelder 1992). Further impacts of natural 
conditions on agricultural production, trade, infrastructure, and access(ibility), as well as on 
population distribution and ethno-linguistics are to be illustrated in subsequent chapters.  
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Figure 5.1: Morphology of the Philippines 
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The city system and population distribution: Coastal and Manila biases 
Figure 5.2 (and 4.1) visualise the Philippine city system and population distribution as of 
2003 and 2000. There are 115 cities in the Philippines in 2003, most of them located at the 
coast. This is due to (a) the trade advantages of coastal locations, and (b) the better 
accessibility of coastal regions compared to the mountainous interiors of the islands. Most 
cities are historically established sea trade centres and serve as strategic entry points into the 
mainland.  
The capital and megacity Metropolitan Manila or National Capital Region (NCR) clearly 
dominates the city system with 9,033,183 inhabitants, followed by Davao City  (1,147,116 
inhabitants) in Davao del Sur, and Cebu City, or rather, Metro Cebu-Mandaue (978,549 
inhabitants) in Cebu province. The dominance of the NCR emerges as a result of colonial 
economic preferences. The Spanish colonial power from 1565 until 1898, the American 
colonial power from 1898 until 1946, as well as subsequent Filipino governments organised 
their state power, policy and resource allocation in a centralised and urban- (i.e. Manila-) 
focussed manner (Krische 2000: 39-44). As an indicator of widespread urbanisation processes 
induced by the capital, the concentration of cities is exceptionally high also in the 
neighbouring provinces of Central Luzon and (the Eastern CALABRAZON parts of) 
Southern Tagalog. On the contrary, the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), Cagayan 
Valley, Eastern Visayas, and the ARMM, selected provinces of Northern and Central 
Mindanao and Caraga as well as Western provinces of Southern Tagalog display a stronger 
rural character. 
Historically, the Filipino population is rural-based (compare chapters 5.2 and 8). However, 
with economic power accumulating next to political power in the urban areas, Philippine 
settlement patterns have also turned increasingly urban (compare chapters 6.1 and 6.2.1 for 
details on spatial economy and migration processes). In mid-2002 already 60% of the 
78,744,000 Filipinos reside in urban areas. Moreover, the urban population currently grows 
faster at annually 3.2% than the total population at 1.9% (ESCAP 2002).  
However, it ought to be noted that classifications into urban and rural areas in the Philippines 
have to be analysed with caution. Firstly, their differentiation is based on a complex and 
multi-indicator definition (see www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/ 
artciles/con_urbanrural.htm). Secondly, classifications change constantly (compare 
www.nscb.gov/ph/factsheets/) and are not always easy to follow up. None the less, as will be 
shown in chapter 6, the overwhelming dominance of the NCR and its adjacent provinces in 
the city system and population distribution present simultaneously a foundation, a means, and 
an outcome of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.  
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Figure 5.2: Absolute rural and urban population by Philippine provinces in 2000 
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Ethno-linguistic diversity  
Filipinos are a socio-culturally extremely diverse people. Figures on the number of ethnic-
linguistic groups differ according to which authority is read and the applied ethnological 
definition. Accounts vary from 51 major ethno-linguistic groups (Monsod & Monsod 2003) 
over to at least 77 (Peralta 2003) to 169 groups (Hirtz 2003). The majority of scholars agree, 
however, to organise the altogether 81,408,000 Filipinos (as of mid 2004) into four broad 
groupings in accordance with their place of origin and sequence of immigration to the 
archipelago that now constitutes the Philippines.  
The first settlers of austroloid and meleanic origin arrived ca. 20.000 years ago and are today 
subsumed under the term ‘Negritos’. Afterwards people of old-Malay descent moved to the 
archipelago, to which, for example, the Ifugao in Luzon still belong. Today these two groups 
together comprise various indigenous communities who make up in-between 2% and 10% of 
the total population, depending on the author cited. They live mostly in the mountainous 
interiors of the (greater) islands, especially Luzon. 
In subsequence followed younger-descent Malays who represent the majority of Filipinos 
today inhibiting mainly the lowlands and the coastal strips. Due to Spanish missionary work 
most of them converted to Christian religion (today ca. 93% of Filipino are Christians: 85% 
Roman Catholics, 7% Protestants, 1% indigenous Iglesia ni Cristo) making the Philippines the 
only Christian-dominated country in Southeast Asia.  
Mindanao was islamised from Indonesia since the 15th century and reigned as Islamic 
sultanates. After many years of battles the Spanish gradually conquered the sultanates in the 
mid and late 19th century. The Spanish, after them the Americans and Malay Filipino 
government(s) since the 1950s have purposely drawn Christian settlers from Luzon and the 
Visayas there. As a result, nowadays the Muslim groups are minorities in Mindanao (and 
make up about 5% of the total Filipino population and less than 21% of the Mindanao 
population) and concentrate in the Sulu archipelago and Southwest Mindanao (Hayase 2004: 
34-37; 54-55; Schneider 2000: 15-16; compare chapters 5.2, 6.3, and 9).  
Furthermore, early trade with the Chinese, Indians, and Arabs introduced respective diverse 
people and again different economic and socio-cultural influences to the archipelago. In 
Southeast Asian comparison the Chinese population in the Philippines is small at ca. 850.000, 
i.e. 1.2% of all Filipinos in the late 1990s. They usually live in bigger cities like Cebu, Davao, 
Zamboanga, and 50% of them alone in Metro Manila (Ang See 1997: 40-41). In spite of their 
small numbers the Chinese play an important role in the Philippine economy (compare 
chapter 6.3).  
With respect to languages, the official languages are Pilipino – which essentially grounds on 
the Manila-based Tagalog and is the language of education – and English as the business 
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language introduced by the US colonial power. De-facto many more languages exist:  Figures 
again vary from 105 (Taoshiaki 2002) to 988 (Schneider 2003). The geographic fragmentation 
of the country facilitates the parallel existence of languages. Dialects and/or languages often 
alter from one island to another, from lowland to upland, from one community to another. 
Spanish vocabulary has accessed mainly bureaucratic process language and naming, however 
some elderly in the Visayas and Mindanao still speak a Creole of Spanish and local tongues 
(field visits 1 and 9; Taoshiaki 2002: 11). 
On the one hand, due to their various historical interactions with other cultural spheres and 
their ethno-linguistic diversity Filipinos are assumed to be disproportionately exposed to 
global developments (compared to many of their Southeast Asian neighbours like Thailand) 
and consequently to more easily and successfully act in the globalising world of today. On the 
other hand, however, their exceptional ethno-linguistic diversity and morphological 
fragmentation simultaneously makes the Philippine(s) (state) face the challenging task of 
creating and maintaining societal and national unity and cohesion (see chapters 3, 9 and 10). 
5.2  Laying the basis for policy intervention: Decentralisation 
In 1991 the Congress of the Philippines under the presidency of Aquino Corazon (1986-1992) 
approved Republic Act No. 7160 which is known as the Local Government Code (LGC). The 
LGC enacted the decentralisation of service delivery functions and regulatory powers from 
national to three geopolitical local government units (LGUs): provinces, municipalities, and 
barangays. LGUs are illustrated schematically in figure 4.2 part C for the case of Bohol. 
With this decentralisation endeavour Philippine government and administration is being 
historically transformed once again. Until 1991 the archipelago’s history of spatial 
organisation of control and power has entailed the following periods: 
¾ When the Spanish conquered the archipelago they encountered little socio-political village 
communities known as ‘barangays’. Only the Muslim areas in the South were organised in 
kingdom-like realms. During their rule the Spanish tried yet were not able to establish 
centralised control over the archipelago (compare below). They actively used ‘cofradias’, 
local religious fraternities, in order to increase their influence sphere (and spread 
Catholism effectively by these means).  
¾ Local and regional landowners (see chapter 6.1.3 for details) rose alongside agricultural 
commercialisation in the 18th century. They mostly engaged individually in economic 
exchange relations with foreigners, which, in turn, further reinforced centrifugal powers.  
¾ The Americans used these locally established power structures as an extended form of 
their own power outreach and “superimposed a weak central state over a polity of quite 
autonomous local centres of power” (Hutchcroft 1998: 25). They were more successful in 
conquering Mindanao (by exploiting internal rivalries among the various Moro leaders) 
and created a Moro province, which they governed separately from the rest of the country 
(David 2002: 73). 
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¾ In early post-war Philippines the independent national governments(s) worked to enhance 
centralised control.  Many of the wealthy and influential landowner families became 
politicians based in Metro Manila.  
¾ When Ferdinand Marcos became elected President in 1965 he established his own 
oligarchy, made up by members of his clan and trusted cronies. Concomitantly, he further 
pushed allocation of decision-making and power to his followers and to Metro Manila 
(Hamilton-Paterson 1998). 
¾ In 1972 Marcos declared martial law, centred his power base on the military, and 
officially recognised the need to decentralise. De-facto, however he only deconcentrated 
the workload to local government offices while accumulating more power centrally, 
which made him all-powerful and able to commit severe human right violations and 
political corruption (compare Bolongaita 1996; Osteria 1996). 
¾ After ‘people power’ or ‘EDSA I’ ousted the authoritative regime of Marcos in 1986, a 
new Constitution was ratified in 1987 under Aquino Corazon, which opened legislative 
doors for the decentralisation processes to come. It was also decided that in the Philippine 
Presidential form of government, the President exercises supervisory authority directly 
over the provinces, while the provincial governments exercise supervision over 
municipalities (Valdellon 1999). 
Since its enactment in 1991, the implementation of the Local Government Code has been 
politically shaped through the presidencies of Aquino Corazon (1986-1992), Fidel Ramos 
(1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), and Gloria Mascapacal Arroyo (2001-ongoing). 
Precisely, the Code aims at guaranteeing that “the territorial and political subdivisions of the 
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest 
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the 
attainment of national goals” (Republic Act No 7160 Sec. 2). In order to meet these targets it  
¾ Devolves and deconcentrates authority, assets and personnel to provide service delivery 
functions from various national government agencies to local government units, 
¾ Gives regulatory, governmental and corporate powers to local government units that 
traditionally belonged to national government, 
¾ Increases the financial resources available to local governments through (a) autonomous 
taxing powers, (b) automatic release of internal revenue allotments (increase from 11% to 
40%), and (c) local share of revenue from national wealth derived by locally-based 
government-owned and/or -operated corporations. For the first time local governments 
can receive domestic and foreign grants directly.   
¾ Encourages the active participation of and partnership with the private sector and civil 
society organisations like NGOs and people’s organisations (POs) in special bodies like 
the local school board, local health board, local peace and order council and development 
councils at provincial, municipal, and barangay level.  
The local development councils – called Sangguniang – exercise the delegated legislative 
power and provide guidance on development paths. Table 5.1 overviews the organisational 
structure and tasks of the LGUs, specifically the Sangguniang. It highlights that 
decentralisation in the Philippines aims at strengthening participatory policy-making and local 
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governance. By not merely bringing government closer to the people, but by equally 
involving local people in thinking out, planning and implementing policy themselves the LGC 
is often claimed to foster another step of the Philippine road towards democracy (Valdellon 
1999; see below comments on autonomous regions). It ought to be noted that not all 
governmental sectors have been decentralised. Chapter 8 picks up the sectoral tasks 
decentralised to the case provincial government of Bohol with special relevance to this study. 
Table 5.1: Structure and tasks of local government units and Sangguniang 
 Provincial Government  Municipal Government Barangay Government  
 
Executive 
Provincial Development 
Council  
Sangguniang  
Panlalawigan 
Municipal Council 
 
Sangguniang Banlungsod/ 
Sangguniang Bayan 
Barangay 
 
Sangguniang 
Barangay 
Head Governor Mayor Barangay Captain 
Members of 
Sangguniang 
Mayors of composed 
cities and municipalities 
Chairman of the 
committee on 
appropriation of the SP 
concerned 
Congressman 
Representatives of NGO 
(not less than ¼ of the 
members of the fully 
organised council) 
All punong barangays 
(city/municipalities) 
Chairman of the 
committee on 
appropriation of the SP or 
SB concerned 
Congressman 
Representatives of the 
NGOs (not less than ¼ of 
the members) 
Members of the SB 
Representatives of NGOs 
Representative of 
congressman 
Tasks of 
Sangguniang 
Formulate long term, medium term and annual 
socioeconomic development plans and policies 
Formulate the medium-term and annual public 
investment programmes 
 
Enacts ordinances 
Approves resolutions 
Appropriates funds of the 
general welfare 
Source: adjusted after PPDO 2002 
Regional autonomy  
Besides its objective of local autonomy the Local Government Code re-confirms the special 
administrative position of two autonomous regions. The formal organic creation of the 
Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) and (b) the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) dates back to 1989 (figure 4.1). The LGC accounts for the autonomous regions only 
as long as these come up with own local government codes (Republic Act No 7160 Sec. 526).  
As table 4.2 clarifies, despite both regions being named ‘autonomous’ only the ARMM 
functionally operates autonomously and has as the sole region in the country its own regional 
government. The CAR operates despite its name as an administrative region under the direct 
supervision of national government. This is partly due to the negative outcome of a plebiscite 
in 1990 to decide on the autonomous status and to continual legal challenges. Although the 
ARMM remains an integral part of the Philippines, and the President exercises supervision 
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over the regional governor, regional autonomy and governance guarantees wide-ranging 
powers and functions, including certain governmental powers and separate executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers to impose and collect certain taxes (compare ADB 2002a).  
In many ways the formal creation of both autonomous regions is seen as a step by the 
(national) government towards formal ‘justice of recognition’ to the indigenous communities 
in the upland North of Luzon and the indigenous Muslim communities in Mindanao, as well 
as a response to ongoing (armed) conflicts with them. Broadly speaking, conflicts between 
government and various indigenous minorities in the uplands of Northern Luzon started in the 
1970s, when large-scale governmental ‘development projects’ meant to construct and exploit 
dams, mines, and agro-industrial sites in lands inhibited by the minorities (Hegmanns 1990). 
Conflicts were partially settled by the Constitution of 1987 and the Indigenous People’s Right 
Act of 1997 recognising the rights of indigenous cultural communities (see chapter 9.3.4). 
Conflicts between government and Muslim minorities in Mindanao date back to colonial 
times, but arose increasingly after independence when government-induced migration of 
Christian Filipinos put growing pressure on original landownership, plus Christian Filipinos 
took control over the large parts of the administration and the rich natural resources in the 
region. In the 1970s the situation escalated into armed conflict over uneven socio-economic 
resource distribution, political separatism, and recognition of cultural-religious identities as 
“many Muslim resisted the national identity of Filipino because they understood that Muslims 
had no place in a nation-state that consistently disregarded and denigrated Islam” 
(Horvatich 2003: 23; see chapters 9.1, 9.3.4, 10 for follow-up). It ought to be noted that in 
spite of their common experience of marginalisation there are various Muslim identity groups 
– reflecting ethno-linguistic diversity – with each of them pursuing their own socio-economic 
and political goals until today (Schneider 2000; Buendia 2002). Internationally the conflict(s) 
of Mindanao are registered as civil war with the major opponents being the national (local) 
government(s) and military on the one hand and the ‘Moro Islamic Liberation Front’ (MILF) 
and the more militant ‘Abu Sayaff’ on the other. A peace agreement has been signed with the 
‘Moro National Liberation Front’ (MNLF) in 1996, which can partially be seen as a response 
to the granted autonomy for the ARMM. Despite positive peace talks between MNLF and 
MILF fighting continues and has actually gained intensity since 11 September 2001 
(http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/ Ipw/Akuf/; see follow-up chapter 9.3.3).  
The objectives of the Local Government Code for local autonomy and cooperation between 
administrative and political scales, and between societal and state actors become even more 
crucial in the light of these conflicts over uneven resource and power distribution. Thus, it is 
to be examined in this study whether the quote is justifiable to claim that “the recent 
Philippine decentralization appears as a good opportunity to fight poverty” and disparate 
development (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 304). 
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6.  Spatial divides of poverty and wealth in the Philippines: 
Empirical explorations  
This chapter (together with subsequent chapter 7) presents findings to key question I: It 
identifies and relates different faces of spatial disparities of poverty and wealth in and 
between Philippine regions and provinces. Thereby some reference is made to some of their 
social inequality manifestations. The structure of the chapter follows the list of indicators of 
disparities of poverty introduced in chapter 2.3.2. Aspects of access and infrastructure are 
integrated with the social and economic issues they overlap with (no sub-national data is 
available on technological connectivity).  
One implicit aim of this chapter is to identify – with support of a map series, statistics, and 
scholars’ assessments – those factors, which are particularly important to the production of 
disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines (these will centre the analysis of policy 
intervention later on). It ought to be noted that this chapter already represents the outcome of 
the many steps of combined deductive-inductive research; it does not demonstrate individual 
inductive identification stages. Therefore, those issues detected to be of explicit significance 
(for example indicators on economic sectors) are discussed in more detail than others.  
As outlined, problems related to data quality and availability constrain the research process. 
Notwithstanding my counteractions (see chapter 4) these data restrictions to some extent  
(a) Impede the quantitative findings and suggest to emphasise on their qualitative contents 
and to use, if appropriate, other scholars’ assessments complementarily, and  
(b) Make comparisons across sub-national spaces, over time, and across variables more 
difficult.  
Ultimately, this data environment can be assumed to significantly reflect both, on the 
developmental paths of as well as on policy-making vis-à-vis poverty and disparity alleviation 
in the Philippines (compare theory chapter 3; Balisacan 1997: 2; follow up in chapter 8). 
6.1  Economic disparities of poverty and wealth  
6.1.1  National government’s income-based perspective 
The official ‘faces’ of disparities of poverty in the Philippines are income-based estimates 
published every three years by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). 
Statistically, the data are of comparably low quality because, firstly, their coefficients of 
variations are often above 10% (NSCB 2003a). Secondly, prior to 2003 the NSCB recorded 
poverty incidence at regional scales only. It follows that provincial poverty data before 2003 
are re-estimates from regional data (NSCB 2003b). Thirdly, NSCB publications on poverty do 
not cite the population data sources they use (see NSCB 2000; 2002b; 2003a; 2003b).  
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Figure 6.1: Poverty incidence: Magnitude of urban and rural poor by province, and the poor as 
a percentage to provincial population in 2000 
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Perspective Ia: Absolute and relative poverty across provinces  
In 2000, poverty incidence is registered by a per capita income less than the annual poverty 
threshold of 11,605 Pesos (calculated to meet food and non-food requirements18). 
Accordingly, the NSCB (2003a) estimated 34% of Filipinos to be poor. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the spatiality of poverty incidence by (a) the magnitude of rural and urban provincial poor, 
and (b) their proportion to the total population. Numerically, the poor cluster in and around 
Metro Manila, Bicol, the Central Visayas, and Western provinces of Mindanao. Obviously, 
absolute numbers of the poor are strongly related with population numbers in the respective 
regions. Negros Occidental is the province with the highest number of 1,312,727 poor, 
followed by Masbate. Cebu province and Metro Manila rank third and seventh with 1,081,449 
and 848,962 poor people respectively19.  
Poverty is more a rural than an urban phenomenon. Only in and around Metro Manila and 
Cebu urban exceeds rural poverty – a result of high urbanisation (compare figure 5.2). 
Reversing the absolute numbers, the quartile with the lowest percentage of the poor to the 
total population (7.5-32.7%) allocates in and around Metro Manila and Central Luzon. The 
very far North of Luzon, and – strikingly – the small islands of Guimaras and Basilan, as well 
as the provinces of Cebu, Misamis Oriental, and Davao del Sur also belong to this first 
quartile, but resemble ‘wealthier islands’ surrounded by provinces with a clearly higher 
proportional poverty incidence. According to his field observations expert interview 20 
regards the information on Guimaras and Basilan to be unrealistic: He would categorise both 
provinces among the poorest in the country. Provincial ‘pockets’ of the highest percentage of 
the poor (51.9-70.9%) concentrate in Mindanao, Eastern and Western Visayas, Bicol, and the 
CAR, and are headed by Masbate, Sulu, Romblon, and Ifugao provinces.  
Figure 6.2 shows the poor as a proportion of the regional population since 1991. As a trend, 
the poors’ percentage in most regions has decreased between 1991 and 1997 and has 
increased since – a possible indicator for the impact of the economic recession commonly 
called the ‘Asian crisis’ in 1997/1998. The crisis set off in Thailand, spread over Asia and is, 
broadly speaking, seen as a result of volatile globalisation-led growth that relies upon global 
capital and labour division. However, the Philippines were less hard hit than their neighbours. 
Yet, the crisis coincided with a severe El-Nino-related drought in the Philippines, which 
exacerbated the recession (Bautista 2000). 
                                                
18
 The measurement involves construction of (a) food and (b) poverty thresholds: (a) includes income needed to 
obtain a food basket for urban and rural areas of each region, satisfying a minimum nutrition of 2000 kilocalories 
per person per day; (b) defines food threshold plus non-food expenditure of household within a 10 percentile 
band around the food threshold in the income distribution (including costs for clothing, housing, medical care, 
education, transportation and communication, non-durable furniture, personal care). 
19
 Note that absolute numbers of the poor evidently reflect general population distribution patterns. 
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Exceptions in figure 6.2 are the (a) ARMM and Bicol, which have developed the opposite 
direction, (b) CAR and Cagayan Valley, which have reduced their proportion of the poor 
continuously since 1994, and (c) Northern Mindanao where the percentage of the poor has 
almost stagnated.  
The figure suggests grouping those regions with similar poverty levels over time. The 
‘wealthiest’ group is headed by Metro Manila and includes Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, 
and Central Visayas. The other extreme with poverty percentages around 60% consists of the 
ARMM, Bicol, and Central Mindanao. In fact, all Mindanao regions register high-poverty 
levels, the Visayan medium-levels, the Luzon regions located proximate to Metro Manila low, 
and the Luzon regions located at a distance to Metro Manila high and medium poverty levels. 
 
Figure 6.2: The poor as a percentage to regional population 1991-2000* 
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Perspective II: Distribution of income poverty or income inequality  
The NSCB (2000) stresses that its poverty measurement enables comparison across provinces, 
while still acknowledging local differences as it is based on locally distinct food baskets (see 
footnote 18). In contrast, Balisacan (1997) claims this methodology to induce spatial 
distortions: As consumption turns to higher quality with higher income, food thresholds are 
higher for the wealthier than the poorer. Thus, food poverty lines are not comparable across 
regions since they imply different living standards. Balisacan infers that illustrations of the 
distributional aspects of poverty are biased.  
As noted, a popular indicator that explicitly illuminates the distributional aspects of disparities 
of poverty is the income-based Gini-coefficient20, as displayed in figure 6.3 for Philippine 
families by provinces in 1997 and 2000. In 2000, the most obvious ‘pockets’ of low-income 
inequality are located in the provinces around Metro Manila (not the Metropolitan itself!) and 
the very North of Luzon, whereas especially the Visayan provinces register comparably high-
income inequality. Mindanao shows a mixed picture, ranging from provinces in the ARMM 
with the lowest inequality in the country to highly unequal Zamboanga, South Cotabato, and 
Bukidnon. Compared to 1997, broadly speaking, income distributions have deteriorated in the 
Visayas and have become more equal in Luzon and Mindanao – with the exception from 
Bicol and CAR provinces. This is an interesting observation given that, according to figure 
6.2, poverty incidence in most provinces started to rise again in 1997 and one could expect 
inequality to increase parallely.  
In a qualitative comparison of figures 6.1 and 6.3 the Philippine provinces can be grouped 
according to their specific income poverty and inequality relation. There are  
(a) Provinces with high poverty incidence and low inequality (e.g. the ARMM provinces, 
Agusan del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Marinduque); 
(b) Provinces with high poverty and high inequality (e.g. the CAR and Bicol provinces, 
Bohol, Capiz); 
(c) Provinces with low poverty and low inequality (e.g. provinces surrounding Metro Manila, 
Central Luzon, the very North of Luzon); 
(d) Provinces with low poverty yet higher inequality (e.g. Metro Manila, Cebu, Capiz, Iloilo, 
Misamis Oriental, Davao del Sur), and  
(e) Residual provinces with non-conform and varied patterns. 
 
                                                
20
 The ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality to the area below the line of 
perfect equality: O indicates perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality.  
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Figure 6.3: Gini coefficient of Philippine provinces in 1997 and 2000 
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6.1.2  On labour: Alternative viewpoint 
Unemployment and underemployment  
Unemployment and underemployment21 are not included in official poverty statistics, yet the 
national government views them as central to Philippine developmental problems (NEDA 
2001: 31-35). The Philippine labour force participation in 2001 is at 67.5 % the highest in ten 
years (NSCB 2002b). The ILO (2003) calculates the rate even higher at 69.8%, yet also 
illustrates that Philippine labour force participation remains low in Southeast Asian 
comparison. Figure 6.4 shows the annual national employment and underemployment rates 
between 1991 and 2001, and employment rates by region in 2001. Employment rates vary 
between 89.9 and 92.6%; that means that unemployment rates officially swing around 10%.  
 
In this context, one expert interviewee advises to consider that “in the first half of 2005 
Arroyo and other government officials announced that the ‘officially’ given figures on 
unemployment are not correct. They said approximately 13%. But if you ask me and other 
friends of mine in the Philippines agree it could be around 30%. Again a problem of statistics 
or of faked statistics” (expert interview 20). Unemployment numbers are also likely to be 
                                                
21
 Underemployment includes all employed persons who desire additional (hours of) work (NSCB 2002b). 
Figure 6.4: Annual employment and underemployment rates of the household population 15 
years and over 1991-2001, and employment rate by region in 2001  
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many times higher than the official counts, because data are inconsistent as several sources 
publish different figures on the same indicator22. Furthermore, informal labour makes an 
important contribution, yet is not registered and figures remain vague. For example, Schneider 
(1999) registers between 16% and 34% of employment in Baguio and Zamboanga City as 
informal23. In the absence of formal social protection schemes, there is little incentive to 
register as unemployed. The government only offers internet-based assistance to employment 
search and creation (Brooks 2002). These services concentrate in Metropolitan Manila and its 
surroundings. Notwithstanding these data constraints, all employment data used for this study 
indicate similar tendencies and therefore the figures are utilised as qualitative indicators.  
Employment rates show a slightly ‘bumpy’ increase in the early 1990s and a sharp downfall 
after 1996, which, despite some fluctuations, have not picked up considerably until 2001. 
Obviously, these trends correspond (in reverse direction) to those of poverty incidence. 
Underemployment follows an opposite trend and thus matches with those of unemployment, 
yet is with rates ranging from 23.7% (1998) to 16.6% (2001) considerably higher than 
unemployment. The labour underutilisation rate peaked with up to 33.3% in 1998, the crisis-
year.  
Boom- and bust experiences and the income - labour nexus 
The experiences of Filipinos in the labour market, with income-poverty and with inequality 
all reflect the boom and bust cycle in overall economic growth. The course of the Philippine 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1984 and 2002, as illustrated in figure 6.5 has been 
very unstable: The country suffered from three socio-economic crises in 1983/84, 1990-92 
and 1997/98: Once it managed to recover from one recession, another already commenced.  
The recession 1983/84 is claimed to have resulted from a foreign debt crisis and stoppage of 
foreign loans interrelated with unsuccessful governmental interventions due to ‘cronyism’ 
under Marcos (compare chapter 5.2), and the rise of mass protest against Marcos following 
the assassination of his ‘rival’ Aquino in 1983. The bust years 1990-92 were mainly an 
inflation crisis with inflation reaching 20% (Lim 1998). As mentioned, the ‘Asian crisis’ 
together with the El Nino-instigated drought set of another severe recession period in 
1997/98.  
Strikingly, in 2000 the GDP grows at 4.2%, yet employment falls and vice versa in 2001. 
Three explanations are likely: (a) Values on GDP before and since 2000 are not directly 
comparable because of a change in methodological derivation. Comparable figures of GDP 
would probably have been lower for 2000, given that economic recovery was dampened by 
                                                
22 Compare data published by ADB, ESCAP, NEDA and NSCB (see bibliography). 
23
 ‘Informal’ includes the self-employed without official licence and enterprises with less than 5 employees. 
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political turmoil through (b) ‘people power II’ forcing Estrada out of and Arroyo taking over 
presidency, and (c) a blackmail series in Mindanao (compare chapter 8.4.2). Since 2001, 
rising employment and GDP and less underemployment have indicated a hopeful ‘new 
beginning’ under Arroyo (compare chapters 9 and 10). 
 
Figure 6.5: GDP growth and GDP by sector (at constant 1985 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spatial disparities in the labour market  
Figure 6.6 visualises absolute (sectoral) employment by province in 2001. Besides logically 
reflecting population distribution, the differentials in employment exemplify levels of 
economic attractiveness. In absolute numbers, employment is allocated in the NCR and 
surroundings, to a lesser extent in Cebu and Negros Occidental, and in and around Davao del 
Sur. In comparison, figure 6.4 implies that the unemployment rate in 2001 is also highest in 
the NCR, followed by Southern Tagalog, Central Luzon, and Central Visayas. In contrast, the 
ARMM registers a contrasting pattern with very little absolute employment yet the lowest 
unemployment rate. Its economy is based above all on subsistence agriculture and fisheries, 
both sectors with many family workers and little (registered) dismissals.  
Relating the findings to the city and population distribution in figure 5.2, obviously, (a) the 
largely urbanised regions record high absolute employment, high unemployment, and high 
absolute yet low population-relative poverty. On the contrary, (b) those regions with less 
absolute employment, relative low unemployment, yet high relative poverty incidences 
comprise the CAR, Cagayan Valley, Eastern Visayas and the ARMM, selected provinces of 
Northern and Central Mindanao and Caraga as well as Western MIMAROPA provinces of 
Southern Tagalog – all of which display a stronger rural character according to figure 5.2.   
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Figure 6.6: Employment by sector and province in 2001  
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6.1.3  Sectoral developments: Agriculture vs. services and industry? 
Figure 6.7 visualises the absolute gross domestic product (GDP) by economic sector and GDP 
growth rates by regions from 1999 to 2001 and in the crisis year 1998. As to be expected, in 
absolute terms, the NCR outnumbers all other regions in terms of income production, 
followed by its neighbouring regions of Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon, the Central and 
Western Visayas and Southern Mindanao. Noteworthy, the Western Visayas produce almost 
as much as their Central neighbour, yet with much smaller population numbers (see figure 
5.2). With the exception of Northern Mindanao, residual Mindanao regions are far behind the 
development of Southern Mindanao. The ARMM and Caraga are at the least end of the GDP 
parameter in the country. Western and Central Mindanao, Eastern Visayas, Bicol, the CAR 
and Cagayan Valley follow.  
In sectoral terms, the figure confirms already noted spatial patterns: The agricultural sector 
has disappeared from the NCR. Services produce more than 50% of the GDP there and in the 
Central Visayas. Industry dominates over 50% of the economy in CAR, while in turn 
agriculture takes the lead in Cagayan Valley, Western Mindanao, and the ARMM. Subsequent 
chapters discuss sectoral developments in detail. In comparison with employment by sector in 
figure 6.6 one can infer, broadly speaking, that most regions with a majority of labour force in 
agriculture are least successful in terms of GDP production and growth (exceptions of 
Cagayan Valley and Central Visayas). In contrast, those regions with high employment in 
services and industry yield higher economic products and growth (exception of CAR).  
None the less, with regard to GDP growth 1999-2001, Cagayan Valley and Southern 
Mindanao head the countrywide trend, based on agriculture/fishery (-industry) and trade – and 
despite the sharp decrease in GDP in 1997/98 (small map, figure 6.7). The more industry and 
service-led NCR, Central Luzon, the CAR, Western and Central Visayas also yield high 
growth rates, and suffered comparatively less during 1997/98. This finding suggests that 
hazards may have had more adverse effects on the Philippine regional economy than the 
Asian crisis in 1997/98 (Shaw 1999; see chapters 5.2, 6.3). Southern Tagalog is one step 
behind because of its divide into, broadly speaking rural-agricultural MIMAROPA and 
urbanising, service-industry-led CALABRAZON (see table 4.2; small map in figure 4.1).   
Thus, the spatial distribution of GDP adds another ‘layer of disparities’ to the already 
elaborated rough patterns and underlines the basic differentiation into  
(a) Largely urbanised regions with larger overall economic production, higher absolute 
employment, high absolute yet low population-relative income poverty. Note that these 
regions also have high rates of labour turn-over and income inequality, as opposed to 
(b) Rural regions with less absolute employment, relative low unemployment, lower overall 
economic production, relatively high-income poverty incidences, yet lower income 
inequality. This broad differentiation is specified in subsequent sections.   
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Figure 6.7: Gross domestic product by economic sector and region, and its overall growth 
rates 1999-2001 and during the ‘Asian crisis’ year 1998 
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Agriculture and fishery: Traditional backbone of the Philippine economy 
The Philippines are traditionally an agricultural and fishery economy. Table 6.1 shows that 
Palay rice, corn, sugarcane, coconut, and banana are the top 5 crops in terms of value of 
production in 200124. Besides minor changes, these plantation crops have been the top 5 for 
50 years. Colonial powers 
introduced plantations to the 
Philippines, which have 
dominated the agro-industrial 
(export) landscapes in 
Mindanao, the Visayas, and 
Cagayan Valley until today. 
Plantation-led areas typically co-
exist with areas characterised 
through small-scale, mainly 
subsistence agriculture (see chapter 7). Relating tables 6.1 and 6.2 it becomes obvious that 
only coconuts and bananas are used for large-scale exports, whereas rice even has to be 
imported in huge amounts. Put differently, the Philippines are not able to provide their 
inhabitants with their prime crop food.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the fishery sector, the production 
quantity of catches has increased 
constantly since the early 1970s as 
figure 6.8 illustrates. Besides fisher 
folks’ ‘traditional’ coastal fishing for 
subsistence, there are an estimated one 
million small-scale fishermen (mostly 
relying on reef fishery), who contribute 
almost one billion US dollar to the 
                                                
24
  1Philippine Peso is worth 0.0200140 US Dollar or 1 US Dollar 49.9650 Pesos as of 05/10/2006.  
Table 6.2: Top 5 of agricultural exports and imports 2002 24 
 
Export commodity Value in US$   Import commodity Value in US$ 
1. Oil of coconuts 352,625,000  1.Wheat 486,728,000
2. Bananas 308,887,000  2.Cake of Soya Beans 231,911,000
3. Dried coconuts 94,798,000  3.Milled Paddy Rice 211,663,000
4. Canned Pineapple  81,979,000  4.Dry Skim Cow Milk 145,712,000
5. Prepared Fruit  64,901,000  5. Cigarettes 107,838,000
      Source: FAO 2003 
Table 6.1: Top 5 agricultural crops by value of 
production 2001 24 
 
Crop Value of production in million Pesos 
Per cent of 
total production 
1.  Palay 105,323,1 36.6 
2.  Corn 30,724,8 10.7 
3.  Sugarcane 25,211,3 8.8 
4.  Coconut   24,434,4 8.5 
5.   Banana  22,672,3 7.9 
       Source: NSCB 2002b  
Figure 6.8: Quantity of fish production 1992-2001 
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economy (White, Vogt, Arin 2000). Besides, commercial large-scale fishing with processing 
facilities on board, and aquaculture of prawns, milkfish, shells, or seafood in mangrove 
brackwaters are growing sectors in the Philippines. Aquacultures have been practiced in the 
Philippines since the 17th century and have become a very significant export product and a 
means to large-scale income generation (Uthoff 2000). However, at the local level, over-
fishing and resource depletion, pollution, and deforestation of mangrove areas – the breeding 
and nursery sites of many fish, shells, and birds, and control to soil erosion and salination – 
make fisher folks’ attempts to secure a livelihood ever more difficult (compare Bohol case in 
chapters 7.2.3 and 8.4.3; Kelly 1996; ADB 1999).   
Productivity of the primary sector and labour dilemmas 
Since the early 1980s the primary sector has in fact been a shrinking sector in terms of 
employment and income production the Philippines and continues to dominate the economy 
only in the mentioned regions of Cagayan Valley, Western Mindanao and ARMM (compare 
figures 6.6, 6.7). In 1985 agriculture and fisheries still accounted for 26.7% of the national 
economy, industry for 33% and services for 40.4%. By 2003 the share of the primary sector 
drops to 19.9%, the secondary sector stagnates at 33.5%, while the tertiary sector produces at 
46.7% almost half of the economy (see figure 6.5). Only Cagayan Valley and Southern 
Mindanao experience a period of successful growth due to their primary sectors, which are 
mainly plantation-led (coconut, palm oil, fruits, timber), plus in case of Southern Mindanao in 
services (figure 6.7).  
Notwithstanding its reduced productivity, in 2001 37.7% of all employed Filipinos are still 
officially engaged in the primary sector (NSCB 2001). These figures do neither include 
unpaid family workers, people pursuing several jobs at a time nor the informal sector. 
Therefore, figures can be assumed higher: Estimates reach 64% (Shaw 1999: 44). As figure 
6.6 displays, agriculture and fishery remains the dominant sector of employment in most of 
Mindanao, Eastern Visayas, Northern Luzon as well as MIMAROPA- Southern Tagalog. 
These agricultural/fishery-led regions are – when compared with the spatial patterns of 
poverty incidence and the city and population distribution – at the same time those with over-
proportionally high percentage of poor inhabitants and those with a stronger rural character 
(see figures 6.1, 5.2). 
It ought to be noted that agricultural and fishery development in the Philippines is additionally 
impeded through the  
(a) The lack of space in the relatively narrow strips of fertile coastal lowlands where 
increasing urbanisation takes away agricultural lands;  
(b) The natural disasters that frequently hit the country; 
(c) The morphological fragmentation; and  
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(d) Dependence on irrigation infrastructure.  
For example, the sharp decrease in GDP in Southern and Northern Mindanao and Cagayan 
Valley in 1997/98, depicted in figure 6.7, are, as briefly hinted at before, above all caused by 
the natural phenomenon of El Nino and the following drought. The ‘Asian crisis’ is only 
partially to blame because the Philippine agricultural sector is only limitedly integrated in 
global(ised) markets. Somewhat paradoxically, “Thus, in a perverse way, the backwardness 
of Philippine agriculture has proved a strength during the crisis” (Shaw 1999: 48; compare 
also Clausen forthcoming B).  
The morphological fragmentation of the Philippines results in high transport, logistic, and 
infrastructure costs which eventually make “it cheaper to bring corn from Bangkok to Manila 
than to bring corn from Cotabato to Manila” (Intal & Osman Ranit 2001: 1). Moreover – and 
this accounts for all economic sectors – the small markets of the single islands make 
economies of scale more difficult, cause lower price outcomes for farmers, and the domestic 
markets to be unable to compensate unexpected, high demand levels which are then released 
through imports. These inefficiencies of the distribution system lead to additional pressure for 
economic protection, which in turn, keep up labour costs. It is argued that the Philippines fall 
behind in international competition for foreign investment and labour division in all economic 
sectors because of their high labour costs compared to countries like Indonesia, Vietnam or 
China (expert interviews 1, 20).  
Irrigation infrastructure is an essential aspect to enhance agricultural productivity because “it 
is land quality, not farm size per se that tends to positively influence the income of the poor” 
(Baliscan & Pernia 2002: 5). However, Baliscan & Pernia forget here that the establishment 
and maintenance of irrigation facilities already require a certain financial asset which most of 
the very poor do not possess. Figure 6.9 highlights that the irrigated areas in Luzon exceed 
those in the Visayas and Mindanao in absolute terms. Central Luzon, Illocos and Cagayan 
Valley are top in the country, whereas the ARMM and Central Visayas come last. This is 
particularly interesting because Cebu and Negros provinces belong to the traditional large-
scale agricultural plantation areas (compare Torres-Mejia 2000). Also worth noting is that 
irrigated areas in Bicol exceeds those in Mindanao. In terms of irrigation potential, huge 
capacities exist in Mindanao, and to a lesser extent, in Western Visayas and Cagayan Valley.  
The map hides yet another problematic aspect persistent in Philippine irrigation development. 
Irrigated farmland is above all located in the fertile, intensively cultivated lowlands but 
receives water from upland springs – a relationship that turns to become problematic with 
increasing intensity of upland agriculture as chapters 7.2.3 for the case of Bohol. Kikuchi, 
Maruyama, Hayami (2003) even foresee the gradual collapse of existing irrigation facilities in 
the Philippines due to water mismanagement, rehabilitation and maintenance problems, and a 
consequential food crisis in near future.  
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Figure 6.9: Status of irrigation development in 2001 
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Landownership fundamentals  
Figure 6.10 underlines some of the mentioned aspects and points at a problem that is 
fundamental in understanding disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines: Social 
inequalities created through unequal landownership overlap with material and spatial 
disparities. 
The figure visualises the percentage of farm area by total area and province in 2002 (part A) 
and its changes since 1991 (part B). Part A shows that relatively high percentages of land are, 
broadly speaking, in agricultural use in Bicol, Negros, Northern and Southern Mindanao. 
Interestingly, other agricultural productivity hubs such as Cagayan Valley register relatively 
little proportions of farmland. These findings can only be understood when related to the 
overall alienable and disposable, i.e. private land area, which in turn partially reflects 
morphological conditions, as illustrated in part C of the figure. With regard to Cagayan 
Valley, the map indicates low percentages of alienable lands, which may in turn result in the 
low farmland proportions (which are, however, as noted, highly productive, possibly by 
means of irrigation). 
For further explanation, the figure indicates farmland by their operators’ place of residence 
and not by the actual location of the farms. This is also the reason why, at first sight 
strikingly, Metro Manila records the highest percentage of farm area in the whole country and 
its figures exceed even a 100%. In other words, many farm owners live in Metro Manila and 
operate their farms as ‘absentee owners’ at a distance. These finding are linked to the fact that 
most agricultural lands in the Philippines are owned by wealthy landowners, while practically 
looked after by tenants and landless workers. The landowners contribute to the wealth of the 
capital (for example through taxes), whereas the tenants and landless Filipinos make up 
specific poverty groups and contribute to the poverty accumulation in the agricultural regions 
(compare Bohol case in chapters 7 and 8; Torres-Mejia 2000). Similar situations may apply to 
the provinces surrounding the Metropolis, however, these provinces may also be affected by 
the mentioned displacement of agricultural lands through urbanisation and industrialisation. 
The phenomenon of sharply decreasing percentages of farm area in these provinces stresses 
this argument (figure 6.10 part B). 
In the context of disparate development, relations between Philippine landowner elites and 
marginalised workers are most worthy of note. However, it ought to be mentioned, that a 
fairly distinct middle class has emerged in the Philippines alongside industrialisation and 
particularly globalisation processes. The middle class geographically concentrates in urban 
areas, mostly Metro Manila, and is estimated by expert interview 9 to comprise about 30% of 
Philippine society (see also chapters 9.2.2 and 9.3.2, Kimura 2003).  
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Figure 6.10: Farm area by province: Several viewpoints 
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Industrial development through globalisation 
Since the early 1980s the Philippine economy has aimed at the expansion of industries and 
services through export-orientated trade and inflow of foreign investment, in short through 
globalisation: Already in 1990 exports totalled 18.5% of the GDP and increased to 23.5% in 
1995 and 51% in 2000 (Orbeta 2002). FDI inflows rose from US$ 530 million in 1980 to 
US$1.408 million in 1996. In addition, net private capital inflows increased from US$639 
million to US$4.600 million (Angeles 2000). Sector-wise, as figure 6.5 and 6.7 show, the 
industrial sector grows less and is smaller than its service counterpart. In 2001, 16.3% of all 
employed Filipinos work in industry.  
Spatially, industrial employment and GDP production are located disproportionately in Metro 
Manila, close-by Central Luzon provinces, CALABRAZON- provinces of Southern Tagalog, 
the Central Visayas, especially Cebu province. Interestingly, in CAR industry takes over more 
than 50% of the economy but generates little employment. Similarly, the regional shares of 
exports and FDI are biased: In 1988, Southern Tagalog makes up for 3.7% of exports and 
28.8% of FDI in the national total, compared to Metro Manila at 57.1% and 42.7% 
respectively. By the year 2000, Southern Tagalog develops as the dominant exporter with 
52.3% and receiver of FDI with 63.4%, followed by the NCR with 23.6% and 18.1% 
respectively. Obviously, investments, firstly, allocate almost exclusively to Metro Manila and 
Southern Tagalog, and secondly, have shifted proportionally from the Metropolis southwards 
into CALABRAZON provinces of Southern Tagalog in the 1990s (Pernia & Quising 2002).   
The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the Philippines explicitly aims at 
using global industrial enterprises as levers for a more balanced development, particularly for 
agro-industries in the poorer regions (compare Palpacuer & Parisotto 2003). However, the 
eventual SEZ distribution again replicates existing spatial and economic divides as figure 6.11 
illustrates. With 71 Special Economic Zones Southern Tagalog (mostly in the 
CALABRAZON) clearly outnumbers all other regions, followed by the NCR with 24, Central 
Luzon with 15, and Central Visayas with 13 SEZs. Again, the Mindanao, Eastern and 
Western Visayas, and Northern Luzon Regions are worse off with 41 SEZs between them 
(PEZA 2003). The three SEZs in Banquet may account for the strong mining-industry in the 
CAR. However, as mentioned, industrial employment is small in the CAR (see chapter 6.3).  
In fact, Philippine export processing zones (the most common kind of SEZ) generated only 
0.3% of national employment, compared to 12.0% in China, 4.4% in Sri Lanka and 2.1% in 
Malaysia in 1995 – once again calling for less global integration of the Philippine economy 
than their neighbours (Jayanthakumaran 2003). Moreover, the SEZs tend to be badly 
integrated into local subcontractor systems and import between 40% and 75% of their 
production costs. Hence, neither local ancillary industries nor local (agro-) industries benefit 
substantially and durably from spill over effect (Hanisch 2000). In addition, a focus on 
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(industrial) growth through foreign investments reinforces the volatility of markets (compare 
small map in figure 6.7). Market volatility is also a reason for the discerned high 
unemployment in the NCR, Central Luzon, and Southern Tagalog (figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.11: Special Economic Zones in the Philippines in 2003 
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Figure 6.12: Micro, small, and medium 
enterprises in the service sector for every 
1000 Filipinos by province in 2000 
Development potentials in the service sector  
Services are the fastest growing and largest sector in the Philippines in terms of overall GDP 
and employment generation (see figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7). In 2001, 46% of all employed Filipinos 
work in services. In addition, many small-scale businesses work in the service sector 
informally and seasonally as an income diversification instrument. This implies that they are 
not officially registered and pay taxes, yet are equally without access to bank credits and 
government support.  
Figure 6.12 presents the officially 
registered small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the service sector 
for every 1000 Filipinos by province in 
2000. It illuminates that. As to be 
expected, the quartile of highest 
allocation (plus outliers) of SMEs 
(between 71 and 166) is located in Metro 
Manila and the adjacent provinces. The 
North and South of Mindanao, especially 
Misamis Oriental and Davao del Sur are 
also included in this quartile. In contrast, 
the SME presence in ARMM is very low. 
In the North there is a clear ‘boundary’ 
between Central Luzon and the provinces 
of the CAR, which belong to the last 
quartile at between 3 and 41 of service 
SMEs by 1000 Filipinos. Towards the 
Eastern parts of the country another 
‘pocket’ of provinces with low service 
SMEs consists of Eastern Visayas, South 
of Bicol, and Bohol province. Generally, 
with the exception of Cebu and Negros 
Oriental, the Visayas register comparatively few SMEs. This is a striking finding, as the 
Visayas – to be illustrated subsequently – represent in fact one of the main tourism hubs in the 
country, where one would consequently assume many SMEs to develop. Offering a possible 
explanation from a more conceptual angle (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: 10) point out that in 
many developing countries like the Philippines even officially registered micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises ironically more often face discrimination in receiving funding, 
marketing or contract incentives by governments and international investors than large and 
already capital-stocked enterprises. 
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Tourism: A rural development catalyst? 
Potentially the Philippines offer what many tourists seek for: White sand beaches, coral reefs, 
isolated ‘dream’ pacific islands, tropical flora and fauna, and exotic lifestyles. Moreover, 
Filipinos possess the assets of speaking 
English, they have – as to be shown in 
chapter 6.2 – a comparatively high 
educational attainment level, and are 
generally assumed to be open-minded 
towards foreigners (compare White & 
Rosales 2002). 
In more central areas like Cebu expansion of 
tourism services can help to compensate 
population employment pressures. However, 
as figure 6.13 shows, many of the tourist 
attractions are located in rural and/or remote 
areas. Hence, tourism could ideally serve as 
the development catalyst for these areas and 
somewhat naturally compensate for the 
economic neglect of the rural and peripheral 
by the industries. In other words, tourism is 
the only economic sector, which has the 
potential to turn presumably comparative 
economic disadvantages of remote locations 
of the archipelago into advantages (see 
Pearce 2001 for an overview on this thesis).  
For example, the approximately 3000 inhabitants of the small and isolated island of Boracay, 
located off Aklan province (see figure 6.13), used to live on subsistence fishery and 
agriculture. Since 1978 the island has been proclaimed as a ‘tourist zone’ for individual small-
scale tourism, and first higher-standard accommodation were established in 1985. Tourism 
has developed rapidly and made Boracay one of the prime destinations for (foreign) visitors in 
the country. A complete transformation of Boracay’s economy is the result. Vorlaufer (1996: 
153) estimates that in the mid-1990s between 11,000 and 14,000 people – including 
Boracayanos, Filipinos from other islands, as well as foreigners – live on tourism earnings on 
the island. Agriculture and fishery have almost disappeared, former farmers and fishermen 
now base their livelihoods on (formal and informal) tourist boat trips, market trade, 
construction work, tricycle services, souvenir sales or else. Skilled jobs with good pay in 
Figure 6.13: Popular tourist destinations  
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high-end hostels attract migrants to the island. All in all, Boracay now fulfils economic 
‘centre’ functions in the region (Shah, Gupta, Boyd 2000; see chapter 8.4.2 for follow-up). 
Figures on the economic impact of tourism are rare and vary (see illustration of data situation 
below). Overall, however, in comparison with its Southeast Asian neighbours the 
Philippines’s volume of arrivals is still one of the lowest. Figure 6.14 shows that total visitors’ 
arrivals into the Philippines have constantly increased until 1997, then decreased slowly – 
probably due to the Asian crisis – and since 
1999 rapidly, probably due to diverse 
political turmoil (compare also Rodolfo 
2003: 13).  
Yet, it is widely acknowledged that tourism 
in the Philippines is still in early stages of 
its product cycle and can – should – become 
a major contributor to the generation of 
foreign exchange earnings, FDI, here to 
economic growth through global market 
orientation (NEDA 2001: 71-78; compare chapter 8.1). Thereby high-end mass resort tourism 
goes hand in hand with smaller-scaled tourism in order to enable both, centres and peripheries 
to benefit from the sector in a sustainable way. To summarise an opinion asserted by many 
scholars: “We are optimistic that […] tourism development in coastal areas of the country 
will thrive in the coming years and contribute more to both environmental sustainability and 
the generation of rural wealth” (White & Rosales 2002: 260).  
Excursus: Talking data quality 
Hidden by figure 6.14 are the commonly encountered problems with data quality of tourism 
statistics in the Philippines, as demonstrated in figures 6.15 and 6.16 on spatially aggregated 
data. Figure 6.15 represents foreign travellers, overseas Filipinos, and domestic tourists 
visiting Philippine regions in 2001. The displayed patterns seem clear and reliable: By far the 
most (largely domestic) tourists arrive in Southern Tagalog, followed by the CAR and Central 
Visayas, which also registers the highest proportion of foreign visitors (no data are available 
for the NCR). The numbers of visiting overseas Filipinos seem marginal.  
Figure 6.16 illuminates the provincial database from which the regional data is derived and 
gives evidence that the regional patterns are not reliable. Vast data inconsistencies and 
incompleteness are apparent across scales. Probably, data deficiencies would be even greater 
at municipal scale. In other words, the spatial scale of data illustration utilised in the maps – 
which is, however, often the only available one – may hide deficits in data generation at 
higher scales. This discovery should be considered for all perspectives on disparities of 
Figure 6.14: Visitors’ arrivals 1991-2001   
Source: NSCB 2002b 
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poverty and wealth in the Philippines given in this study. Especially domestic tourism data 
should be treated with caution, because domestic tourists are neither officially counted nor 
differentiated from migrants visiting their place of origin. International tourists have to fill in 
registration cards when first entering the Philippines by plane, yet not when they arrive by 
ferry. According to figure 6.16 particularly Cebu stands out as a destination of international 
tourists. The Visayas represent a major destination for international beach, diving, and sex 
tourists, as to be explored for Bohol in chapter 8. Notwithstanding, the high numbers for Cebu 
may also ground in its function as a gateway for tourists into the Visayas, through its 
international airport and seaport (the 2nd largest after Metro Manila) and not necessarily hint 
at the numbers of tourists staying in the city.  
 
Figure 6.15: Absolute numbers of tourists by 
region in 2000 
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Figure 6.16: Absolute numbers by tourists by province in 2000 – Data quality  
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Road infrastructure: An important aspect to all economic sectors 
In the fragmented archipelago of the Philippine infrastructural accessibility represents one key 
factor to the development of peripheral regions. A central aspect is road infrastructure, which 
can, particularly when coupled with other sectoral investments exert great impacts on the 
welfare of the poor in the Philippines by establishing linkages through transport networks and 
channels of market distribution from peripheries to centres and vice versa (Ali & Pernia 2003; 
Pearce 2001).   
Road density by province is displayed in figure 6.17. Basically, the map adds another ‘layer’ 
to the already-known pattern: Road networks are best in and around Metro Manila, Illocos, 
Central and Western Visayas, and Misamis Oriental. The outstanding position of Illocos may 
result from infrastructure investments by Marcos into his home region (compare chapter 9). 
The dense road network in Central and 
Western Visayas may be rooted in its 
relevance and investments in tourism. 
Interestingly, Bohol exceeds its 
neighbour Cebu (compare chapter 7.2.4 
for intra-provincial situation). The roads 
in Misamis Oriental may be side effects 
of (foreign-owned) agro-industry. 
Noticeably, the province tops Davao del 
Sur.  
Morphology may obviously influence 
provincial road density. Generally 
speaking, regions with greater lowlands 
are served better with roads than those 
with a more mountainous character. 
Central and Western Visayas represent 
two exceptions. The road network may 
also reflect population distribution and 
city system, however, does not do so in 
Illocos, Bicol, Western and Southern 
Mindanao, and Bohol province (compare 
chapter 5.1).  
 
Figure 6.17: Provincial road density in 2000 
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6.2  Social disparities of poverty and wealth: Filipinos’ human 
resources  
6.2.1  Population dilemmas  
Rapid population growth and the sharp contrast between regions with high and low 
population density put pressure on the Philippine present and future development paths 
(compare Gultiano & Ulrich 2001). The Philippine population has almost multiplied by four 
since the first census after independence 
in 1948 and reaches 81,408,000 people 
in mid 2004. The national population 
growth rate peaked at 3.08% in 1970 
and has been reduced to a – still high – 
2.36% in 2000. The continued 
population growth causes the 
unfavourable national age dependency 
ratio of 69.8 in 2000. This means that in 
2000 59% of the Philippine population 
are between 15 and 45 years old. These 
59% care for themselves and another 
37% young and 4% elderly. About a 
third of the population is below fifteen. 
Thus, the population entering the labour 
force will continue to grow quickly for 
at least fifteen years (NSO 2001/ 2002). 
Figure 6.18 shows provincial population 
densities in 2000. As expected, the 
economic centres register the highest 
densities, led by Metro Manila with 
15,684 inhabitants per km2. Some of the 
poorest provinces in Bicol, Western 
Visayas, and Sulu have high densities, too. In contrast, inhabitants in Caraga, Eastern 
Visayas, MIMAROPA, Cagayan Valley, and CAR live more scattered.   
Relating these findings to the overall population growth from 1995-2000 (figure 6.19), 
projected total fertility 1995-2005 (figure 6.20), and income-poverty and inequality profiles, 
the following provincial processes and groupings can be inferred: 
(a) The wealthier and relatively urbanised provinces in Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog-
CALABRAZON, Central and Western Visayas, Davao del Sur, and Misamis Oriental 
Figure 6.18: Population density by Philippine 
province in 2000 
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show high population densities and high overall population growth despite low fertility 
levels: I assume that they represent destinations of large-scale migration flows25. 
(b) Metro Manila itself seems already to be too ‘crowded’ to absorb large amounts of 
migrants. 
(c) The poor and highly unequal 
provinces in Bicol, Eastern Visayas, 
Caraga, and Western Mindanao 
demonstrate high fertility despite 
low/medium total population 
increase. If mortality is not 
exceptionally high, this pattern hints 
at large-scale out-migration. 
Emigrants escape the employment 
and poverty problems and at the 
same time support their families and 
places of origin through remittances. 
(d) The poor provinces of the ARMM 
and Kalinga and Apayo in CAR 
register high fertility and overall 
high population growth, yet their 
inhabitants do not seem to leave 
their homes. Similar processes are 
indicated in the case of Palawan. 
This pattern reflects that migration 
requires a certain amount of existing 
financial and network resources. It is 
not an option for the (very) poor.  
(e) Residual areas like Cagayan Valley or Illocos show varying patterns (as areas beyond the 
regional or provincial level may as well). This findings for the Illocos case strikes, 
because the region is known as a ‘traditional’ origin of migrants.  
As a result, provinces (c) have high dependency ratios; that means lower percentages of 15 to 
64 years-olds in their population despite their high total fertility rates. In contrast, the 
destination provinces (a) and (b) have lower dependency ratios as they have absorbed the 15 
to 64 year-olds. It follows, that the places of outbound migration loose their most productive 
                                                
25 There are no official statistics on inland migration streams in the Philippines. 
Figure 6.19: Annual population growth 1995-
2000 
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population and their human capital basis. They experience a ‘brain drain’ although these 
‘brains’ are essential factors required to foster substantial change in their political economy 
landscape.  
Filipinos also migrate abroad. In fact, they have become the largest ‘migrant nation’ in the 
world (Philippine Daily Inquirer 09/03/2003). In 2001 the stock estimate of overseas Filipino 
workers (i.e. the employed only) totals at 7,402,89426 – around 9% of the total population and 
20.2% of the labour force. In addition, between 1981 and 2001 657,097 unemployed Filipinos 
have emigrated permanently (CFO 2002). Migrants’ remittances are essential incentives for 
development ‘at home’. Officially, migrants send back 6,031,271,000 US$ of remittances in 
2001 which are not only significant for individual families and communities but for the 
Philippine economy as such (compare chapter 9.3.3). 
                                                
26
 Data on international out-migration are published by the National Statistical Office (NSO), the Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), and the Commission of Filipinos Overseas (CFO), each 
applying unique definitions. Therefore figures differ; see www.census.gov.ph; www.cfo.gov.ph; 
www.poea.gov.ph. 
Figure 6.20: Projected total fertility rate by region 1995- 2005 
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6.2.2  Education, health, and human development   
High educational attainment and knowledge pools of Filipinos – an inheritance of American 
education system – is often claimed to be the most outstanding comparative advantage 
Filipinos have in the ‘global’ economy (see Hutchcroft 1998). Figure 6.21 visualises the 
subnational educational attainment of Filipinos aged five or older in four grades of 
qualification: Those with (a) no education, (b) elementary, (c) secondary, or (d) tertiary 
qualifications (no cumulative counting). A clear South-North differential strikes with regard 
to people with no and primary education, which reverses into a North-South divide with 
respect to secondary and tertiary qualifications. The inhabitants of Central Luzon, Southern 
Tagalog and Illocos are the best educated, whereas the ARMM registers the highest 
percentage of non-educated inhabitants in the country. In Luzon, only provinces in the CAR 
and Cagayan Valley register larger proportions of the not or little educated. Mindanao 
provinces, with the exceptions of Misamis Oriental and Davao del Norte, record comparably 
low educational qualification levels. This is particularly interesting with respect to the 
outstanding economic centre function of Davao del Sur (compare chapter 6.1). Similarly, 
however, Cebu province reveals only moderate qualification levels. In terms of percentage of 
people with tertiary education Cebu is even overtaken by Illoio and Aklan provinces, although 
only four universities are located in Illoio and none in Aklan as compared to eight in Cebu 
(STEDNET 2002) – possibly once again an indicator for incorrect statistics?  
Provincial averages of Filipinos’ life expectancy, displayed in figure 6.22 part A, confirm 
familiar spatial development patterns from a health perspective. Unexpectedly, Camarines Sur 
in Bicol belongs to the quartile of highest life expectancy. Given its high poverty, inequality 
and population density, I cannot think of any explanation but data inconsistency (although the 
data source is generally reliable). 
Figure 6.22 part B displays that the Philippines lack doctors, especially most of Mindanao and 
Bicol and some parts of Eastern Visayas are severely underserved. Central and Western 
Visayas situate in middle ranks. However, the map does not comment on nurses or barangay 
health workers, its data source is only limitedly reliable, and illustrations do not match with 
prior findings: There are relatively few doctors in the provinces adjacent to Metro Manila in 
contrast to higher numbers in CAR or Palawan. Possible explanations may be that Filipinos 
living close to the Metropolis tend to go there to see doctors, and that the survey counts 
alternative health experts and ‘medicine men’ of the indigenous people in CAR and Palawan. 
This argument is supported by the fact that the highest relative numbers of doctors 
countrywide is registered for the small island of Siquijor, which is known for inhibiting many 
alternative healers (field research 01-03/2004). Yet, why are alternative health experts, 
‘medicine men’ counted, not nurses and barangay health workers? 
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Figure 6.21: Educational attainment of household population over five in 2000 
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Figure 6.22: Life expectancy in 2000 and doctors per 10,000 population in 1998 
 
Water scarcity 
Figure 6.23 displays the proportion of Filipinos without access to safe drinking water in 2000. 
Water scarcity is not only relevant to health but to agricultural productivity as well as to 
tourism infrastructure. Particularly the small islands struggle with the provision of safe water, 
often simply because of natural scarcity of drinking water. Besides, infrastructure 
rehabilitation and maintenance, and policy play an important role (continued in chapter 8). 
Water provision in parts of Central Luzon, some Southern Tagalog, Illocos, and the CAR 
provinces is most advanced. Some of these regions benefit from their natural water capacities, 
some from better distribution systems. Supposedly, in Metro Manila more people live in 
squatter settlements with no access to safe water than in its surroundings, accounting for the 
worse water situation in Metro Manila. The ARMM shows the worst water provision in the 
country. Other regions provide varied patterns that do not principally conform to those of 
other indicators. The water situation in Central and Western Visayas is, maybe because of 
their climate and predominately karst geology, worse than in their Eastern neighbours. The 
people of Centre, Western Mindanao, Quezon, and Palawan are equally bad off, although one 
can expect water availability less precarious in mountainous regions. 
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Integrative measurement: On 
human development  
The Human Development Index (HDI) in 
figure 6.24 demonstrates poverty from a 
multi-indictor viewpoint at provincial 
scale for the years 1994, 1997 and 2000 
(compare chapter 2.3.2). Non-surprisingly, 
the HDI of 2000 – again – indicates the 
familiar North-South discrepancy. 
Accordingly, the NCR has the highest 
development level, followed by almost all 
Luzon provinces. Only the CAR provinces 
show lower HDIs – a striking finding 
given the recent industrial growth and 
reduction of income poverty there (albeit 
high poverty incidences). For explanation, 
growth processes take place in an insular 
manner, often concentrating on the mining 
sites. Moreover, many of the indigenous 
minorities of the Philippines inhibit the 
uplands of the CAR provinces. These 
minorities have, as mentioned, been in conflict with state government over property rights 
since the 1970s and usually belong to the poorer segments of the CAR’s population (chapter 
5.2). These issues may explicate the high levels of income inequality prevailing in the region 
(figure 6.3).  
In the Visayas Illoio is the only province to be included in the quartile of second highest HDI 
while – interestingly – Cebu is not. A differential from West to East is apparent with 
Masbatae and Western Samar recording the lowest indices. In contrast, in Mindanao the 
differential stretches from East to West, however, no province is included in the second 
highest quartile at all. Sulu province has the lowest index in the country.  
Since 1994 human development has improved in almost all provinces. Especially Luzon 
(except from CAR) has turned into a ‘pocket’ of high human development which somewhat 
contrasts Southern Tagalog as a pocket of economic development. The Western provinces in 
the Visayas and the Eastern in Mindanao caught up, too. Ifugao, Masbate, Western Samar, 
Agusan del Sur, and the ARMM provinces have kept their low indices since 1994. 
Interestingly, neither Cebu nor Davao del Sur have increased their HDI considerably despite 
their economic pole functions. The NCR has been classified highest development throughout.  
Figure 6.23: Percentage of population with no 
access to safe drinking water in 2000 
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Figure 6.24:  Human Development Index by Philippine provinces 1994, 1997, 2000
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6.3  Spatial development ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ qualitatively 
assessed 
This concluding section of chapter 6 breaks down the previous cartographic and statistical 
findings to summarise typical perspectives on disparities of poverty and wealth, and discerns 
central qualitative themes to uneven development in the Philippines. These themes may 
partially appear stereotypic. Stereotypes, however, can help to discern and frame otherwise 
hardly recognisable processes in a pointed way, especially in the face of complex subject 
matters and data constraints (compare Clausen 2002). Part of this is to point at development 
constrains, prospects and explanatory factors behind them (sometimes raising explanations 
and issues not mentioned before).  
Figure 6.25 qualitatively categorises and contrasts ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ at provincial, 
regional and/or urban/rural scales from  
(a) An income-wealth,  
(b) An overall economic strength, and  
(c) A human development & migration perspective.  
This chapter sets up a ‘disparity-profile’ as related to these themes for those provinces, 
regions, and rural/urban areas with sufficient data information. Note also that, as determined 
by their thematic relevance, scales are purposely combined and vary within figure 6.25. 
Rural-urban income divides  
Broadly speaking, all three perspectives on disparities of poverty and wealth in the map 
illuminate a clear North-South divide, with Metro Manila and the adjacent provinces being 
the dominating centre regions, here the growth and development hubs of the country. Already 
in 1969 Senator Ninoy Aquino, the later assassinated opponent of Marcos subsumed the most 
visible feature of disparate development in the Philippines: “Manila is an imperium in 
imperio, a republic within a republic, and that Manila is as alien to the Philippines as Hong 
Kong” (quoted in Hamilton-Paterson 1998: xxiii). The quote can be assumed equally valid 
today. It highlights the immense material and imagined boundaries existing between the 
capital city and the residual country, and given its date of origin, underlines the historical 
construction of Metro Manila’s primacy position (chapter 5.1). 
The leading theme behind spatial differentials in income wealth/poverty, illustrated in section 
A of figure 6.25, is the urban-rural divide: Income centres are the major cities and their 
surroundings, here the (a) NCR, Southern Tagalog-CALABRAZON and Central Luzon, (b) 
Cebu City and Cebu province, (c) Davao City and Davao del Sur, and (d) Cagayan de Oro and 
Misamis Oriental. In contrast, ‘peripheries’ of income wealth tend to show a more rural 
character. This category comprises, among others, the Eastern Visayas, the ARMM, Western 
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Mindanao, Caraga, Bicol, Southern Tagalog-MIMAROPA, CAR, and Cagayan Valley. The 
latter two regions have recently experienced considerable growth which is however, 
unequally distributed (see below for details). 
From a morphological point of view, this urban-rural divide often overlaps with coastal-
interior and lowland-upland divides in provinces (islands), fostered by historical settlement 
patterns, historical economic and political preferences, and social inequalities (see chapter 5.1 
below; Hirtz 2003). These divides seem to result in gaps of access(ibility) and infrastructure 
services favouring the urban and coastal over rural areas which, in turn, deteriorate yet again 
the economic performance of the latter areas and the well-being of their inhabitants (Balisacan 
& Fuwa 2004). 
The extreme morphological fragmentation of the archipelago has helped to reinforce the 
function and position of Metro Manila (and its surroundings) as the primate centre of income 
in the country. At the same time, however, the distance and isolation of many regions from 
the Metropolitan gives them some sort of ‘protection’ from Manila’s dominance and allows 
them – if necessary production factors are available – to evolve into secondary centres. Cebu 
and Davao City are examples for such emergent secondary centres (Vorlaufer 1996: 134).  
It ought to be noted that neither all of Metro Manila nor Cebu or Davao City can be ascribed 
as belonging to the income ‘centre’ category. Actually – and somewhat paradoxically – 
income inequality is recorded highest in such centre regions and provinces. In other words, 
peripheries also exist within centres, particularly at higher scales, and vice versa. Urban 
income-poverty is an immanent feature in all bigger cities in the Philippines. In contrast, the 
remote island of Boracay in ‘peripheral’ Aklan is a major high-class tourist centre of wealth 
(compare field visits 1, 8, 9; expert interview 7; Spreitzhofer & Heintel 2002).  
The rural-urban theme of income- related disparities is attributed and further fuelled by two 
prominent expressions of social inequality in Philippine society. Firstly, most Chinese 
Filipinos reside and work in urban areas (see chapter 5.1.) Despite their comparatively small 
numbers, Chinese Filipinos are a distinct economic power in the country, often claimed the 
most powerful and wealthy entrepreneurs (expert interview 20; Juan 1996). Due to their urban 
residence patterns, they implicitly contribute to urban-rural income gaps. Moreover, the living 
standard and economic position of many Chinese Filipinos is higher than that of the average 
Malay Filipino. This socioeconomic inequality along ethnic lines has caused some racial 
tensions targeting Chinese (Ang See 1997: 1-23; 161-189). 
Secondly, the concentration of (absentee) landowners in and around the Metropolis fuels 
Manila’s dominant income position in the country while reducing the income growth options 
for the rural peripheries and their inhabitants. Moreover, landowner elites are stated to 
actually hinder development initiatives in some of the rural areas like Mindoro island for self-  
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Figure 6.25: Qualitative classification of Philippine ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ 
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interest purposes (expert interview 20; compare chapter 9.2.3). Balisacan & Fuwa (2004: 21) 
go as far as to suggest that spatial income disparities account for a sizeable but not 
overwhelming portion of the national-level income divide, while prevailing inequalities, for 
example between the above-mentioned social groups are the leading themes of unbalanced 
development in the Philippines. This study acknowledges the importance of such connections 
between social inequalities and spatial disparities in the Philippine setting. The previous 
empirical investigation demonstrates, however, that disparities of income or else poverty 
indicator always have manifold dimensions and factors to them, including topography, 
infrastructure and access(ibilty), historical courses of the political economy, human resources, 
and else besides social inequality. 
Overall economic strength: A matter of sectoral dichotomy between 
service-industry and agriculture  
According to figure 6.25 part B, centres of overall economic strength allocate above all in the 
urban(ising) areas with services and industry ‘hot spots’. Note that while the rural-urban 
divide continues to play a role, it is mostly an agriculture/fishery – industry/service dichotomy 
which acts as the leading theme behind spatial disparities in terms of overall economic 
strength. The service and industry-led centres portray low relative poverty, large GDP 
production and absolute employment. In contrast, high relative income poverty, low absolute 
employment, and little GDP production prevail in many rural, remote, and agriculture/fishery-
led regions. Industry and service ‘hot spots’ are better integrated into global markets than their 
agricultural periphery counterparts. The lack apparent for the latter is to some extent based on 
insufficient (road) accessibility of peripheral regions, and productivity problems, partially 
related to inefficient or non-existing irrigation systems. 
As to be expected, the economic centres comprise Metropolitan Manila, Cebu City, Davao 
City, and partly, Cagayan de Oro. The provinces of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog-
CALABRAZON benefit from their proximity to the large market and good infrastructure of 
Metro Manila, plus its historically grown global contacts (Makabenta 2002). The 
administrative division of Southern Tagalog into CALABRAZON and MIMAROPA reflects 
– and may be partly a response to – their dividing paths of development: While the 
CALABRAZON provinces develop into new cores of globalised industry and services, the 
MIMAROPA provinces are increasingly cut off from these political economy processes. 
Central Luzon has benefited from the presence of the US American forces especially in 23 
locations, especially around Clark and Subic Bay (ca. 80-120 km north of Metro Manila) 
between 1898 and 1992. The naval and air bases of the US army have triggered foreign and 
local investments, services and employment there, plus paid land rents which made up to 5% 
of the Philippine state’s financial budget. Since 1992 the region has been able to take 
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advantage of the pullout of the Americans. The former army bases have been converted into 
two export processing zones. By 1999, the two zones already provide more than 50,000 jobs 
(exceeding employment provided by the US army). At the same time economic growth and 
stability fluctuates (reflecting general boom and bust trends in the country), in particular when 
enterprises relocate their production to lower-cost countries like China (Zimmer 2004).  
Similarly, economic development in Cebu City and province (and other parts of Central 
Visayas) benefit from good infrastructure facilities in terms of good road connections, the 
international airport, and five ports in and around Cebu-Mandaue (Makabenta 2002). Its 
economic strength is disproportionately attributed to the expansion of tourism-oriented 
services, as well as to industrial growth in several recently established Special Economic 
Zones especially on Mactan island. In the 1990s the ‘Ce-boom’ was declared to transform the 
city into a new Hong Kong of Asia. This target has not been reached so far, foremost because 
of export deficits, lack of technological inputs, and water scarcity (Torling 1997). 
The Western Visayas stand out as an overall economic centre, with similar GDP to Central 
Visayas despite their comparatively lower population numbers. Interestingly, the Western 
Visayas do not have their ‘own’ urban agglomeration centre; Cebu City functions as their 
gateway. Economically, the strength of the region lies mainly in tourism and trade services, 
exemplified by Boracay island. However, the Visayas are also characterised by high levels of 
inequality and co-existence of peripheries and centres at higher scales, facts that remain 
hidden beneath the regional and/or provincial qualitative classification of figure 6.25.   
The major economic competitive advantage of Davao del Sur is the status of Davao City as 
‘the’ Mindanao door to international markets and its success in agro-industrial trade services. 
Misamis Oriental is its only competitor. The natural resource richness of the entire Mindanao 
region once led to calls for “Mindanao to emerge as RP’s next boom region” (Enginco 1995: 
18). However, the persistent conflict between Moro movements and the government have 
hindered investors and government policy to reach out to many parts of the region (chapter 
5.2). For example, foreign investors tend to withdraw from and local entrepreneurs may be 
forced to close down their business in conflict-ridden areas. These are, however, above all 
Western Mindanao, Zamboanga, the ARMM, and Sarangani and Cotabato in Southern 
Mindanao, here already the poorer areas. In 1999 large parts of Mindanao had not been 
supported with agricultural services by the government for over two decades (Shaw 1999; see 
chapter 9.3.4). Only in 2001 Mindanao has been made a new national focus of policy 
intervention only (see NEDA 2001; chapter 8.1). Moreover, mostly due to security reasons, 
but also to irritated political relations27 and public-private partnerships, the East Asian   
                                                
27
 Among other aspects, Philippine government has accused Malaysia and Indonesia to secretly support the Moro 
movements in Mindanao.  
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Growth Triangle ‘BIMP-EAGA’ has not progressed far. It was launched in 1994 by Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines islands of Mindanao and Palawan and 
aims at regional promotion of agro-industry, natural resource-based manufacturing, tourism, 
and SME encouragement (Turner 1995; ADB 2002b). On the whole, in a vicious cycle the 
conflict situation deteriorates the living situation of many people (Muslims and non-Muslims) 
in Mindanao, which, in turn, fuel opposition against the government and thus, the conflict(s). 
Overall, residual Mindanao (besides Misamis Oriental and Davao del Sur) belongs to the 
‘economically weak peripheries’. This category also comprises, roughly classified, Bicol, 
Eastern Visayas, major parts of Northern Luzon and the MIMAROPA-provinces of Southern 
Tagalog (see also Kelly 1999; Pernia & Quising 2002). Manasan & Mercado (1999) claim a 
mix of developmental handicaps to adversely affect these peripheries, stressing failure of 
agricultural programmes (compare chapter 8), lack of infrastructure, and natural hazards.  
Strikingly, however, large areas of Luzon, which are most prone to natural hazards in the 
country, belong to the economic centre regions. Another example, peripheral Cagayan Valley 
has shown considerable resilience against natural hazards by its quick recovery after the 
recession 1997/98. Similarly, despite their vulnerability towards hazards, the Southern 
provinces of CAR show generally progressive development tendencies. On the whole, these 
findings suggest that natural hazards may severely constrain economic development, 
however, they do not seem to be the decisive factor in determining development trends and 
centre or periphery status of Philippine regions and provinces. Instead, more comprehensive, 
multi-scalar perspectives on specific development settings may result in a more realistic 
identification of (economic) peripheries and centres. This argument is underlined by the fact 
that the ‘success story’ of the CAR is largely attributed to industrial expansion in SEZs, to 
mining, and (related) big infrastructure investments on the one hand. On the other hand, great 
disparities and inequalities at higher scales are hidden by this story, with upland areas 
inhibited by indigenous minorities being disproportionably often at the lower end of the 
disparity parameter (Hirtz 2003). 
By and large, it is clear that development of Philippine provinces and regions depends to a 
considerable extent on the comparative advantages of their (urban) centres for industrial and 
service establishments, or otherwise connectivity and proximity to such centres. In turn, the 
elaborated accounts confirm Balisacan’s statement that “the poverty problem in the 
Philippines remains largely an agricultural phenomenon” (1997: 24); and Rigg’s general 
observation on Southeast Asia surely accounts for the Philippine case:  
“Every country has its lagging regions […] as well as its lagging people. This 
inequality is sometimes expressed in terms of a rural-urban core-periphery dichotomy 
– by which it is also meant an agriculture-industry dichotomy – sometimes in terms of a 
regional balance, and often both” (Rigg 2003: 155-156). 
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Impact of economic globalisation 
The impact of economic globalisation upon Philippine (disparate) development is 
controversially discussed. On the one hand, globalisation works to exacerbate the spatial, 
sectoral, and social divides. This is partially related to the fact that most island regions have 
their distinct and historically grown international economic relations, which continue to build 
the basis of their cotemporary global networks (compare chapter 5.3).  
Besides, and possibly more important, globalisation generates global enclaves of industry and 
services especially in and around Metro Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City. These, in turn, 
create employment and income. Their spill over effects into directly adjacent hinterlands has 
been comparatively successful, however, effects beyond that into more peripheral hinterlands 
are marginal and not sufficient. Simultaneously, the economic boom and bust cycle of the 
Philippine economy partially also reveals further risks of volatility through disproportionable 
emphasis on global markets. The urban and service/industry centres, which seemingly benefit 
from globalisation, yet face its volatility from within disproportionately, too: They have the 
highest rates of unemployment, underemployment, and job turnover. For example, during the 
‘Asian’ crisis 1997/98, 58.13% of all establishment closures from 1998 to 2000 took place in 
Metro Manila alone (STEDNET 2002).  
On the other hand, and none the less, economic globalisation acts as a catalyst for 
development through FDI in Special Economic Zones, service trade instigated by tourists, 
remittances send back by labour migrants, and an increase of exports. In addition, these 
growing sectors generate, even if not sufficient, at least some employment for the local 
population (compare Kelly 2001). Lanzona (2001) deduces in his case study on Bicol that 
globalisation has actually been beneficial to workers in centres and peripheries alike because, 
with the liberalising reforms, wages have risen in absolute terms for all Filipinos. Similarly, 
Balisacan is convinced that “contrary to popular perceptions, recent episodes of [mainly 
globalisation-induced] growth have not been anti-poor; the bulk of the poverty reduction in 
recent years has come from the beneficial effects of growth on the poor”. Yet, the data 
revealed in this chapter shows that poverty has in fact increased significantly again since the 
crisis 1997, and that it is important to take into account (and Balisacan agrees here) that “the 
importance of growth in poverty alleviation varies greatly, however, across administrative 
regions and sectors of the economy” (1997: 28-29; note by A.C.). Put differently, 
globalisation tends to create enclaves of industrial and service development whereas the 
primary sector where the majority of Filipinos still engages is little incorporated in global 
markets and with it – logically – many parts of the agricultural-led peripheral regions and its 
inhabitants. This observation leads to the overall conception that the Philippines are a country 
that is – despite trying hard and with some (urban) exceptions – (still) situated at the periphery 
of the global market. Furthermore, the existing global enclaves have proven to be volatile. For 
 
107
example, in opposition to Lanzona’s above-noted positive assessment of rising wages through 
global integration, this rise in wages is also claimed responsible for increasing tendency of 
multinational corporations to relocate their production sites from the Philippines to countries 
with lower labour costs such as Vietnam or China.  
Human development and migration: Reflections of the same coin? 
Human development, as demonstrated in section C of figure 6.25, sheds light on human 
resource disparity aspects of centre-periphery relations28. The map confirms a level of 
correspondence between human development centres and peripheries with their economic 
counterparts. The strong North-South divide and the dominance of Metro Manila and its 
surroundings show up again. Patterns vary with Illoio and Misamis Oriental overtaking the 
economic centres of Cebu and Davao del Sur. The better positions of the former provinces in 
educational attainment and life expectancy may account for this difference, and highlight that 
social indicators matter in development in the Philippines. Further, the case of Illoio suggests 
that the role of urban areas is possibly not as significant for educational and life expectancy 
factors in human development as it is for economic development. The example of Misamis 
Oriental underlines this claim to some extent: The province is smaller than Davao City in 
terms of size and economy, yet tops it in overall human development regards.  
Section C of figure 6.25 also includes information on processes which simultaneously display 
consequence and means of centre and periphery relations in the Philippines: Migration 
streams reflect the strife of Filipinos from the peripheries to seek employment, higher income 
and allegedly better quality of life in the centres. These flows grow with population pressures 
on peripheries and involve mainly the young and productive (see Gultiano & Ulrich 2001). A 
loss of capital stock, here a brain drain occurs as the inevitable consequence in many 
peripheries. With it a vicious cycle commences: Development is further hold back when the 
most productive segments of the population leave, which then triggers the next generation to 
follow their footsteps and migrate as well. In the communities left behind, hopes and 
development initiatives typically focus – and partially rely – on remittances send back by the 
migrants (compare chapters 8.4.1 and 9.3.3). 
It should be noted that inhabitants of those peripheries that are already situated at the very end 
of the disparity of poverty parameter, usually do not possess the resources to get involved in 
this migration system. This phenomenon is observable for entire provinces including the 
ARMM provinces, Kalinga and Apayo of CAR, and Palawan. Partially, this spatiality of 
immobility may ground on the fact that the ethno-linguistic minorities who live there, prefer 
                                                
28
 This section refers mainly to population, education, and HDI data. The health issues discussed in chapter 6.2 
are, apart from life expectancy, neglected because of the illustrated data inconsistencies. 
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not to move but to stay with their kind. However, it is at the same time yet another indicator 
for the generally little integration of provinces with indigenous population in overall 
transformation processes and interactions with other Philippine provinces. Development 
seems to stagnate there. Turning back to the elaborated income divides this stagnation may 
also explain why income relations in the named provinces are – despite being at a very poor 
level – actually among the most balanced in the country.  
To conclude … 
The Philippines have some ‘ingredients’ promising developmental success, especially rich 
natural resources, a globally-oriented, well educated, and abundant workforce which speaks 
the main business language of the world (compare Hutchcroft 1998; White & Rosales 2003). 
None the less, a disparate and inconsistent course dominates the country’s development path. 
The subsequent typical themes have been identified to be particularly decisive for 
manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines. Importantly, these 
themes are constantly interrelated in the formation of ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’, and thus, in 
shaping development problems and/or prospects together: 
¾ A North-South divide favouring Metropolitan Manila and its surroundings; 
¾ A gap between urban and rural, lowland/upland, and coastal/interior areas. Centres are 
typically urban/lowland/coastal and peripheries are typically rural/upland/interior; 
¾ Increasing disparities within centres and – less common – central enclaves within 
peripheries. Globalisation pushes the rise of these enclaves. Those peripheries at the very 
end of the disparity parameter show little differentiation but stagnation.  
¾ A dichotomy between stagnating agriculture and fisheries on the one hand, and growing 
industry and service sectors on the other hand. This trend is reinforced by globalisation; 
¾ The significance of human resource development, infrastructure, and access(ibility) to 
positively affect many other factors of (disparate) development. 
¾ A population-employment dilemma in peripheries, resulting in large-scale out-migration 
and brain drain to centres. 
¾ A ‘certain reciprocity between social and spatial divides (compare chapter 2.2.1) with 
regard to the concentration of Chinese Filipinos and landowners in urban areas, especially 
Metro Manila, and the concentration of Muslim and indigenous minorities in Mindanao, 
especially the ARMM and the CAR. 
¾ The persistent existence of (political) conflicts in those regions with clear reciprocities of 
spatial and social disparities (despite the fact that at least the ARMM is regionally 
autonomous). 
Together, these themes cumulatively build up a regional disparity parameter, with Metro 
Manila, CALABRAZON, and most of Central Luzon at the upper and the ARMM and 
Caraga, followed by other parts of Western Mindanao, the North of Luzon, Eastern Visayas, 
and MIMAROPA at the lower end. This disparity parameter has been gradually and 
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cumulatively reinforced and fostered throughout the historical course of political economy 
and conflict (see chapter 8.1). There is a certain correspondence between those areas of 
disproportionably deprivation and exclusion with those where ethno-linguistic minorities live 
and where political conflicts exist. As expressed by expert interview 2: “What are the ones 
that are in the lower bracket? Mostly, I think, ARMM areas. The Muslim region. And some of 
the areas in, in the north. Indigenous people. So there is also their distance to the centre”.  
Referring back to the theoretical considerations, in my opinion, many Philippine regions and 
provinces show excluding characteristics of some sort. The only region, which could be 
ascribed to face more or less all-embracing exclusion would be the ARMM as indicated by its 
overall stagnation (there are not enough information available on Caraga to assess its 
exclusionary status). 
With regard to economic sectors, agriculture and fisheries appear to represent ‘the’ constrain 
sector with its prevalence in peripheries, its insufficient productivity, and being trapped in 
historically grown unbalanced ownership relations. Prerequisites for large-scale industrial 
developments (driven by globalisation) are only given in the already wealthier and 
progressive urbanised areas, and thus result in either replicating existing disparity patterns or 
creating isolated enclaves. The only sector, which combines global market and income growth 
orientation with a spatial focus on ‘unspoilt paradise’ peripheries and smaller-scale 
development, is the tourism sector. Moreover tourism services offer potential (self-) 
employment to the generally well educated, English-speaking, and abundantly available 
Filipino labour force and therefore ways out of the population-employment-migration 
dilemma. For these reasons, tourism is increasingly heralded and promoted as ‘the’ potential 
vehicle for achieving economic growth combined with redistribution countrywide (compare 
chapter 8.1). 
Against this background, the subsequent chapter examines and contrasts the typical themes of 
intra-provincial disparities in Bohol, elaborating the ‘faces’ of intra-provincial as compared to 
inter-provincial and inter-regional disparities in the Philippines.    
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7.  Intra-provincial disparity patterns: The case of Bohol island 
7.1  Conceptual and methodological background  
This chapter portrays disparities of poverty in Bohol by (a) comparing the island to other 
provinces referring to the maps in chapters 5 and 6, and by (b) illuminating scalar relations 
between inter- and intra-provincial disparity patterns through maps at municipal level. 
Particularly part (b) proved difficult: I was restricted by poor data availability and quality. 
Philippine Executive Order 135 explicitly outlines the establishment of intra-provincial 
statistical systems to precisely define the needs of the poor in each province (NEDA 2001: 
240). In Bohol, such endeavours have not progressed far. The quality of spatially aggregated 
data is determined by the interest of municipalities to participate in surveys (expert interview 
15). Although the Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO) started an initiative 
to assemble statistics from municipal and barangay LGUs, major parts are incomplete and 
faulty (PPDO 2004a). I used them to cartographically display population data only and was 
otherwise compelled to vector-based information, non-spatial data, the self-assessment survey 
Bohol Poll 2001 and 2002 (HNU 2002), and qualitative interpretation supported by assorted 
field visit observations. The differences existing between the entire Philippines and Bohol are 
qualitatively summarised and 
contrasted in chapter 7.3  
This chapter relies more heavily on 
qualitative research such as 
interviews and field observations. 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 organise the 
interview partners and field visits 
by their thematic interaction with 
the topic in order to allow a 
reflective and in-situ interpretation 
of statements and observations. 
In correspondence to prior findings 
on national development constraints 
and catalysts in chapter 6, three 
thematic ‘cornerstones’ and ‘subclasses’ to disparities of poverty and wealth are chosen to be 
examined in detail in this chapter and the subsequent policy analysis (compare chapters 1.2 
and 4.1). These ‘cornerstones’ include, as figures 7.1 and 7.2 display 
¾ Disparities and poverty,  
¾ Disparities and agriculture, fishery, and resource management, 
¾ Disparities and tourism and alternative livelihoods. 
Figure 7.1: Interview partners by thematic 
interaction with the subject 
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Figure 7.2: Overview of field visits carried out in the Philippines in 2003 and 2004 
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7.2  Comparative exploration of disparities of poverty in Bohol 
7.2.1  Basic characterisation 
Bohol is with 411,726 
hectares the 10th largest 
island of the Philippines. 
Figure 7.3 displays Bohol’s 
topography, which is shaped 
by lowlands along the coast, 
around Tagbilaran and 
Panglao in the Southwest, 
and North/Northeast, and 
mountainous or hilly areas 
in the interior and the 
Southeast. The morphology 
of Bohol resembles that of 
most Philippine islands (see 
figure 5.1).   
Bohol's 1,137,268 inhabit-
ants (as of 2000) also range 
at medium Philippine levels. 
According to figure 5.2, the 
rural population exceeds the 
urban by large in 2000. This 
finding is confirmed by 
intra-provincial patterns of 
the absolute municipal 
population in 1995 displayed 
in figure 7.4. Tagbilaran City 
has the strongest urban 
character. Only the island of 
Panglao and Bien Unido in 
the far North register almost 
equal numbers of urban and 
rural population; in all other 
municipalities rural exceeds 
urban. The Western 
municipalities facing Cebu 
Figure 7.4: Rural and urban population by municipality in 
1995 
 
Figure 7.3: Bohol’s topography 
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province (and City) show a relatively urban whereas the interior more a rural character. 
Numerically, most Boholanos live at the Western coast, in Eastern interior, and in South-
Eastern coastal municipalities. Tagbilaran City and the municipalities of Ubay, Talibon, 
Inabanga and Carmen have populations of more than 40,000. 
The majority of Boholanos are of Malay-Filipino inheritance. A small minority of Chinese 
lives in Tagbilaran City, and a small indigenous group in the uplands of the interior. Some 
Muslim Filipinos, mainly refugees from Mindanao, live in and around Tagbilaran City. 
Figures are available for neither group, and they are only rarely mentioned during 
conversations and in official documents. 
7.2.2  Official poverty accounts  
With an income-related poverty of 53.6 % (of the total population), Bohol belongs to the 
highest provincial quartile of poverty incidence country wide in 2000 (see figure 6.1). 
Incidences have risen since 1994 (figure 6.2), however, remain much lower than at peak times 
of 60.5% in 1985 (PPDO 2002). Income inequality, expressed by the Gini-coefficient, has 
also risen between 1997 and 2000 and in national comparison the province is again listed in 
the highest quartile (figure 6.3; NSCB 2003a). The province’s poverty incidence regularly 
exceeds the Central Visayan regional average (figure 7.5).  
 
Figure 7.6 demonstrates the results of a survey by the Bohol Poll asking Boholanos to assess 
their poverty status (with no definition of poverty being given). Accordingly, Boholanos 
consider their poverty incidence to be higher around 60%. Similar to the official trends, self-
rated poverty have risen between 1997 and 1999, slightly decreased until in 1999/2000, and 
from 2000 increased again considerably to 66% in 2002 (the indicators according to which 
such poverty has been self-rated were not available by HNU 2002). 
Figure 7.5: Poverty incidence in Bohol 
and the Central Visayas 1991-2000 
 
Source: Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b 
Figure 7.6: Boholanos’ self-assessed 
poverty 1997-2002 
 
Source: HNU 2002 
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In contrast to official national poverty measurement, the latest and most widely used official 
intra-provincial Bohol poverty data focus on education and health indicators. This Bohol 
Poverty Index was compiled, processed, and published by the PPDO in 2001. Surprisingly it 
completely ignores economic dimensions of development; it is derived from the following 
indicators: (a) Percentage of families with unsanitary toilets; (b) Percentage of families with 
access to doubtful water resources; (c) Percentage of children 0-83 months old who are 
malnourished; (d) School drop-outs of children 6-21 years old. Figure 7.7 portrays the 
corresponding distribution of poverty incidence across municipalities, supported by a ranking 
of the twenty poorest municipalities in table 7.1.  
Hence, recent intra-provincial poverty data for Bohol are not quantitatively – but only 
qualitatively – comparable to their inter-provincial counterparts. This is an important aspect to 
consider for cross-scalar policy-making and for analysis in this study. Note that the data also 
excludes Tagbilaran City, here only provides information on 47 municipalities.  
 
Figure 7.7: Bohol municipalities by poverty index in 2001 
Table 7.1: Ranking of 20 
poorest municipalities* 
Rank Municipality  District 
1 Pres. Garcia 2 
2 Ubay 2 
3 Bien Unido 2 
4 Inabanga 2 
4 San Miguel 2 
5 Alicia 3 
6 Buenavista 2 
7 Pilar 3 
8 Danao 2 
9 Trinidad 2 
10 Talibon 2 
11 Dagohoy 2 
12 Clarin 2 
12 Getafe 2 
13 Anda 3 
13 Loon 1 
14 Sierra 
Bullones 
3 
15 Catigbian 1 
16 Batuan 3 
17 Duero 3 
18 Candijay 3 
19 Sagbayan 2 
20 Loboc 3 
* double rankings possible  
Source: Provincial Gov. Bohol 2003 
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Figure 7.7 shows a ‘strip’ of high poverty at the North/Northeastern coast and in the interior, 
with gradually decreasing indices towards the South and West of Bohol. More precisely in 
morphological terms, poverty clusters comprise small islands, coastal lowland in the North 
and mixed upland and lowland interior communities. Wealth, in contrast, clusters particularly 
in and around Panglao (and around Tagbilaran, although there is no poverty index for the city 
itself), Tubigon, Jagna, and Guindulman – all coastal municipalities with a stronger urban 
character according to figure 7.4, yet with varying lowland and upland features. It ought to be 
noted that figure 7.7 may hide significant disparities at intra-municipal scales. A good 
example is the ‘wealthy’ and economically progressing municipality of Tubigon, where 
wealth de facto accumulates on the mainland (and causes the high index) while the outer 
islands are considered to be very poor (field visit 5; interview 17).  
On the whole, qualitatively speaking, patterns of disparities of wealth in Bohol resemble the 
national findings regarding the allocation of wealth in coastal and urban(ised) areas. The 
strongly urbanised yet very poor Bien 
Unido represents an exception.  
Unlike the national pattern, poverty is 
not disproportionately indicated for 
the uplands in Bohol, but on the 
contrary, in the great lowlands in the 
North and Northeast. Furthermore, the 
upland municipalities with the highest 
altitude, Jagna and Garcia Hernandez, 
belong to the wealthiest quartile of 
municipalities. This, however, is – similar to the illustrated Tubigon case – probably due to 
the wealthy coastal and urbanised areas compensating upland poverty within these 
municipalities. Generally, the coastal/lowland and interior/upland wealth differential 
prevalent at national level tends to corresponds in Bohol’s Interior, South and Southwest 
(field visits 4, 5, 12, 13). 
Self-assessed poverty incidences of Boholanos (table 7.2) equally mark the Northern 
municipalities and generally rural areas as the poorest, with decreasing incidences towards the 
South. Interestingly, Tagbilaran City does not stand out as exceptionally wealthy. 
The spatial pattern of official poverty incidence data broadly resembles self-assessed poverty 
incidences, and vice versa. I continue to relate further intra-provincial, indirect indicators of 
disparities of poverty to the official poverty accounts (similar to the approach at national 
scale).  
 Table 7.2: Self-rated poverty (in %) in 2001 
  
Not poor On the line Poor 
Bohol 18 19 63 
District 1 16 20 64 
    Tagbilaran 24 12 63 
    Rest District 1 14 22 64 
District 2 20 15 65 
District 3 17 22 61 
Urban 22 17 61 
Rural 16 20 64 
Source: Divine World College Research Centre 2001 
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7.2.3  Economic sectors, productivity, and employment 
Labour force participation in Bohol is posted at 68% in 2001 and ranks slightly above the 
Philippine average. Employment estimates reach a regional high of 94.6% in 2001 and 
therefore, unemployment a 
low. In an interesting contrast, 
Boholanos’ self-assessed 
unemployment in 2002 reaches 
a much higher 19% (HNU 
2002). Either unemployment 
has increased an unlikely 14% 
in one year, or official or 
peoples’ perspectives are vastly 
mistaken. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 
show that agriculture and 
fisheries comprise 54% of the 
employed labour force, yet 
contribute only about 1/8 of the 
total regional GDP (no 
provincial GDP data exists).  
Bohol is scarcely industrialised 
– the exception are a few 
small-scale fruit processing and 
livestock estates along the West coast, in Panglao, Tagbilaran City, and Ubay – yet these 
plants comprise 17% of the employed Boholanos (see table 7.3 later on). There are no Special 
Economic Zones in Bohol (yet; compare chapter 8). Services comprise 29% of the employed 
and contribute most to the GDP. On the whole, besides services especially in tourism, Bohol 
is limitedly integrated in global and national markets. 
Agriculture and fisheries 
Figure 7.8 underlines the almost exclusively agricultural character of Bohol by presenting an 
official (broad) land-use classification. Intensive and irrigated agriculture, especially rice, 
corn, and coconuts operate particularly in the irrigated and wealthier lowlands and coastal 
areas, whereas upland agriculture is characterised by shifting cultivations of root, timber, and 
medicinal crops (see Ulrich 2000). Note that Bohol is less prone to natural hazards than most 
other Philippine provinces. Note also that the built-up areas included in figure 7.8 do not 
correspond with the illustrated patterns on population distribution. Population data is 
extracted from the Census and are assumed more reliable than the land use map (see below 
for further reasons). 
Figure 7.8: Landuse in Bohol 
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Figure 7.8 and 7.9 display that coconut and rice are the two dominating crops, followed by 
corn and rootcrops. Coconuts are exported, however, generally Bohol’s agricultural products 
are only marginally involved in inter-provincial trade. For instance, none of its ports is 
included in national statistics on exports and 
imports while all other provinces of the Central 
Visayas are (NSCB 2002b). There is 
comparatively little production of high-value 
crops like palm oil or mango. Larger scaled 
livestock farms operate mainly around Ubay. 
This study concentrates on crop agriculture and 
fishery. It only marginally deals with livestock.  
As noted, lowland farmers are dependent on 
reliable water supplies from the uplands. Water 
resources have always been scarce in Bohol due to its geology as an island of karstland where 
water resources are limited to limestone aquifers. Until the 1970s, though, Bohol has been 
known for agricultural self-sufficiency. Since then it has recorded a decline in rice yields and 
their gradual replacement with corn and coconut cultivation. For explanation, population 
pressures have induced a rapid intensification of agriculture in the uplands accompanied by 
large-scale deforestation, which, in turn, has reduced water supply for the fields in the 
lowlands. One response from the lowland farmers to keep up harvests and profits has been to 
increase irrigated rice production because it allows two or three harvests a year and doubles 
the rain-fed production (expert interview 3). Logically, water resources are more depleted 
through such practice, and cause traditional irrigation systems to malfunction nowadays. 
Paddy rice lowland farmers in Bohol face serious problems (Ulrich & Reeder 1996: 291-292; 
Ulrich 2000: 476-486; 492). 
Fishery is the second major source of livelihood 
especially for the coastal population including both, 
poorer and wealthier proportions of the Boholanos. 
Marine fish catches have, in fact, multiplied by more 
than four between 1998 and 2002 – largely due to 
commercial fishery (figure 7.10). Commercial 
fishermen enter the waters of Bohol often 
unregistered, therefore their catch can be assumed 
many times higher. However, such increase poses 
risks of environmental damage through over-fishing under which the poorer fishermen suffer 
most (see photos 7.3 and 7.4; expert interviews 7, 10, 3). Moreover, over-fishing implies 
serious and long-term environmental degradation to coral reefs, the most important fishing 
grounds for small-scale fishermen. As White, Vogt, Arin (2000: 599) note, the contribution of 
 Figure 7.9: Crop area distribution in 2003 
Figure 7.10: Fishery development 
in Bohol 1998-2002 
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reef fishery to small-island fishery like that of Bohol can make up to 70% of the total harvest. 
Aquaculture or inland municipal fishery makes up (an increasingly) major proportion of 
fishery in Bohol – similar to the national scale. Fishponds are mainly located along the 
Western coast and in the poor East – can aquaculture develop into a potential development 
catalyst there (compare chapter 6.1.3)?  
Spatially, in contrast to national patterns, one cannot infer that (only) the poorest areas in 
Bohol are mainly characterised by the primary sector. Agricultural and fisheries are spread 
across the entire island. Reasons that are more intricate explain persistent poverty. Firstly, it is 
significant to note that farmland in Bohol is organised mostly in small-scale patches with an 
average size of 0.6 hectares (compare photos 7.1 and 7.2). Because of such small-patched 
organisation, only 50% of the agricultural land area in Bohol is considered productive beyond 
subsistence. Therefore, figure 7.8 hides significant diversity in land-use beyond the figure’s 
broad classifications. This is also the reason why each class in the map contains several crops 
or types of land usage. 
Secondly, the subsistence character of much of Bohol’s agriculture causes that farmers 
“mostly, they will not sell their products, they will just need them for their consumption”. 
This again interrelates with their trade as “mostly they go to the local markets” because they 
cannot afford transport costs to the larger markets for example in Tagbilaran (expert interview 
3; Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: 63). Consequently, the intra- as well as inter-
provincial trade, productivity, and earnings gained from the primary sector remain marginal. 
Thirdly, the small farm size impedes the introduction of technology into the sector (compare 
chapter 8.4.3). Overall, this small-patched land and subsistence character makes Bohol a 
typical case of the small Philippine islands where Spanish colonial powers have not 
established big plantations and with them significant larger-patched land use patterns. Its 
neighbour Cebu represents the alternative typical case as a major plantation province (field 
visit 6). 
Besides the small patches, and similarly to national patterns, above all unequal land 
ownership and control systems are often claimed responsible for the prevailing poverty in 
agriculture in Bohol. Until the departure of the Spanish colonisers, the uplands used to be 
frontiers of communal pasturing. Families that were more affluent possessed the fertile 
lowlands of which large parts were cultivated by tenant farmers. In the 20th century many of 
the wealthy landowners moved to larger farms in Mindanao and sold the lowland rice lands to 
wealthy absentee owners who did not live nearby. Under American colonial rule these 
relationships were transferred into bureaucratic acts, control over the fertile lowlands through 
the wealthy absentee elite legitimised, and access to lands for tenants and agricultural workers 
more difficult (Ulrich 2003: 160-161; see chapters 6.1.3, 8.3.2 and 8.4.3). 
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  Photo 7.1: Small-patched agriculture in 
Carmen 
 Clausen 2004
  Photo 7.2: Rice terrace in the uplands of 
Sierra Bullones 
Clausen 2004
  
  Photo 7.3: Fisherman on his way to work 
Clausen 2004
  Photo 7.4: Fisherman’s home on Pamilacan 
Clausen 2004
  
  Photo 7.5:  Tourist resorts along Alona beach 
on Panglao island  
Kindly provided by expert interviewees 11/18 
 
  Photo 7.6: Chocolate Hills in Carmen 
municipality 
Clausen 2004 
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Tourism 
Similar to national data, I treat intra-provincial tourism figures on Bohol with caution. 
Visitors entering the province by ferry are not officially registered. Expert interviewee 20 
confirms that this applies also for arrivals by plane. Moreover, resorts do not count the 
number of visitors but only the number of booked rooms – which may differ considerably due 
to the usually large size of Filipino families staying in one room together (field visits 9, 10). 
In national comparison in 2000, Bohol 
ranks low with respect to (direct) tourist 
arrivals, and considerably lags behind its 
neighbour (and gateway) Cebu. Its share 
of foreign visitors (about one third) is 
comparatively high (see figure 6.16). 
Figure 7.11 illustrates these trends more 
precisely. Accordingly, tourist arrivals in 
Bohol have experienced a boom and bust 
course since 1998. Recently, a growth 
tendency is detected, which is probably related to positive political atmosphere under 
President Arroyo as indicated in chapter 6.1.2.  
Assuming that the ratio of micro-, small, and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the service sector 
demonstrates commercial activities of the less wealthy and, therefore, possibly carries positive 
side-effects of broader tourism development (compare chapter 6.1.3), the findings displayed 
for Bohol in figure 6.12 are disappointing: The province belongs to the quartile with the 
lowest SME presence country-wide.  
Yet, the sectoral employment trends since 1980, presented 
in table 7.3, notwithstanding illustrate a certain growth of 
the service sector (with a slight decrease since 1995) as 
opposed to decreases in the primary and tertiary sectors.  
The Bohol Tourism Office compiled a directory of tourist-
relevant facilities in Bohol including hotels, pensions, 
resorts, travel agents and tour operators, dive shops, land transport services and restaurants 
(BOT 2003). Although tourist attractions are spread across most of the island, including for 
example the Chocolate Hills in Carmen (a national geologic monument of 1,268 haycock 
hills, see photo 7.6), their proportional locations exemplify an obvious spatial bias of tourism 
development. Of in total 98 listed facilities 62 are located in Tagbilaran City, 19 at Alona 
beach on Panglao island (see photo 7.5), 16 in alternative locations in Panglao and only one 
elsewhere. Likewise, the PPDO admits that tourist facilities in 2002 are almost exclusively 
          Figure 7.11: Tourist arrivals in Bohol  
Table 7.3: Employment by 
sector (%)*   
 2001 1995 1980 
Primary 54 58 64 
Secondary  17 11 15 
Tertiary  29 31 21 
* numbers are rounded 
Source: PPDO 2002; NSCB 2001 
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located in Tagbilaran City and Panglao (PPDO 2002: 15). It follows that areas, which are 
already relatively wealthy, economically benefit the most from tourism, while the peripheral 
and marginalised are further cut off. Existing divides seem to be replicated.  
7.2.4  Social development, infrastructure, and connectivity issues 
In terms of population density, Bohol ranks medium among Philippine provinces in 2000 (see 
figure 6.18). Intra-provincially, Tagbilaran City lists, as expected, the highest population 
density in 1995 (figure 7.12). 
The municipalities around the 
city, those facing Cebu, 
Panglao, Jagna and some 
municipalities in the far East as 
well as Bien Unido in the North 
also record higher densities, 
compared to relatively scattered 
population distribution in 
residual Northern, Eastern, 
Southern and interior Bohol. 
Table 7.4 indicates that these 
population strongholds have 
continued to grow until 2000. 
Interestingly, Dagohoy has been 
the fastest growing municipality 
although comparatively few 
inhabitants and population 
density was registered in 1995 
(figure 7.4).  
Overall, population growth in 
Bohol is at an annual average of 
2.9 %, and thus higher than the 
national rate (compare also 
figure 6.19). Bohol’s population 
has numerically multiplied 
fivefold since 1903. Given this 
rapid population growth the mentioned low official rate of unemployment strikes me and 
suggests that the higher self-rated counterpart provided by the Bohol Poll is more realistic 
(confirmed by expert interviews 5 and 20). Boholanos engage in out-migration specifically to 
Mindanao and Metro Manila (Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999). 
Figure 7.12: Population density 1995  
 
   Table 7.4: Fastest growing municipalities in 
Bohol 1995-2000 
 Municipality Annual population growth rate 1995 - 2000 
1. Dagohoy  3.68 
2. Panglao 3.32 
3. Loon 3.30 
4. Tagbilaran City 3.22 
5. Baclayon 3.21 
Source: Bohol Provincial Government 2003b 
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Education and health  
Figure 6.21 illustrates that (a) about 5% of Boholanos aged five or older have no education, 
(b) over 50% have accomplished primary education, (c) approximately 25% secondary, and 
(d) about 20% tertiary levels. In comparison to other provinces, Bohol ranks in (a) medium, 
(b) highest, (c) medium to low, and (d) high quartiles respectively. Strikingly, the province 
registers more tertiary attainments than Cebu although official sources locate eight 
universities in Cebu and only one in Bohol (compare chapter 6.22; STEDNET 2002). The 
educational data situation becomes even more confusing when considering the vector-based 
educational infrastructure of Bohol displayed in figure 7.13 (as compiled by the PPDO 2004), 
where seven universities are recorded for Bohol. During my field visits and interviews I heard 
of only two universities, both located in Tagbilaran City. I also learnt that only the 
(secondary) educational facilities in Tagbilaran and Ubay offer education and qualification, 
which enable their students to gain access to higher-level careers. Overall, again major 
limitation to research due to low data quality become apparent. In this context, I am unable to 
provide a reliable assessment of educational facilities in Bohol, let alone their spatial 
distribution.  
According to figure 6.22 Boholanos are included in the quartile of Filipinos with the highest 
life expectancy and register – in comparison with other provinces – a great lack of doctors. In 
addition, figure 7.13 shows that most hospitals are located along the coast, reaching up to 
Inabanga in the West and Anda in the East, whereas the North and interior municipalities are 
scarcely served. Private hospitals allocate particularly to areas between Tagbilaran and 
Guindulman or Tagbilaran and Tubignon. People from outer islands and often those from the 
uplands usually have to travel to ‘mainland’ Bohol for education and health services. Thus, 
they have to spend their scarce financial resources for transport to obtain (public) social 
services (field visits 4, 5, 11). 
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Figure 7.13: Educational and health infrastructure in Bohol as of 2001 
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Water scarcity 
Figure 7.14 adds another aspect of health infrastructure: It visualises the percentage of 
households with access to doubtful water resources. The respective inter-provincial map in 
figure 6.23 registers 30.8% of Boholanos with no access to safe water in 2000, sorting it into 
the second highest quartile of 
provinces. Figure 7.14 now 
illuminates that particularly in the 
poor North, in some 
municipalities up to 70% of 
households, lack safe water 
access, with gradually decreasing 
percentages towards the 
(wealthier) South. Noteworthy, 
lowland areas are generally more 
adversely affected than uplands 
(with the exception of Carmen), 
because various rivers well in the 
mountains and usually flow 
towards the South of the island 
(PPDO 2002; compare accounts 
on agricultural water supply). The 
municipality of Cortes, adjacent 
to Tagbilaran, records rather poor access to safe water due to economically profitable yet 
environmentally controversial aquaculture and nipa production in its main river (nipa is a part 
of mangroves used for roofing) (field visit 5).  
Altogether, these findings strike even more when considering that according to the PPDO 
(2002), even in the well-developed Panglao the majority of the tourism resorts face 
continuous scarcity of drinking water. Such statement suggests that the situation for those 
municipalities, which feature bad access to safe water according to figure 7.14 may indeed, be 
even more serious. Similarly, a majority of Boholanos whom I talked to during field visits 3, 
4, 5, and 12 actually stated water supply problems among their prime concerns. Against this 
background the in average high life expectancy of Boholanos is an interesting feature. 
Figure 7.14: Households with access to doubtful water 
sources 2001 
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Access, infrastructure and connectivity  
The above accounts already indicate that infrastructure and particularly transport routes via 
road and sea play a significant role to economic, trade and tourism markets as well as to 
access to social service.  
In national comparison, according to figure 6.17, Bohol is recorded in the highest provincial 
quartile in terms of road density (even exceeding Cebu). Accordingly, one might assume that 
road access to the rural and peripheral is unproblematic. However, figure 7.15 illustrates that, 
generally, Tagbilaran City is the ‘centre’ of the road system and province-wide by far best 
equipped in terms of connecting infrastructure. Almost all visitors enter the island through 
either the Tagbilaran airport or the Tagbilaran seaport, a fact, which naturally supports the 
allocation of tourist infrastructure there. Obviously, this is an immense competitive advantage 
for attracting economic and business activities, social facilities, political decision-makers, and 
Boholanos (migrants), as well as tourists and international aid organisations to settle in 
Tagbilaran and its surroundings (compare chapter 8.3.1). 
Moreover, during my field trips I learned that solely those roads classified as ‘national’ roads 
in figure 7.15 are concrete or asphalt roads yet even these have large potholes, are often in bad 
condition, and allow slow travel by car. This observation, firstly, brings attention back to 
matters of access, connectivity, and ‘the distance to care’ to markets, facilities, tourist 
attractions beyond Tagbilaran and national roads. It secondly suggests that the infrastructure 
conditions pertaining in those municipalities in Bohol and provinces of the Philippines that 
are officially acknowledged as less well equipped may in fact be entirely inadequate. Thirdly, 
such findings once again indicate the low data quality and limited reliability of many 
Philippine information systems.  
Correspondingly, while the provincial government (2003b) claims that the province has 
sufficient electricity supply, I learned that many inhabitants of more remote areas like the 
Anda peninsula and Inabanga either have no electricity at all or self-generated, unsteady 
power sources (field visits 4 and 5). Figure 7.15 shows that electricity is limitedly provided 
for the mountainous areas of the island as well. 
Figure 7.15 also indicates that especially Eastern parts of the island are literally cut off from 
(ferry) connections with neighbouring islands and/or the rest of the country. Generally 
however, port facilities and ferry connections are more evenly distributed across the province 
than the road network, and operate, for example, in the peripheral North. The Southern 
coastline between Jagna and Tagbilaran are not served with more ferry lines and ports, 
because these two connections are well established and attract travel and trade from 
neighbouring municipalities.  
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All in all, the infrastructure situation in Bohol can be stated to be either adequate for a 
spatially balanced tourism-services and industrial development nor allows for easy access-
outreach relations in terms of trade and markets, as well as of services between the peripheral 
areas, their inhabitants and the government (compare chapter 8). 
 
Figure 7.15: Connectivity infrastructure in Bohol as of 2001 
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7.3  Analytical inferences across inter- and intra-provincial scales  
This chapter literally presents a follow-up to chapter 6.3. It summarises, compares, and 
analyses the themes of disparities of poverty and wealth elaborated for Bohol with those at 
inter-provincial and -regional scale. Analysis of Bohol is more constrained by data availability 
and reliability, and is focussed on disparate development related to poverty, agriculture, and 
tourism issues. Therefore, not all themes are comparable between the investigations of Bohol 
and of the Philippines. It also ought to be considered that comparisons of poverty patterns are 
restricted entirely to qualitative assessment, due to the dissimilar derivation process of 
national/inter-provincial and intra-Bohol poverty data. Table 7.5 provides a schematic 
overview of the comparative findings to be explained in detail in the following. 
Table 7.5:  Qualitative assessment of manifestations of intra-Philippine and intra-Bohol 
disparities 
Manifestations 
of disparities 
Inter-regional & provincial 
Philippines Relation* Intra-Bohol 
Direct and 
official poverty 
indicators 
Based on income data Ù Based on health and education data 
Agriculture/fishery – service 
& industry dichotomy ≈ /Ù 
Subsistence agricultural/fishery 
is dominant, some dichotomy to 
tourism, no industry 
Human resources matter Ù Economy matters more 
Population-employment 
dilemma  ? not reliably assessable 
Brain drain from peripheries 
to brain gain in centres ? not reliably assessable 
Indirect 
indicators 
Infrastructure and access 
seem to play important role, 
but not comprehensively 
assessable 
≈ / ? Infrastructure and access are decisive factors 
North-South  Ù South-North   
Metro Manila - residual 
Philippines ≈ 
Tagbilaran City/ Panglao island) 
- residual Bohol 
Urban - rural  ≈ Urban - rural (with exceptions!) 
Coast - interior ≈ /Ù 
Partly matching (in South and 
West), partly not (in the North/ 
Northeast) 
Spatial 
disparities 
between 
Lowland - upland  ≈ /Ù 
Partly matching (in South and 
West), partly not (in the 
North/Northeast) 
Unequal landownership  ≈ Unequal landownership 
Chinese concentration in 
urban centres  ? not assessable 
 
‘Faces’ of  
social 
disparities 
not identified 
comprehensively 
– to be continued 
Indigenous minorities in CAR 
and Muslim minorities in 
Mindanao peripheries 
? not assessable 
                                                 *contrasting: Ù; resembling: ≈; not assessable:? 
                                                                                                          Clausen 2006 
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In terms of spatial patterns, the North-South divide and focus on Metro Manila in the 
Philippines faces a South-North divide and focus on Tagbilaran City and partially, Panglao 
island in Bohol. Alike the national level in Bohol the centres of development are the 
urbanised areas, especially Tagbilaran City and its surroundings. Implicitly, centre-periphery 
relations in Bohol have, similar to the whole Philippines, a distinct urban-rural face.  
The municipal urban centres (usually the seats of municipal government), especially those at 
the Southern coast show characteristics of secondary centres, whereas “the more 
disadvantaged households and groups are in the rural townships, in the rural areas” (expert 
interview 7). Basically, the more rural and further North and Northeast located municipalities 
record higher poverty incidence and an overall peripheral status. At the low end of the 
municipal parameter of disparities of poverty and wealth are Pres. Garcia and Bien Unido29. 
Spatial disparities within municipalities/communities may, alike at national scale, vary 
considerably. Morphological differentiation play a role, however not a straight one as at 
national scale (or they may simply be more precisely assessable in Bohol). Broadly speaking, 
the coastal/lowland and interior/upland wealth differential prevalent at national level more or 
less corresponds in Bohol’s South and Southwest. However, large lowlands reaching far into 
the interior of the island mark the very poor North and Northeast of Bohol. A different 
example, the relatively wealthy municipalities of Jagna and Garcia Hernandez are 
comparatively mountainous and have only a narrow lowland coastal strip – where, however, 
in the case of Jagna a vibrant harbour town is the motor of development (which could 
possibly hide intra-municipal disparities between coast and mountainous inland). 
Spatial disparities of poverty and wealth in Bohol show some, yet again less plain 
interrelations with sectoral disparities than the inter-provincial patterns. This is mostly due to 
the almost exclusive agriculture and fishery character of the provincial economy with very 
little industry operating in Bohol. Note – and this may be an aspect applying to many other 
‘agricultural peripheries’ of the Philippines – that agriculture and fisheries are mainly 
subsistence-oriented activities in Bohol. This is particularly due to small patches of land 
(compare below), little economies of scale, productivity, and trade.  
Tourism services allocate almost exclusively in and around the wealthier centres of 
Tagbilaran City and Panglao island. This is notwithstanding the fact that tourist attractions are 
spread around the island. This implies, that the potential of tourism as a lever for more 
balanced development does not seem to be taken advantage of (compare follow-up in chapter 
6.1.3).  
                                               
29 Note that while Ubay is among the officially poorest municipalities, it is also the location of several recent 
economic investment incentives (cattle farming) and therefore not considered at the very end of the disparity 
parameter (compare chapter 8). 
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The research in Bohol illuminates a high significance of issues of access, infrastructure, and 
connectivity for socio-economic development in both, (rural) peripheries and (urban) centres. 
One expert interviewee summarises the problems peripheral rural communities face: 
“… the service delivery is not reaching them adequately, because of the squattered 
nature it is quite hard to form an organisation, it takes a longer time. Whereas in the 
urban they can call and ask for assistance. In the rural areas it takes a longer time to get 
the poor people together” (expert interview 7). 
It ought to be noted that the issue of unequal landownership – prevalent in Bohol and the 
entire Philippines alike – plays an additional and significant role in this context. Unequal 
landownership deteriorates the marginalised situation of poorer tenants and landless workers 
as such, that they often lack the (legal, material, time and educational) assets to actively 
connect and benefit to the centres of assistance (i.e. mobility and establishing linkages 
requires resources already!). In other words, governmental outreach to the landowners (even 
if they are absentee owners) is automatically better facilitated than to those who are actually 
in more urgent need. 
Findings on human development in Bohol allow interesting and somewhat summarising 
inferences for general development patterns. Therefore, they are elaborated in this final part of 
chapter 7. Precisely, in inter-provincial comparison of the Human Development Index in 2000 
(figure 6.24) Bohol is included in the medium quartile, and has actually ‘jumped’ up a class 
since 1997 (where it had stagnated from 1994). This means that in 2000 Bohol is for the first 
time included in the same HDI quartile as its ‘wealthy’ neighbour Cebu. This may be related 
to Bohol’s life expectancy and educational attainment being above Philippine average (figures 
6.21 and 6.22).  
At the same time, considering the composition of 
the HDI, and given Boholanos’ outstanding 
education and life expectancy, the HDI still must 
have been pushed down by a lack of GDP by capita, 
here by a lack of economic productivity. These 
findings firmly suggest that economic aspects 
impede overall development in Bohol more than 
social (health and education) aspects. Such 
inference is underlined by Boholanos’ response to 
the Bohol Poll question for the most important 
problem they face in 2002, as represented in table 7.6. Accordingly, for more than 50% of the 
respondents the major problem in Bohol is the economy. Interestingly, the agricultural sector 
and its problems are apparently not counted as to belong to overall economic problems. This 
may again point at the dominant subsistence nature of the primary sector, and that the arena 
for economic progress is seen to be based in industry and services (compare perception of 
Table 7.6: Most important problem 
in the respondents’ place (in %) 
Economy 57.2 
Agriculture  11.0 
Public services 10.0 
Public safety 6.1 
Environmental 1.8 
Others  6.0 
Don’t know  8.0 
                                            Source: HNU 2002   
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government in chapter 8.1). Moreover noteworthy in the context of this study is obviously the 
third ranking of problems in public services. 
Hence, it follows firstly, that the recent social-indicator-based poverty identification process 
by the provincial government ignores the de-facto existing economic developmental setting 
and therefore may adversely identify and target disparities of poverty and wealth.  
Secondly, in Philippine comparison Bohol can be clearly classified as a developmental 
periphery which however recently shows endeavours, prospects and potential to maybe turn 
into a centre in the long run, especially through its commitment to opening up and benefiting 
from global markets through tourism services (compare figure 6.25). 
Thirdly, when dealing with sectoral issues of poverty-alleviation, agriculture, and tourism, 
there is also a need to consider related issues of disparate development. This is particularly 
crucial in times of growth, or as the provincial government of Bohol points out: 
“The more development took place, the greater the level of exclusion of the poor 
leading to a situation where pockets of poverty coexist with levels of relative affluence 
that often end up hiding the poor from the eyes of LGUs, policy makers and 
development institutions” (Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b: 2).  
The quote declares that material disparities of poverty and wealth may interrelate with 
disparities of policy outreach in Bohol. Chapters 8 and 9 continue to empirically investigate 
the content and truth of this assertion. 
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8.  Investigating the effect(iveness) of policy-making on 
disparities of poverty in Bohol  
This chapter provides empirical answers to key question II. It analyses governmental policies 
for their outreach and effect(iveness) on the peripheral, marginalised, and most problematic 
poverty issues in Bohol. The decentralised setting requires integrating the case research on 
Bohol in a national government policy framework. Examples from other regions of the 
Philippines may also be used for complementary or comparative analytical purposes. 
This chapter aims at discovering typical constraints of policy-making upon disparities of 
poverty and wealth in the peculiar Bohol-Philippine setting, assuming that the performance of 
policy on disparities of poverty and wealth depends on their – and their makers’ – uneven 
presence across space, society, time, and context (see chapter 3.1.2). Sectoral anti-poverty, 
tourism, and agricultural (partly including fishery) policy fields present the entry points for a 
policy analysis that is based on policy documents, qualitative interviews, field visits, outreach 
mapping and academic literature (see chapters 4.3.1 and 4.3.4). 
8.1  National policy framework 
Disparities or poverty, redistribution or growth?  
Essentially, poverty – not regional – policy is politically considered “the most formidable 
development challenge for the Philippines in the 21st century” (NEDA 2001: 1; compare 
chapter 2.3.2). Such precedence of poverty over disparities is apparent by official statistics 
highlighting absolute over relative poverty incidences (compare chapter 6.1.2).  
None the less, policy priorities in President Arroyo’s Medium-term Philippine Development 
Plan 2001-2004 recognise that “the fight against poverty will not be complete unless existing 
regional disparities are narrowed down” (NEDA 2001: 7). Compared to her predecessors, the 
Arroyo government is claimed to give greater attention to regional development (Mercado 
2002). The targets of the plan are  
¾ The decongestion of Metro Manila into Southern Tagalog- CALABRAZON and Central 
Luzon - Subic Clark; 
¾ Urban centres as growth catalysts for rural hinterlands; and  
¾ General poverty in Mindanao.  
It shows that in the light of the findings of chapters 5, and 6 only few of the identified 
developmental peripheries are specifically targeted: Visayan provinces are not mentioned, and 
rural development is assessed as a function of growth in proximate urban centres. Instead, the 
development ‘hubs’ of Metro Manila and adjacent Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon 
continue to be addressed. Except targeting poverty in Mindanao, national policy outreach 
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plans for a more spatially balanced development remain somewhat unspecified and seem 
neither complete nor efficient. 
Interestingly, national policy guidelines (more) explicitly recognise the socially dividing 
implications of poverty. Since the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act 1997 (under 
Ramos) governmental policy has concentrated on balancing the social volatilities induced by 
globalising free market forces. Likewise, the central targets of Arroyo’s presidency as listed in 
her 2001 state-of-the-nation-address follow such “socially oriented market economy 
approach” (Ana 1998) and include  
¾ Free enterprise development appropriate to 21st century globalisation with a social 
conscience;  
¾ Agro-industrial modernisation, founded on social equity;  
¾ Social bias towards the disadvantaged people; and  
¾ Rise of the moral standards of governments and society.  
More emphasis has also been put on participatory governance approaches and administrative 
effectiveness as a means to combat (disparities of) poverty: 
“Good and effective governance is vital to winning the battle against poverty […] New 
partnerships between the government on the one hand, and business, civil society and 
people’s organisations on the other, will be forged and strengthened as the 
bureaucracy is right-sized to permit a reengineered government to do more with less in 
the delivery of public goods and services. This requires a performance-based and 
results-oriented government” (NEDA 2001: 253). 
Notwithstanding the apparent acknowledgement of social and sectoral disparities and of state-
society partnership, the majority of scholars judge that ultimately free-market, capital-based 
growth strategies dominate national government’s policy-making. For example, the 
government is claimed to head for turning the Philippines into ‘a newly industrialised 
country’. This would imply that their main policy priority is still on targeting growth over 
redistribution – an assessment underlined by the existing material disparities as shown in 
chapter 6 (Thompson & Villacorta 1996; Clausen forthcoming B). In other words, from this 
perspective the development discourse and relationship between market initiative and state 
government regulation in the Philippines remains dominated by global economy-centred, 
income-growth, ‘classic’ government-focussed anti-poverty concepts (Rigg 2003). This 
involves that national policy-making follows the theoretical argument of pursuing and 
achieving a more balanced development by the means of globalisation (see chapter 2.2.3; 
below). In what ways such approach involves a reorganisation of traditional, top-down policy-
making procedures towards more participatory state-society interactions in a decentralised 
policy environment is to be examined by empirical research in this chapter. 
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Policy trends in economic sectors 
Sectoral policy guidelines, particularly in the primary and tourism sectors, underline the 
above-noted growth paradigms and provide explanations for sectoral manifestations of 
disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.  
During Marcos’ authoritative regime the Philippine economy was highly protected and 
operated on principles of import substitution. Especially agriculture received technical and 
financial support while industries and services, including tourism, were strongly controlled 
and regulated (Manasan & Mercado 1999). However, since the 1980s the Philippine economy 
has profoundly been re-shaped towards greater global competitiveness and integration 
through globalisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation in the industry and service 
sectors (Orbeta 1996; Austria 2001). Particularly export industries but increasingly also 
tourism are heralded as major catalysts for growth in the Philippines, and the transformation 
of the economy into a globally-integrated market shall guarantee this growth (compare 
chapter 6.1.3). Accordingly, in the 1990s the inflow of foreign investments was liberalised. 
Moreover, the Philippines entered multilateral and regional trade associations, namely the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the 
Word Trade Organisation (WTO), to enable the growing industries and services to realise 
economies of scale, to penetrate larger markets, and to attract foreign networks and 
investments (Aldaba 2000; Lim 1998). Eventually, the Medium Term Development Plan 
2001-2004 explicitly aims at “putting the Philippines on the International Tourism Map” 
(NEDA 2001: 71) based on the expectation that “tourism is the fastest lane to getting the 
economy back on the track” (Roxas-Mendoza 2001: 28). At the end of the 20th century the 
Philippines are more global market-oriented than ever before (compare chapter 6.1.2 and 
6.1.3; Balisacan & Pernia 2002). 
This ‘global turn’ of the economy, however, takes place to the detriment of agriculture and 
fishery, which have been largely neglected since. Only President Estrada addressed food 
security and the modernisation of the primary sector in his ‘ERAP for the Poor’-movement 
(compare chapter 9.2.3). The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernisation Act (AFMA) of 1998 
promises to mitigate problems of the rural poor in the agricultural sector. Yet it envisaged so 
by reinforcing, once again, global export-market orientation and agro-industrial growth (see 
also chapter 8.4.3). Chapter 6 and 7 have already illustrated some controversial consequences 
of economic transformation. The subsequent chapters elaborate whether and how such 
national framework interacts with decentral policy-making and disparities at intra-provincial 
scale in Bohol. 
 134
8.2  Boholano conceptions of disparities of poverty and wealth 
8.2.1  Decentralised policy priorities and motives 
How does the provincial government of Bohol recognise, identify, and approach disparities of 
poverty and wealth in a decentralised setting? Generally, the government practically executes 
and administers policy through respective offices, after the Sangguniang has set the guidelines 
(usually on the basis of recommendations and facts provided by the specialised offices; 
compare chapter 5.2). Note that in the Philippine presidential system of government, the 
President exercises supervisory authority over the provinces, while the provincial 
governments exercise supervision over municipalities (Valdellon 1999). 
There are no policies and/or agencies, which deal exclusively with disparate development in 
Bohol. However, some sectoral and anti-poverty policies take an area- or group-based 
approach. Officially, as at national level, anti-poverty endeavours – and not disparities – set 
the main theme guiding most policy initiatives in Bohol. Asked to put up independent 
development plans by the Local Government Code, the respective Bohol Medium-term 
Development Plan 2004-2009 subsumes spatial as well as sectoral and social development 
under the prime objective of poverty reduction:  
“The development challenge facing Bohol over the years has to do primarily with 
addressing poverty and its limited physical and economic resources to at least 
guarantee minimum desirable levels of social welfare and overall quality of life of 
Boholanos” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: 23). 
The quote illuminates that the provincial government holds in particular a lack of economic 
resources and growth responsible for (disparities of) poverty, which result in inadequate social 
services and overall deprivation. This economically-oriented conception on (disparities of) 
poverty strikingly contrasts with the social identification process of poverty statistics (see 
chapter 6.1; 7.3). The above quote also indicates that the government highlights ‘life chances’ 
or what comes close to the ‘equality of opportunity’-approach. It follows that – similar to its 
national counterpart – the provincial government of Bohol emphasises poverty (reduction) 
over disparity (alleviation). Yet, at the same time the provincial government considers the 
spatial, social, and sectoral manifestations of poverty and acknowledges the significance of 
targeting policy in order to reach the poor: “To respond to the needs of the poor, it is first 
important to reach them wherever they are” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003a: 26). 
Respective spatial, social, and sectoral development priority targets are specified: 
Spatial area targets 
¾ Coast and islands in the North; 
¾ Uplands in the interior, and 
¾ Watersheds in Loboc, Wahig-Inabanga, and Abatan.  
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Social group targets 
¾ Farm and non-farm labourer; 
¾ Tenant and part-time farmers; 
¾ Marginal and part-time fishermen, and  
¾ Miscellaneous: Unemployed, scavengers, single mothers or disabled.  
Sectoral targets 
¾ Agro-industrial development, and  
¾ (Eco-) Tourism (see Provincial Government Bohol 2003a, 2003b). 
These targets – unlike their national counterparts – adequately meet the uneven development 
situation in Bohol as identified in chapter 7. Particularly sectoral targets are further specified: 
The Bohol Medium Term Plan 2004-2009 identifies developmental constraints – here similar 
to national plans – to lie especially in the primary sector, such as 
 “low productivity in agriculture and fisheries continues to dampen economic growth. 
Majority of the farmers and fisherfolk have not been reached with basic services and 
extension programs to improve productivity and gain more access to an expanding 
market” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: xiv-xv). 
The above-listed poverty groups are all engaged in fisheries and/or agriculture, and face the 
sectors’ quoted productivity and access problems: Farm and non-farm labourers depend on 
seasonal employment for subsistence, earn little, and are at greater risk to social instability 
and economic downturn. Tenants and/or part-time farmers are not able to produce economies 
of scale due to the small sizes of farms, poor irrigation, low value crops, poor soil, and 
inadequate technical equipments. Fishers confront fish depletion due to environmentally 
degraded marine habitats, intrusion of commercial fishing, and over-fishing. In this context, 
the government is “aware that asset reform is crucial to reducing inequalities and stimulating 
growth” and state that “expanding the assets base, as well as the productivity, of these 
various target groups remains a priority within the sub-sector”(Provincial Government of 
Bohol 2003b: xv).  
In contrast, (eco-) tourism is understood as a development catalyst sector and is meant to 
“…stimulate economic growth and provide direct cash benefits to local communities. 
These benefits can in turn be channeled to improve nutrition, food security, housing, 
and ultimately raise the standard of living in rural areas” (Provincial Government 
Bohol 2003b: 88).   
In other words, the provincial government – alike the national government – approaches 
tourism as a means to overall economic progress on the one hand – the ultimate target is to 
replace Boracay as a tourist destination (expert interview 11). On the other hand, (eco-) 
tourism is officially recognised to provide alternative livelihood options to Boholanos, 
potentially also for the rural and peripheral. In this context the plans acknowledge the 
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capability of (eco-) tourism-related micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to provide 
employment and income, and therefore relieve some pressure and obstacles faced in 
agriculture and fishery. This policy focus on tourism development (and not industrial) seems 
reasonable in the face of the predominantly agricultural and peripheral character of Bohol (see 
chapter 7).   
Overall, while the general priorities of the provincial government resemble their national 
counterpart by highlighting poverty over disparity reduction, they approach it differently by a 
combined growth-redistribution approach. This includes more explicit and detailed 
identification of spatial target areas, social target groups, and sectoral targets than at national 
level – giving some credit to Lake’s theoretical argument for decentralised local government’s 
policy outreach potentially being more effective (discussed in chapter 3.3.2).  
Table 8.1 outlines the responsibilities that have been decentralised to policy-making at LGUs 
in the fields of poverty alleviation, agriculture/fishery, and tourism policy since 1991. It ought 
to be noted, however, that most of the tasks pursued by the provincial government ideally 
should be supported by and carried out in partnership with municipal and barangay LGUs as 
well, as they obviously affect their jurisdictions and population. All policies are expected to 
be in line with the idea that “the response to the poverty situation needs to be target-specific, 
adequate and timely. The interventions have to be mutually reinforcing and complementary, 
as well as affordable over time, by Government and other stakeholders. The key task is to 
match specific needs with project services” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003a: 17). 
Table 8.1: Decentralised sectoral tasks of provincial governments (selection)* 
Agriculture & 
Fisheries 
Extension of & research on services and facilities: 
- Prevention/ control of plant/animal diseases => Productivity  
- Livestock farms & markets, breeding stations, artificial insemination centres 
- Assistance for cooperatives etc.  
- Transfer of appropriate technology & knowledge 
- Cooperative implementation of land reform with national government 
Tourism - Tourism development (programmes)  
- Tourism promotion  
Social Welfare & 
Development 
- Poverty alleviation projects  
- Programs on rebel returnees and evacuees 
- Disaster relief operations 
- Population development services 
Public Works & 
Infrastructure  
- Local roads and bridges 
- Inter-municipal water works, drainage, sewerage, irrigation systems 
* This study does not explicitly focus on the aspects displayed in grey colour, may however comment on them in discussion.  
Source: adapted after Republic Act 7160; Balgos 2001; Osteria 1996 
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8.2.2  Profile of policy analysis  
This study investigates seven policy initiatives and their respective policy-makers and 
executers and – given that no explicit anti-disparity policy is under operation in Bohol – 
subdivides them into (a) sectoral ‘indirect’ policy, in the fields of tourism and 
agriculture/fishery, and (b) ‘directly targeted’ anti-poverty policy. Table 8.2 provides an 
overview of the chosen policies and their makers.  
Similar to national government the provincial government of Bohol aims at enhancing 
participatory governance and state-society partnership processes (see Provincial Government 
of Bohol 2003b). Accordingly, some governmental policy is executed in partnerships by 
NGOs, peoples’ organisations, and/or international aid organisations. This institutional setting 
allows for some comparison between ’classic’ governmental and more recent ‘partnership or 
governanced’ policy-making. The table does not allow insights into questions of if and how 
local populations are targeted to participate in policy-making when not organised into 
peoples’ organisations (the more common scenario). These issues are dealt with in the 
respective sections of this chapter. 
Emphasis is on policy-making at provincial government level, with each policy case 
highlighting specific sectoral engagements. The two area-based, non-sectoral cases 6 and 7 at 
municipal and barangay level exemplify policy-making characteristics in typical Boholano 
peripheries – a small island and an upland community – in a comprehensive way.  
Mostly, the subsequent sections present information on the state of policy (and their makers) 
as of early 2004, the main period of my research in the Philippines. Yet, it remains difficult to 
relate – and compare – the seven policies with each other for the following reasons: Firstly, 
the reference periods of the single policy description vary, for I was often dependent on the 
(date of the) information provided by policy-makers and interview partners. Secondly, in 
early 2004 the policies were situated at different stages of the policy cycle and, logically, 
applied varying log-frames. Such setting suggests to highlight qualitative explorations of 
patterns and trends over detailed fact-focused comparison, and to organise the respective 
policy investigation into two stages, which are adopted with reference to the policy cycle: 
1. Policy plans and initial activities (chapter 8.3); 
2. Advanced policy implementation and accomplishments (chapter 8.4); 
Note that the boundary between the two stages may sometimes blur depending on the 
information available (compare subsequent chapter). Crucially, the two analytical steps are 
always contextualised in the decentralised policy setting of the Philippines, here broader 
development priorities of the national and provincial governments.  
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Table 8.2: Policies and policy-makers in analysis  
 Sector  Policy Policy-maker & executer Institutional background Partnership model* (if assessable) Main office  
Provincial government  
1 Investment General direction & annual projects 
Bohol Investment Promotion 
Bureau (BIPC) 
Provincial government 
 
 Tagbilaran 
City 
2 Tourism 
General direction & annual 
projects 
Bohol Tourism Office (BTO) & 
foreign consultant (German 
Development Service DED) 
Provincial government & 
International Aid  
Community leadership Tagbilaran 
City 
3 Agriculture General direction & annual projects 
Provincial Agriculturalist (PA) Provincial government ‘Classic’ government Tagbilaran 
City 
4 ‘Abante Bohol’ poverty 
reduction project  
Bohol Poverty Reduction 
Management Office (BPRMO) 
Provincial government ‘Classic’ government Tagbilaran 
City 
5 
Poverty ‘Strengthening local 
government for effective 
service delivery for poverty 
reduction’ (‘SLGP’) 
Provincial Planning and 
Development Office (PPDO) & 
Bohol Local Development 
Foundation (BLDF) 
Provincial government & 
NGO  
Community planning & 
self-help 
TagbilaranCity 
& Baclayon 
Municipal & barangay government  
6 Area-based, integrative  
Policy on the island of 
Pamilacan, Baclayon 
Municipal government of 
Baclayon & foreign consultant of 
the DED 
Municipal government & 
International Aid & 
People’s Organisation 
 
Baclayon 
7 Area-based, integrative 
Policy on uplands of Sierra 
Bullones 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Foundation (‘SWCF’) 
NGO & People’s 
Organisation  
Sierra 
Bullones  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         * following theoretical accounts in chapter 3.3.3 
                                                                                                                                                                Aspects in grey colour are not explicitly focussed but only mentioned briefly during analysis 
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A note on encountered monitoring and evaluation practices  
Certain encountered practices of policy administration complicate this study’s assessment of 
governmental policy effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty. Firstly, the only examined 
policy-maker to provide thoroughly elaborated annual monitoring and evaluation reports is 
the non-governmental organisation SWCF (policy 7). Secondly, the majority of ‘quantitative’ 
evaluation information available is based on annual periods and usually available for one year 
only instead of a series of years.  
Thirdly, neither the Bohol Tourism Office (BTO, policy 2) nor the Provincial Agriculturalist 
(policy 3) compile any comprehensive information on whether and how planned projects have 
been implemented. The BTO reasons this lack partly by their recent foundation in 2002 – it 
had been part of the Bohol Investment Promotion Centre (BIPC) before (expert interview 19). 
The planning officer of the Provincial Agriculturalist admits with respect to implementation 
reports that “the management requests them to do. But that is our …kanang …weakness. 
Because we are not able to implement it” (expert interview 3). Another example, when expert 
interviewee 2 is asked for information on a presentation he had given on decentralisation and 
participatory governance he first agrees and then withdraws: “What I can do is to give you a 
summary but I don’t have it right now […] Maybe because, ah […] when I was invited to this 
meeting, I just thought I just talk about my institute and not on a very specific project”. A 
related phenomenon, fourthly, interviewees refer to other ‘more responsible’ or ‘better 
informed’ officers. For example, expert interviewee 3 illustrates ”under the rice [programme] 
we have many projects. So I cannot oversee it thoroughly because we …ah… coordinator. I 
suggest you can talk to [him] so that he can explain to you” (compare also notes on 
informality and hierarchy in the Philippines in chapters 4.3.2 and 9).  
Fifthly, the BIPC, Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office (BPRMO, policy 4), 
Philippine Planning and Development Office (PPDO) & Bohol Local Development 
Foundation (BLDF, policy 5) combine plans and accomplishments into short reports, 
sometimes allowing pointed insights, often not30. In the case of the BPRMO project field 
workers are claimed to write “an activity report plus their observations on the progress of our 
project, on the mistakes, what do you call that, the problems encountered, and then what were 
the recommendations of the people” (expert interview 4). Yet, I was not able to look at the 
reports but confined to information handed out to me and to qualitative appraisals.  
Overall, the listed practices clearly restrict research findings to varying extents and are to be 
considered in subsequent analysis. As a result, not all analytical issues of figure 3.2 can be 
considered for every policy case.  
                                               
30
 For example, ‘Sectoral Provincial Framework Maps’ for Bohol cannot be used for this study because they do 
not differentiate between ‘plans’ and ‘existing and implemented facilities’. 
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8.3  Policy plans and initial activities: Setting up policy outreach 
8.3.1  (Eco-) Tourism endeavours  
Bohol is divided into three economic investment promotion planning zones: The coastal 
municipalities facing Cebu are planned as an agro-industry/light industry zone and suitable 
locations for Special Economic Zones. The interior and Northeast represent a zone of 
agriculture, and the Southern coast from Tagbilaran/ Panglao to Anda – with one ‘excursion’ 
to the ‘Chocolate Hills’– are to establish an eco-tourism base (see figure 8.4; BIPC 2001).  
According to the Local Government Code Bohol’s provincial government can develop and 
promote the island’s tourism policy largely independently from national policy (table 8.1). 
None the less, when Bohol was declared a national (eco-)tourism target of the Philippines in 
1998/99, this national impetus also reinforced provincial tourism endeavours. Since then the 
provincial government (policy 2) has launched eco-tourism31 programmes and attempts to 
integrate them in multi-sectoral approaches, for example, by linking them to coastal resource 
management or agro-tourism (expert interview 10). The Bohol Tourism Office (BTO) is 
meant to function as a prime policy community leader that seeks to advocate, consult, and 
coordinate cooperation with private and civil stakeholders (see chapter 3.3.3). Such multi-
sectoral and multi-stakeholder approach ought to facilitate (eco-) tourism to operate as a 
means to sustainable economic growth also in the rural and peripheral, and to enhance the 
acceptance of policy and its embeddedness into local areas and with the local people.  
The official ‘six pillars of Bohol tourism’ comprise the (a) Chocolate Hills in Carmen (photo 
7.6), (b) the Tarsier, one of the smallest living primates and oldest land species in continuous 
existence in the Philippines which inhibits the Corella area, (c) dive sites off the coast of 
Panglao, Balicasag, and Cabilao in Loon, (d) beaches of Panglao and Anda (photo 7.5), (e) 
cultural heritage buildings made out of coralline stones, above all allocated in the South and 
East coastline, and (f) Bohol’s history and culture (Provincial Government of Bohol (2003b).  
Figure 8.1 part B displays these six pillars and some other attractions in a popular marketing 
prospectus distributed by the Tourism Office. The brochure conveys the impression that 
tourism attractions and facilities are spread across the entire province. However, the image 
blurs scales and distances, as a comparison between Part A and B of figure 8.1 illuminates. 
For example, the Chocolate Hills are in reality much smaller in proportion and situated further 
Southeast than illustrated in the brochure. None the less, figure 8.1 shows that some of the 
attractions are in fact situated in municipalities previously defined as poor, which implies that 
tourism development can potentially make a difference there. 
                                               
31
 It ought to be noted that ‘eco-tourism’ initiatives in the Philippines may not necessarily be understood to 
comply with the original concept and mainly concern with the environment and its conservation (compare 
Ashley & Roe 2003: 5). Instead, the term of eco-tourism is often used as an umbrella term for community-based, 
small-scaled, multi-sectoral, and pro-poor tourism approach.  
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Figure 8.1: Bohol satellite image and tourism prospect 
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The case of Pamilacan island (of Baclayon municipality, see figure 4.2) demonstrates such 
smaller tourism endeavours in ‘peripheries’ (policy 6): The inhabitants of the island barangay 
used to live almost exclusively on catching whale sharks and whales. Since 1997 they have 
been legally forbidden to pursue this occupation (after interventions by the World Wildlife 
Fund) (expert interviews 10, 7). Ever since, LGUs together with a Pamilacano peoples’ 
organisation, the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation, which was 
founded during the policy process, NGOs, and international consultants have planned, 
promoted, and partly introduced whale-watching and diving tourism to the now protected 
coral reefs surrounding Pamilacan in order to foster new livelihood options for Pamilacanos. 
In addition, some (eco-) tourist accommodation on the island has opened up income 
alternatives. Similarly, small-scale eco-tourism projects have been launched particularly in the 
Eastern municipalities of Mabini, Candijay, 
and Guindulman, as well as in the Western 
municipality of Buenavista and promoted 
through, for example, coastal resource 
management showcases (see photo 8.1; 
expert interviews 10, 11; field visits 4, 11).  
Pamilacan island as well as Mabini, 
Candijay, Guindulman, and Buenavista are 
included in so-called circuit routes for 
tourists identified by the Bohol Tourism 
Sketch Plan (CY 1998-2020) as an attempt to 
spread tourist routes across the island. Six 
circuit packages for visitors are identified. 
They all start from Tagbilaran City, yet cover all of Bohol and hence stretch beyond the 
official investment planning zones for tourism: 
¾  Circuit 1: Tagbilaran, Dauis & Panglao,   Balicasag & Pamilacan Islands; 
¾  Circuit 2: Tagbilaran, Corella, Baclayon, Albuquerque, Loay, Loboc, Bilar, Carmen; 
¾  Circuit 3: Tagbilaran, Clarin, Inabanga, Buenavista, Getafe, Talibon, Sagbayan; 
¾  Circuit 4: Tagbilaran, Cortes, Maribojoc, Loon, Calape, Tubigon, Antequera, Balilihan; 
¾  Circuit 5: Tagbilaran, Dimiao, Valencia, Garcia- Hernandez, Jagna, Duero, Anda; 
¾  Sub-circuit 5: Anda Peninsula: Guindulman, Anda, Candijay, Mabini;  
¾  Circuit 6: Agri-tourism circuit: Pilar to Ubay. 
Notwithstanding these decentral endeavours, the satellite image of Bohol in comparison with 
the marketing prospectus (figure 8.1) clarifies that tourism marketing and plans by the BTO 
so far omit the peripheral Northern islands and coastlands despite their vast natural coral 
Photo 8.1: Eco-tourist river cruise in 
mangrove estuarine area in Buenavista  
 
Kindly provided by expert interviewee 11/19
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reefs. The coral reefs in the North exceed those in Panglao and Anda by far and are located in 
greater proximity to the potential visitor ‘gate’ of Cebu. The policy neglect of these areas is 
even more striking considering the great poverty incidence in most of the Northern 
municipalities, and considering that these areas are named explicitly as spatial policy target 
areas (see chapter 8.2.1). Tourism could potentially present an alternative livelihood option 
there, similar to the Pamilacan case. Interview partner 17 explains that particularly the 
extreme water scarcity on the Northern islands and coastlines obstructs such tourism activities 
there. Yet, this argument is weakened by the fact that water is scarce in Pamilacan and even in 
Panglao, too. Interviewee 10 states further that the development of the North generally 
receives little attention, partly due to its limited accessibility from Tagbilaran City (figure 
7.15), and more decisively, because most policy-makers – Filipinos equally as foreigners – 
prefer to be based in the city and situate their projects within comfortable reach, like on 
Pamilacan (compare also chapter 8.4.2). 
8.3.2  Targeting policy plans for the primary sector 
Turning to the primary sector, official policy frameworks in Bohol emphasise agricultural 
growth in combination with commercial production in industry and services on the one hand, 
and more balanced access to markets and assets on the other. Decentrally the provincial LGU 
particularly deals with the extension of (research on) services and facilities for increasing 
productivity, support for cooperative organisations, and technology and knowledge transfer 
(table 8.1). Selected areas for investment are high-value crop production, setting up of post-
harvest facilities, feed mill and fruit/meat processing and inland fishing, aquacultures and 
processing. Needs in fishery shall be met, among others, by the delineation of municipal 
waters, provision of alternative livelihood and employment options, and enforcement of local 
fishing ordinances (BIPC 2001). 
Figure 8.2 overviews the project plans of the Provincial Agriculturalist (policy 3) for 2004. 
Basically, the office pursues classic sectoral governmental service delivery and traditionally 
works on its own. Number-wise and in terms of finances the projects’ emphasis is on the 
enhancement of (a) crop and (b) fishery productivity, as well as seed delivery, bio-intensive 
gardening, and technical equipments (expert interviews 3, 13). Besides, activity fields of 
(c) research and (d) training and capacity building, for example, by forming an inland-
fishermen’s cooperation, take over smaller proportions. Overall, the activity plans of the 
Provincial Agriculturalist clearly meet the set decentralised responsibilities. 
Crop productivity enhancement projects are mostly directed at interior and Northeastern 
municipalities and thus, target many of the poorest agricultural areas. The locations with the 
highest concentration of projects plans are Tagbilaran City and Ubay. Panglao – already 
targeted by several tourism projects – is included again. Fishery enhancement projects are 
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more selectively planned for the Eastern municipalities of Mabini, Candijay, Guindulman 
(also tackled by eco-tourism policy), and for Clarin. Again, Panglao island is included while 
in contrast, some of the very poor and agriculture- and fishery-dependent municipalities and 
the outer islands in the North (from Inabanga to Bien Unido) are not.  
This concentration of policy activities in already existing economic centres appears to 
conform to the national guidelines of focussing policy activities in urban areas (compare 
chapter 8.1). In fact, already since Marcos’ times Philippine governments have explicitly 
promoted such development of urban economic centres into major growth poles for the 
respective hinterlands. Equally, the dominance of Metro Manila has been fostered through 
policies, which funnel public investments mostly into the metropolis (Manasan & Mercado 
1999; Spreitzhofer & Heintel 2002). 
As a form of spill-over effect from centre to periphery, local governments in Bohol 
increasingly pursue to utilise their natural resources to profit from the needs of the ‘big 
neighbour’ Cebu. For example, Cebu City and Mactan island do not have sufficient water 
resources required for further commercial expansion. While there are many areas in Bohol 
facing water scarcity as well, the island’s three main watersheds in Loboc, Wahig-Inabanga, 
and Abatan provide sufficient water to their surroundings. Especially the Inabanga-Wahig 
river watershed falls into an area suitable as a source of alternative water supply for Cebu and 
could be exploited to the socio-economic benefit of both provinces and their inhabitants. 
Important to note, the benefits potentially could be distributed along the watershed from the 
town of Inabanga at the coast towards the more peripheral and poorer interior. The 
accomplishments of these policy plans are discussed in chapter 9.3.3 only.  
Cooperating closely with the national Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Promotion 
Center, Department of Agrarian Reform, Agricultural Training Institute, National Irrigation 
Authority, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Cooperatives Development Authority, 
Land Bank, Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, and the World Bank, the Provincial 
Agriculturalist of Bohol instigates so-called ‘Agrarian Reform Communities’(ARCs). ARCs 
are embedded in the nation-wide ‘Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme’ (CARP) 
which was launched in 1987. CARP, including ARCs, are a policy response to the 
fundamental landownership problems persistent in the country (see chapters 6.1.3 and 7.2.3). 
They are nationally and provincially considered crucial in reducing inequalities and 
stimulating growth by transferring assets and land ownership to small farmers, former tenants 
and farm workers: 
“Inequitable access to land has, therefore, contributed to the government’s goal of 
reducing poverty and the promotion of social equity. Asset reform, especially land 
reform, is key to the attainment of these twin goals” (NEDA 2001: 168; compare 
chapter 8.2.1). 
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As part of the ARC programme, community development and support services are provided 
to agrarian reform beneficiaries in clusters of barangays where land distribution is ongoing. 
The project aims at raising people’s incomes and standards of living by improving their 
productive assets, rural infrastructure, financial services, and enterprise development (World 
Bank 2004).  
Figure 8.2: Policy outreach plans 2004 by the Provincial Agriculturist of Bohol 
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8.3.3  Two anti-poverty policies in comparison  
Around 39 different policies and/or projects operated in Bohol in 2003, which were involved 
in some way or another with poverty reduction and carried out by government or participatory 
governance initiatives. The Bohol Program Framework on Poverty Reduction seeks to 
provide a common policy ground for and integrates the guidelines, sectoral, area-based, 
target-group-oriented activities, and capacities of these 39 projects in order to expand their 
outreach and maximise their impact on high-poverty areas, groups, and issues. The framework 
was launched in 2002 and is the first Philippine integrative programme on poverty alleviation 
in a decentralised provincial framework. Its objective is to reduce poverty incidence in Bohol 
from 48.1% of total families32 to 30% until 2012. The framework is coordinated by the 
PPDO- Project Monitoring and Development Unit.  
This study cannot provide a comprehensive account on the effect(iveness) of the entire 
framework. Instead, I in-depth investigate two smaller policies operating beneath the 
framework: Firstly, the ‘Strengthening local government for effective service delivery for 
poverty reduction’ (SLGP) carried out jointly by the PPDO and the NGO ‘Bohol Local 
Development Foundation’ (BLDF; policy 5), and secondly, the ‘Abante Bohol poverty 
reduction project’ pursued by the governmental ‘Bohol Poverty Reduction Management 
Office’ (BPRMO; policy 4). Table 8.3 portrays and contrasts their official features as 
presented in early 2004. 
Table 8.3: Official portray of the two selected anti-poverty policies  
 
Policy 
Strengthening local government for 
effective service delivery  
for poverty reduction ‘SLGP’ 
‘Abante Bohol’ 
poverty reduction project  
- Maker/ 
executer 
Provincial Planning and Development 
Office (PPDO) & Bohol Local Development 
Foundation (BLDF) 
Bohol Poverty Reduction Management 
Office (BPRMO; collaborates sometimes 
with Provincial Agriculturalist) 
Time-
frame 
Official: 2004 – 2007; however: during my 
visit in early 2004 activities had been on-
going on for ~ one year already 
2002 – 2005 
Objective 
Improve access to services for the poor in 
the 17 poorest municipalities (according to 
PPDO survey, see figure 7.7) and reduce 
basic deprivations at purok level 
Address rural poverty primarily in areas 
with insurgency-related problems 
Activity 
focus 
Local participation, capacity building, 
institutional change, technical assistance  
Ideological change and conflict prevention 
through interventions that promote 
community organisations, 
entrepreneurship, sustainable livelihood, 
environmental management, food security, 
socio-cultural values 
Funded 
by 
AusAid – Philippines-Australia Community 
assistance Project (PACAP)+ Counterpart 
LGUs 
20% development fund of provincial 
government + National Peace Commission 
sources: PPDO 2004b; Provincial Government of Bohol 2003a; BPRMO 2003; expert interviews 4,7,17 
                                               
32
 In chapter 7 I have cited poverty incidences measured by total population; therefore figures differ.  
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Both initiatives aim to tackle poverty alleviation with an area-based approach, yet they act out 
of dissimilar motives and apply dissimilar means and operation paths. The ‘SLGP’ is stronger 
embedded in the BPFPR framework than the ‘Abante Bohol’ project, because it is situated as 
a pilot project of the overall framework with the same policy-executer (PPDO and BLDF), 
while ‘Abante Bohol’ has been initiated before the launch of BPFPR. None the less it is the 
BPRMO with ‘Abante Bohol’ which makes Bohol “the only province which has a specific 
office to handle poverty” (expert interview 4) in the Philippines and which receives national 
funding and prominence. Therefore, ‘Abante Bohol’ is the better-known project of the two 
among the public, media, and politicians. 
Outreach setting: On neighbourhood puroks, communist- influenced 
barangays, and local participation 
The area approaches of the two projects are unique in the Philippines and illuminate their 
respective interests on (disparities of) poverty as well as examples of innovatively targeted 
policy approaches possible in a decentralised setting (compare chapter 3.3). Precisely, the 
‘SLGP’ seeks to cover deprived puroks in 128 barangays of the 17 municipalities recorded as 
the poorest by the cited PPDO poverty survey (PPDO 2004b: 1-2; figure 7.7). The choice for 
puroks as the target level of the policy’s activities is based on the perception that puroks are 
voluntary neighbourhood organisations (compare chapter 4.2, figure 4.2). Their solidarity 
purpose is hoped to reinforce local people’s empowerment and participation in policy-
making, to offer an alternative to and help avoid the potentially corrupt political organisation 
levels of LGUs: 
“So that’s the motivation: Makes it easier for them to really mobilise communities if the 
purok system is in place. At the same time, of course, the neighbourhood concept […] 
so they have their own system. It’s only a formal way to get things done and to get 
service from the government” 
 – in contrast to barangays that “were corrupted by the party system. I mean they were 
given money by the parties […] so that they can buy votes. I mean that is one of the 
reasons the barangay council is there: easier […] to go and corrupt them and get some 
party politics, extensions of party politics at the barangay level” (expert interview 7).  
Thus, the ‘SLGP’ addresses puroks as a new arena of participatory policy-making that is 
closer to the people and therefore more promising in terms of policy outreach and 
effect(iveness) on (disparities of) poverty. Implicitly, the ‘SLGP’ – in contrast to the other 
policies examined – emphasises explicitly institutional change over sectoral intervention (see 
table 8.3): 
“Whereas, when you have an multi-sectoral orientation, area-based orientation for 
your organisation or a target-group approach than you have a better chance of 
sustainability for the groups […] Service delivery becomes not the ends but is a means 
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to them to have community organisation, to have their own decision-making council, to 
sit together as members of a neighbourhood association” (expert interview 7). 
It ought to be noted that this positive attitude towards introducing puroks as policy-making 
level is not shared by all experts. Expert interview 10, for example, objects that the 
organisation of puroks is often enforced by barangay captains or councils in order to enhance 
their own power outreach. From this perspective, puroks represent non-voluntary, non-
solidarity organisations, which are no more suitable for participatory policy-making than any 
formal LGU level like the barangays. 
For the second policy in focus, ‘Abante Bohol’, “all the projects are concentrated in conflict 
areas, which means influenced by the communists and usually in the hinterlands where the 
ultra-poor are” (expert interview 4). The total target area comprises 335 barangays in 40 
municipalities which are claimed to be affected by the communist guerrilla organisation of the 
National People’s Army (NPA) (see subsequent chapter for detailed portray of NPA; BPRMO 
2003). Thus, ‘Abante Bohol’s engagement in poverty alleviation is foremost caused by 
political conflict:  
“NPA influence first and foremost […] Otherwise there will also be existing another 
environment which later on will be very violent, you know, this contentment and 
everything because of what they say. So we go in and do something about it. That’s  it 
[…] Because if government does not visit these very poor areas the poor will find an 
alternative in the NPA, in the communist rule” (expert interview 4). 
In fact, it is for this combination of poverty alleviation and political and ideological efforts 
why the national government supports ‘Abante Bohol’ and the BPRMO. All activities of 
‘Abante Bohol’ that promote community organisations, entrepreneurship, sustainable 
livelihood, environmental management, food security, and socio-cultural values ultimately 
address ideological change and conflict prevention (table 8.3). 
As a means to its overall objective, ‘Abante Bohol’ aspires to improve the empowerment of 
local people in policy-making. Thereby the BPRMO addresses the barangay level because  
“we do not implement any intervention unless this intervention is identified by the 
recipients as such. They decide on the tools, on the means, so we just coordinate with 
them, and maybe raise the funds, but they have to have a counterfeit, to have a sense of 
ownership in all these projects. Cause without that, like so many handouts being done 
for so many years – nothing happened” (expert interview 4).  
‘Abante Bohol’ sends trained field workers into NPA-influenced communities, who then live 
with the locals and try to support them with the above-mentioned services, to ‘empower’ 
them, as well as to ideologically-politically ‘battle for their hearts and minds’. Hence, similar 
to ‘SLGP’, ‘Abante Bohol’ recognises the significance of local acceptance and participation 
for effective policy-making, however seeks to utilise them as a means to the broader 
ideological and political interests. 
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On institutional partnerships  
The ‘SLGP’ is institutionally implemented by a formal partnership of the Provincial Planning 
and Development Office (PPDO) and the NGO Bohol Local Development Foundation. This 
partnership setting is based on the observation that, while it has indeed the mandate to govern 
and to reach out to the poor, so far the provincial “government is only effective 5 km around 
town” – referring to Tagbilaran City (expert interview 7). The partnership is hoped to enhance 
‘SLGP’s outreach beyond Tagbilaran, for firstly, NGOs have been observed to reach some 
areas that are not covered by government, and secondly, NGOs sometimes possess better 
finances, human capital stocks, and logistics (expert interviews 5, 17; see Gauld 2000 for 
similar praxis within forest policy in the Philippines). At the same time, in the view of the 
‘SLGP’, provincial government needs to hold significant policy competences  
“because they still control most of the power […] they can obstruct you, they can 
hinder, provide all sorts of constrains, create problems for you if they don’t see the 
connection with their administration. […] Precisely, when you work with community 
groups so they, they are very sharp on that these groups may might work against their 
political interest” (expert interview 7). 
It follows that, while ‘SLGP’s plans ultimately target puroks, the project’s activities are 
operated through a multi-stakeholder partnership base: “All our interventions here in the 
province […] work on a very detailed strategy of hitting all the levels” (expert interview 7). 
In other words, and relating back to theory, the ‘SLGP’ is organised to pursue a middle path 
between a self-help and a community planning partnership (see chapter 3.3.3, table 8.2). 
In contrast to the ‘SLGP’ the BPRMO and ‘Abante Bohol’ more strongly follows the 
traditional conception of policy-making that  
“Government is to initiate and coordinate and that is about it […] and these areas, ah, 
have never been visited by any government except the present (expert interview 4). 
Hence, the BPRMO spokesman agrees with the above quote on the limited outreach of 
governmental policy and attempt to change this situation, however not through formal 
partnerships with non-governmental organisations but by its own ‘classic’ endeavours. 
Thereby the office sometimes cooperates with the Provincial Agriculturalist by contracting 
out some activities in the field to them (compare chapter 8.4.3). Interestingly, when other 
governmental agencies like to get involved in NPA-influenced areas, the BPRMO states to try 
to organise their work cooperatively. In opposition to this statement, however, the office is 
accused of not facilitating the entrance of NGOs and community organisations into the areas. 
According to expert interviewee 5 such non-integrative behaviour causes significant 
impediments to effective implementation of coherent development and peace efforts in the 
NPA-affected municipalities which does not help to effectively reduce the “feeling of 
neglect” that many Boholanos, who live in marginalised locations in and outside NPA 
influenced areas, have towards the government.  
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8.3.4  Excursus: Influence sphere of the National People’s Army  
The National People’s Army (NPA) is the military arm of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP) which calls itself representative of poor peasants and justifies their armed 
resistance against the Philippine government(s) with political agendas for more equitable 
socio-economic reforms, land entitlements, and more political autonomy. In other words, the 
NPA understands itself – similar to the Moro and indigenous movements – as an opposition 
movement fighting for ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ in the Philippines (compare 
chapter 3.1). The organisation’s foundation dates back to the anti-Japanese guerrilla, so-called 
‘Huk’-movements, in the 1940s. It reached its zenith of power during the period of political 
turnovers in 1986 (when they controlled an estimated 20% of communities in the country; see 
Hanisch 1995). Ever since the NPA has officially lost some of its influence sphere, however 
is still active in the entire Philippines and the conflict is internationally registered as an anti-
regime war (AKUF 2006 at http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/). The 
NPA is particularly active in the rural, in uplands, and in agricultural ‘peripheries’, hence 
those areas which are often characterised by unequal landownership and higher (disparities 
of) poverty. As one interview partner describes the NPA presence indirectly:  
“If I have to figure out if a province or an island is secure or not I just look at how any 
cities and how many banks they have […] well, you know, in the rural areas there are 
many mountains [...] well, mountains offer many places to hide and do things without 
anyone noticing” (expert interview 9).  
Thus, the national strongholds of (armed) conflicts between NPA and government are North 
Luzon, Bicol, and the peripheral parts of the Eastern, Western, and Central Visayas. The NPA 
has been active in Bohol since 1981 (Ulrich 2003). During field research there, the presence 
of the NPA has been a re-occurring subject, as the following examples highlight. 
¾ On the route of field visit 5 an insurgency between national forces and NPA took place 
and military forces blocked the roads and searched all passing cars and passengers.  
¾ In early February 2004 the NPA attacked the Provincial Governor of Bohol, Erico 
Aumentado, on the roads of Tagbilaran City after which “there was a press briefing given 
by the NPA head and he said it was meant only to warn the governor that they can strike 
everywhere even in the heart of provincial government” (expert interview 7).  
¾ The influence of the NPA on LGU politics and policy-making is described to be rather 
vast: “They were telling us […] that they [the NPA] have the power, they can even 
summon the mayors, they summon the mayors last Saturday” (expert interview 7). 
¾ In some municipalities and barangays the NPA is said to establish so-called ‘shadow 
governments’ where they take away taxes from the official local governments, block 
access roads, and hold meetings and trainings. One of those places in Bohol is Sagbayan 
(field visits 1, 4, 5, 12, 13). 
¾ Expert interviewee 7 reports of a siesta in an upland municipality in Bohol where NPA 
representatives are invited to an official meeting in the mayor’s house. In other words, the 
conception of the NPA among many Boholanos, even government officials “is not like 
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your idea of a terrorist like with a gun and with some… No, they are part of the 
community” (expert interview 7). Similarly, Boholanos whom I talked to throughout field 
visits, mostly perceive the NPA as an ideological alternative rather than a military or 
security threat (while in contrast the Abu Sayaff in Mindanao is perceived as a threat; field 
visits 1, 12; expert interviews 8, 17). 
¾ Logically, therefore, this public ‘commodification’ of the NPA reinforces its threatening 
potential to government’s official influence sphere, legitimacy, and autonomy (compare 
chapter 3.1). Expert interviewee 4 observes Boholanos to mistrust government in NPA-
affected areas: “In these places, these places, the residents are very worried about the 
presence of government […] they are so suspicious […] because of the communists […] 
they tell them the government is useless”. Such realisations gives obvious evidence for the 
strong support by the national government for ‘Abante Bohol’. 
¾ Since 1999 the provincial government together with the national government in Manila 
have searched for solutions of the conflict and launched as part of a peace and 
development approach the policy of ‘Abante Bohol’ and the BPRMO in 2001 (expert 
interview 5). 
¾ In this setting some provincial government officials are convinced that so far the NPA 
“politically … cannot harm the … our [government] coordinators, all those who deliver 
immunisation and all that stuff. They [the NPA] cannot harm them because politically you 
loose also support from the people there” (expert interview 4).  In contrast, other officials 
believe that the local people are happy to receive governmental service delivery, however, 
continue to believe and support the NPA (expert interviews 5, 7).  
Figure 8.3 visualises confidential military information on the spatial outreach of the NPA in 
Bohol as of 2003/2004. Accordingly, their influence sphere is vast and covers approximately 
one third of the island. Expert interview 5 explicates the map: 
¾ In 39 barangays shadow governments are established, which implies that over 50% of the 
population as well as the barangay councils there support the NPA. These shadow 
governments are in particular set up in strategic locations (e.g. Bilar) close to national 
military camps, access and transport points/ routes and/or the decision-making centres.  
¾ 203 barangays are ‘infiltrated’, which indicates that NPA meetings are held there, NPA 
representatives visit the area and try to establish contacts and ‘recruit’ fellows. NPA-
infiltrated areas are scattered around the islands in order to demonstrate the government 
‘they are there’.  
¾ 91 barangays are ‘threatened’, which means that about 25% of the inhabitants sympathises 
with the NPA. Given the difficulty of gathering this information, some classifications may 
overlap.  
Spatially, the NPA acts particularly in the Northern and Western uplands, stretching towards 
the island’s interior, as well as in the far East of Bohol. There are four so-called ‘fronts’ of 
intensive, armed conflicts between national military and NPA rebels in Bilar, Carmen, Batuan 
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and Sagbayan. The national military has counter-camps in Carmen (307 brigades of the 
Philippine army33), Tubigon and Candijai.  
The previous accounts clarify that the NPA is a strong competitor for the LGUs and their own 
spheres of influence; here an opponent in the “battle for the hearts and minds of the people” 
(expert interview 4), which has to be taken seriously in policy-making, processes in Bohol and 
beyond.  
 
Figure 8.3: Areas influenced by the National People’s Army (NPA) in 2003/2004 
 
 
                                               
33
  Note that the military is a somewhat independent actor in politics in the Philippines. As common in many 
Southeast Asian countries the Philippine army usually operates in the name of the state but maintains the power 
to go against the government if it finds it necessary (compare coup d’etat in 1986, recent rumours of a military 
coup against Arroyo, or coup d’etat in Thailand on 19/9/2006). See Hegmanns 1990 and Siemers 1993 for 
further reference.  
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8.4  Advanced policy implementation and accomplishment: 
Identifying impediments 
8.4.1  Investment activities 
Figure 8.4 demonstrates the investment accomplishments by the BIPC, the provincial 
government agency for attracting and assisting public and private (joint) investments in Bohol 
in 2003. The map recalls that in 2003 the majority of investments went into tourism and trade. 
Initiatives nearly exclusively address Tabilaran City and Panglao island, that means already 
the most progressive areas. Some experts see these preferences rooted – to a certain extent – 
in the National Tourism Master Plan, which declared Panglao a national priority tourism area 
in 1990 and has promoted an SEZ of 2000 hectares there (expert interviews 8, 19, 20). As 
expert interviewee 6 explains, especially slow or problematic land delineation processes are 
responsible for slowing down the development of this SEZ as well as others along the 
coastline (see figure 8.4; compare chapter 8.4.3). 
Only two investments target the primary sector in spatial peripheries: A palm-oil refinery and 
a health resort are set up in Carmen and Dagohoy respectively. The palm-oil refinery is a 
facility for processing high-value crops in Bohol and strengthens the agro-industrial economy. 
Yet, the map hides that in 2003 the refinery was only partly established, as well as a 20-
hectare provider-nursery in Ubay. Still waiting for implementation are oil palm plantations of 
an additional 40,000 hectares in Talibon, Trinidad, San Miguel, Getafe, Buenavista, Danao, 
Dagohoy, Ubay, Sagbayan, Inabanga, and Alicia. These are needed to serve the refinery and 
are meant to involve the participation of marginalised farmers.  
Interestingly, the retirement village (investment 9 in figure 8.4) is an initiative of Boholano 
return migrants who invest in the local economy (compare chapters 2.3.2, 6.2.2). Such 
investments by overseas or returning migrants are highly welcomed and promoted by national 
and local governments alike (expert interview 6; compare chapter 9.3.3). 
Generally, the difficulties in Bohol of spreading investment activities beyond the established 
economic centres into peripheral areas, to the marginalised people, and into the neediest 
sectors appear to reflect countrywide tendencies. The case of the so-called ‘Regional Agro-
Industrial Centers’ (RAICs), a special kind of Special Economic Zones promoted by national 
government, exemplifies this observation. The actual objective of RAICs is to strengthen 
rural-urban interactions and balance centre-periphery relations by reinforcing links between 
agriculture and industry. Initially there were plans for RAICs in all sixteen Philippine regions, 
yet in 1999 only seven operated. These are located in CAR, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, 
Central Visayas, Northern and Southern Mindanao. The remaining nine failed to be 
established foremost due to budget constraints, land acquisition problems, inaccessibility, 
marketing failures, and political disputes. Similar to most SEZs, the operating RAICs register 
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some growth in export-oriented agro-industry, however, they operate as globalised enclaves in 
already established economic centre regions (Hill 2000). 
Figure 8.4: Official planning zones and investment accomplishments in 2003 
 
 
8.4.2   Tourism policy  
My field experiences as a tourist – used here in lieu of lacking official/academic information – 
suggest that out of the decentral tourism circuits identified by the provincial government 
(chapter 8.3.1) only circuits 1 and 2 are, in fact, ‘in operation’. I cannot speak for circuit 6 and 
the Northern ‘stops’ of circuit 3. However, for the residual circuits 3, 4, and 5 account that (a) 
I have neither encountered one travel agency or hotel/resort actually offering tours around 
these circuits, nor (b) are they actively promoted and/or supported by the Bohol Tourism 
Office (interview 11,19), nor (c) have I met many tourists who had visited these circuits, nor 
in my knowledge (d) exist sufficient tourist facilities in these places, and/or (d) facilities to 
reach them (see figures 7.13, 7.14, 7.15). 
These – subjective and non-representative, however indicative – observations are underlined 
firstly, by local people and LGU representatives I met during field visits, who request a more 
decentral implementation of tourist policy covering  “not only Panglao” - “we want to benefit 
as well” (purok assembly II; field visit 3). Similarly, data in chapter 7.2.3 has revealed the 
concentration of tourism services in the already established centres of Bohol.  
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Once again, the national situation is similar here: Until 1992 promotions have focused 
disproportionately on hotel establishments in Metro Manila causing, firstly, an exacerbation 
of already existing divergences in the spatial economy of the country and, secondly, a non-
profitable over-supply of accommodation in the Metropolis. 
Secondly, I turn to the example of the Anda Peninsula, which is included in the circuits as a 
visitors’ destination and targeted by small-scale eco-tourism projects, mostly due to the 
marine sanctuary in the barangay of Basdio. De-facto there are only a handful isolated resorts 
in Anda, most of which are run by foreigners. These resorts are accessible only by privately 
organised transport over earth roads (taxi drivers even refuse to go there from Tagbilaran). 
Due to these accessibility problems, some of the resorts actually face serious economic 
problems (field visit 4).  
A third example, the tourist infrastructure of Pamilacan island offers less than ten single-
roomed, unfurnished nipa huts without fresh water or electricity, illustrated in photo 8.2. 
Therefore most tourists visit 
Pamilacan on one-day boat 
trips, do not stay over night 
but return to Panglao or 
Tagbilaran for 
accommodation and other 
services. As a result, only four 
families (which are those 
running the Pamilacan Island 
Dolphin and Whalewatching 
Organisation) out of the 1500 
people living on Pamilacan benefit from and can make tourism their (part-time) business. 
Other than that, tourism does not make a large contribution to the islanders’ alternative 
livelihood and anti-poverty endeavours, but, on the contrary – fourthly – induces new divides 
and conflicts between those active in tourism and the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and 
Whalewatching Organisation on the one hand and the traditional fishermen on the other (field 
visit 11; expert interviews 10, 11). These conflicts are essentially based on changing socio-
economic power relations between the old (fishermen) and recently developing (tourism-
earners) elites on the island. Put differently, the new economically successful elite of tourism 
earners challenges the political influence sphere and status of the old fishermen. Financial 
capital succeeds old-established symbolic and social capital (see chapter 10). Alongside, 
connections between social inequality and material disparities become apparent. 
A different socio-cultural component to possibly develop, deteriorate, and harden tourism-
induced conflicts is provided by the case of Malapascua island located off Cebu (field visit 7). 
Photo 8.2: Visitors’ accommodation on Pamilacan island 
 
Clausen 2004
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On Malapascua the diverse socio-cultural backgrounds of the ‘competitors in tourism 
development’ is the leading cause for conflict as the island’s space and population is deeply 
divided between in-migrating investors from Manila and the indigenous islanders over issues 
on land, marketing, operation of tourism business, and employment of local people. Vorlaufer 
(1996: 153-154) detects comparable disputes between indigenous population and immigrants 
on Boracay island. And Shah, Gupta, Boyd (2000) detect that alongside economic 
transformation on Boracay the livelihood of the poorest, who are usually indigenous, has 
actually become more vulnerable and insecure: They typically take over low-skilled 
occupations. Yet, wages for these low skilled jobs decrease because of an over-supply of 
workers while prices rise. In addition the smallest businesses are threatened by immense and 
more capital-intensive competition. However, in contrast to Boracay, Boholanos may, due to 
their outstanding educational attainment (chapter 7.3), be able to take over a larger proportion 
of skilled jobs made available through tourism development. Thus, the potential of local 
economic benefits through tourism expansion may be higher in Bohol than experienced in 
Boracay. 
Another example of tourism-induced conflicts is presented when a majority of the local 
population in Basdio on Anda peninsula reacts to the foreign-administered resorts – and their 
tourists – with hostility. They are particularly frustrated about being cut off from the benefits 
the resorts produce, as their foreign owners tend to provide all services to the tourists 
independently (actually import many goods) and even prohibit local people to enter the resort 
grounds (field visit 4). Here tourism development has until now not led to the intended 
establishment of locally owned, (eco-) tourism-related, micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(and similar situations are observed all over the island). Another possible reason for the 
locals’ hostility towards the foreign investors may be the influence of the NPA, as the Anda 
peninsula has been observed to develop into a major entry-point for and recruitment 
stronghold of NPA activists from other islands (expert interview 5).  
The NPA also plays an active role in a conflict that takes place around the Chocolate Hills 
National Monument (see Ulrich, Day, Lynagh 2001). The establishment of the protective 
Monument status in 1997 is designated to conserve the Hills landscape for its scenic beauty 
and tourism potential. It however imposes the abrogation of private ownership and subsumes 
the land to the state without consulting local residents or considering historical practices of 
land settlement and land use. Therefore, the authorisation of the Monument status has caused 
civil uprising led by the NPA and the establishment of a new ‘front’ against government 
known as the Chocolate Hills Command.  
As a contrasting example, the NGO SWCF (policy 7) introduces eco-tourist tours in the poor 
(and NPA influenced) uplands of Sierra Bullones in a slow community-led process, explicitly 
in order to avoid hostile reactions as found in Anda, Pamilacan, or the Chocolate Hills, and in 
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order to make tourism a socially accepted and economically beneficial contribution for the 
local people. Although specific tours have been developed and organised since 2003, these are 
purposely not marketed by agencies and/or operators in the province (yet). Only ‘insiders’ can 
book these tours. That way the local people are given the time and the chance to get used to, 
make use of and decide upon the course of these alternative income opportunities themselves. 
However, in early 2004 this approach did not shown the desired success (yet?); local people 
still face visitors with great scepticism (field visit 12, expert interview 8). 
Hence – and this is an important aspect to consider – the various case studies elucidate that 
even if tourism initiatives tackle poorer and more peripheral areas, they neither automatically 
incorporate their local inhabitants nor necessarily work to their benefit, nor are inevitably 
welcomed. From the perspective of the BTO and its foreign consultant (policy-maker 2), this 
is partially related back to (a) malfunctioning community leadership. Instead of convincing 
and inducing cooperative practices and policy-making between public, private, and civil 
stakeholders the BTO and provincial government in general engage in very little 
communication and cooperation. Moreover, while it is reasonable and adequately fundable to 
integrate most initiatives with coastal resource management and/or agro-tourism components, 
such approach complicates sharing responsibilities and tasks (expert interviews 11, 19). 
Furthermore, the examples have shown that (b) economic and political interests often work 
against each other in tourism policy. With tourism being an economically profitable growth 
sector, which aims at attracting (foreign) private investor, resulting initiatives often serve the 
interests of the investor only and not those of the local Filipinos and/or the government.  
Besides, (c) expert interviewee 11 describes that the Bohol Office for Tourism de-facto 
pursues all ‘recommendations’ by national agencies and does not decide and act 
independently despite their new decentralised powers (see also expert interview 8).   
And (d), short-comings in transport infrastructure, tourist service infrastructure (for example, 
due to water scarcity) and access(ibility) hinder more effective, decentral and inclusive 
outreach of tourism policy. In this context one expert interviewee explains that governmental 
policy outreach is not only a matter of material infrastructure equipment but significantly also 
a matter of the social (cultural) access(ibility) of the people. In the case of Pamilacan the 
‘included’ tourism earners are at the same time those who are more open and communicative 
towards non-islanders and non-traditional income-earning initiatives (expert interview 10, 
field visit 11). Similarly, political and ideological access(ibility) may play a role for 
governmental policy outreach, public participation and acceptance in NPA-influenced 
barangays and municipalities. 
Interestingly, Bohol’s provincial government is partially aware of these constraints. It 
identifies the most urgent unmet needs to a successful implementation of tourism as a anti-
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poverty, growth-driving policy sector as persistent little involvement of local entrepreneurs in 
projects, generally low levels of and inconsistent investment, inadequate tourist services, non-
optimised promotional activity, and constraints in infrastructure facilities (PPDO 2002: 36-
37). However, the policy-makers in charge so far do not seem to be able to effectively apply 
countermeasures, largely because concurrent re-formulation of policy and missing monitoring 
activities typically work towards “creating many small, poorly planned tourism development 
areas with little or no central planning” (White & Rosales 2003: 239). As a result, tourism 
development mostly replicates economic interests and existing poverty and wealth divides 
between, literally speaking, ‘first class’ tourism development spots in and around Tagbilaran/ 
Panglao/ Chocolate Hills, ‘second class’ mixed functions along the Southern coast and in the 
Chocolate Hills area, and ‘third class’ mainly agricultural, non-touristy residual Bohol. 
Additionally it is important to consider the national political and security situation and the 
respective image that the Philippines, including Bohol, carry in overseas media and public. 
Such image affects tourist flows into Bohol (and the entire Philippines) and therefore the 
demands, resources, potentials, and course of (policy) developments in the sector beyond the 
influence sphere of the provincial government. In other words: 
“Also ich glaube das kommt sehr auf die ganze Situation auf den Philippinen an. Auf 
Terrorismus und solche Dinge. Ich mein, wenn mal wieder zwei Bomben in Mindanao 
in die Luft gehen, dann kommt auch keiner mehr nach Pamilacan. Auch wenn 
Pamilacan nichts mit Mindanao zu tun hat. Oder wenn in Manila was passiert, dann 
kommt keiner“34 (expert interview 10, see also expert interview 9).  
The expert refers to the political conflicts between Moro movements and government in 
Mindanao as well as to kidnapping incidences of tourists by the former. As to be expected, 
these (armed) conflicts represent not only a ‘threat of a bad image’ to the directly affected 
regions but equally to (tourism) development of far-away Bohol and in fact, the entire 
country. Speaking for the whole country “either we have no image – since nobody hears 
about us – or, since all countries hear about us is only the bad image, we get a bad image 
about crime and kidnapping, and everything like that” (Roxas-Mendoza 2001: 29). Such 
negative socio-cultural constructions of the Philippines as a tourist destination peaked when 
the guerrilla group ‘Abu Sayaff’ in 2000 kidnapped 21 tourists from Sabah in Malaysia to the 
Sulu archipelago in 2000. In order to raise awareness of their fight for separatism of Muslim 
Mindanao, the Abu Sayaff allowed international media to broadcast the kidnapping story life 
– leading to international warnings about visiting the Philippines and reductions in tourist 
numbers as reported in chapters 6 and 7.  
                                               
34
 Literal translation into English: “Well, I think, this depends on the general situation in the Philippines. On 
terrorism and such things. I mean, if there are two bombs being detonated in Mindanao, no one comes to 
Pamilacan anymore. Even if Pamilacan has nothing to do with Mindanao. Or if something happens in Manila, 
no one will come” (expert interview 10). 
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8.4.3  Policy implementation in the primary sector 
Policy plans for the primary sectors focus crop enhancement actions by the Provincial 
Agriculturalist. When implemented these are said to be adjusted to local conditions and 
demands for the following reasons. The planning officer of the Provincial Agriculturalist 
stresses with respect to their crop enhancement activities that “although we are giving them 
for free there should be an equity so that they feel they are part of it” and “if farmers have 
request we will consider also. The better if the LGU supports. There will be a counterpart”. 
Moreover, she explains that mostly the poorer LGUs and people turn to them, because “those 
who have the economic resources and the technicians they are doing it in their own way” 
(expert interview 3).  
However, other interviewees as well as some field visits indicate differently. For example, the 
Provincial Agriculturalist distributes – in cooperation with the national Department of 
Agricultural Reform (DAR) – free fishing nets, fast-fattening pigs, and tree seedlings in 
Pamilacan. Apparently, however, the fishing nets’ sizes are inadequate for local fishing 
grounds plus tear quickly. The pigs need large amounts of food in order to grow at a quicker 
pace. In poor areas and especially islands like Pamilacan food is not abundantly available 
even for the people and transport is expensive, so these pigs are under-nurtured and more 
vulnerable to diseases than the local pigs (field visit 11; expert interview 10). As with the tree 
seedlings, they are surely useful, for Pamilacan is almost completely bare and exposed to 
heavy soil erosion. However, due to the extreme water scarcity on the island only certain 
kinds of scrubs and trees can grow there, which are not the ones being delivered. Furthermore, 
Pamilacanos are not trained in dealing with the new devices. Interview partner 4 reports 
similar incidences for upland communities (not precisely referring to the Provincial 
Agriculturalist though) and generally claims for more social training and preparation of local 
people instead of pure, non-reflective service delivery: “So what happens: example, comes in 
a group, hey, gives them pigs, give them pigs, just give for fattening. Here, and the next days 
they have slaughtered the pigs. Because there is no social preparation” (compare also expert 
interview 15). 
With regard to fishery, dynamite35, cycanide36 and Muroami37 fishing methods are a daily 
practice even in marine sanctuaries like in Basdio-Guindulman. It is a desperate attempt by 
fishermen to make a living despite already severely over-fished resources. The process 
eventually destroys both, the basis of fishing and alternative eco-tourism livelihood (field visit 
                                               
35
 Blast method throwing dynamite off the boat. Underwater explosion causes all kind of fish to die (old and 
young fish population) combined with massive destruction of corals around the blast site. 
36
 Fishing by poisoning: Cyanide is taken under water in with glass vessels. After smashing the glass vessels 
cyanide intoxicates the fish for an easy catch under water. The cyanide is lethal for corals as well. In addition 
intoxicated fish will be part of the food chain and will poison human beings. 
37
 Formerly a Japanese method of fishing using a special net. The net is also deadly for young fish population 
due to the very small mesh size. It is destructive for corals due to mechanical destruction. 
 160
4; expert interview 7). Over-fishing is also caused by commercial fishermen who prove 
difficult to be addressed through Bohol’s provincial government as “the commercial 
fishermen, they don’t come from Bohol” (expert interview 3). Basically, they are 
uncontrollable when they enter municipal waters because, at least in early 2004, the plans to 
delineate municipal waters and enforce local fishing ordinances were not implemented. 
Furthermore, inland aquaculture production, which is increasingly being promoted as a 
development strategy, legitimises – nationwide and in Bohol – massive human-induced 
changes of the brackwater eco-system including large-scale mangrove deforestation. As a 
result fish and shell breeding grounds, control for land erosion and siltation are taken away 
from local fisher folks. In other words their struggle to make a living becomes ever more 
difficult. Hence, local environmental and economic costs are high, while at the same time 
employment and food supply for the locals frequently stagnates, especially when technology 
is being introduced. Field research in Bohol and Cebu confirms that Boholanos and Cebuanos 
do usually not eat prawns because they are too expensive (field visits 7, 9). Moreover, local 
ownership of aquaculture fishponds is not supported because Republic Act 7881 exempts 
fishponds from CARP land reform.  
Kelly infers that aquaculture as a development strategy in the Philippines generally 
“represents the continuation of a discourse of development that neglects the informal, small-
scale and non-quantifiable aspects of everyday economic activity” (Kelly 1996: 55). In other 
words, market (growth) is prioritised over Filipinos’ (Bohlanos’) well-being. It follows, 
firstly, that the policy approaches in the primary sector need to take into better consideration 
the various local handicaps and conditions contributing to the problems in agriculture and 
fishery, and secondly, that there is a need for keeping up plans and pursuing their 
implementation, ideally including training of the local population to enhance acceptance and 
participation of new devices, regulations, and goods. In this context, thirdly, a special need is 
also apparent for policy on sustainable resource management training in Bohol (expert 
interview 9).  
With regard to sustainable yet profitable agriculture, according to the Provincial 
Agriculturalist of Bohol, it is able to comply with its growth priorities. About 120,000 mango 
trees, that means high-value crops, bore fruit in 2003/2004 with another 80,000 trees yielding 
in 3 to 4 years38. However, plans for a fruit-processing plant in Tagbilaran to foster high-value 
crop production and processing in Bohol demonstrate the difficulties related with establishing 
a shift from subsistence agriculture to more beneficial technology-led agro-industry in Bohol. 
After extensive discussions between private and public stakeholders and at a progressed stage 
of planning, a market study conducted by the Holy Name University found out that Bohol’s 
subsistence-based agricultural market is not capable of providing sufficient supply and 
                                               
38
 Mango trees grow very slowly and provide fruit only at a progressed age. 
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demand for the plant (expert interview 12). It becomes apparent that that the small-patched 
agriculture prevalent in Bohol impedes the government’s course towards large-scale agro-
industrial development or simply, that the latter does not consider the former appropriately. 
Simultaneously its subsistence character, small market, and morphological fragmentation 
complicate a technological modernisation of agriculture in Bohol.  
An interesting aspect in this context: The provincial policy course goes hand in hand with 
national guidelines, especially those of the Agricultural and Fisheries Modernisation Act 
(AFMA). Yet, the person responsible for administering governmental agricultural policy 
planning in Bohol is not familiar with the Act at all. Contrary to tourism policy, it seems that 
agricultural policy frameworks are not necessarily passed on from national to local levels, or 
that staff at the LGU is not sufficiently trained to translate them into provincial policy.  
If technology-led restructuring of the economy is to be successful, policy-makers need to pay 
attention to the fact that this implies, firstly, that few new employment opportunities are 
generated – a significant aspect regarding high levels unemployment across the Philippines, 
especially in agricultural peripheries with high fertility rates like Bohol. Secondly, the 
creation, implementation and dissemination of technology require large amounts of (private) 
capital, a well-trained stock of experts, i.e. high educational attainments, which is provided 
for in Bohol, and a reliable electricity system, which is not given in Bohol (compare Lee 
2001; ILO 2004). Furthermore, market competition principles tend to drive private 
investments to places that already offer technological and educational resources, which are 
usually – again – the existing economic centres. In other words, to Bohol and general 
Philippines applies what has been discovered in other developing countries: “Without 
innovative public policy, these technologies could become a source of exclusion, not a tool of 
progress” (UNDP 2001: 1). 
Against this background, the governmental plans for agro-industrial expansion in Bohol, 
including the establishment of SEZs in the poor and less accessible municipalities of 
Inabanga, Clarin, and Talibon seem unrealistic endeavours to pursue. Only selected sites, like 
Tubigon and possibly Jagna in the South, both of which already maintain some economic 
linkages and a ferry connection with (the market in) Cebu City and Northern Mindanao 
respectively, may be able to actively and successfully engage in agro-industrial development 
(field visit 5; compare chapter 7). Maybe these conditions are also behind the fact that none of 
the SEZ plans have been implemented so far. Expert interviewee 10 points out for Pamilacan 
what applies to all of Bohol: “Wenn man hier etwas herstellt, man kann halt gar nicht so viel 
verkaufen”39. Therefore, in her opinion, priority one of agricultural policy – just as Kelly 
postulates for inland fishery and aquaculture – should be on locally needed products and 
                                               
39
 Literal translation into English: “If you produce something here, you won’t be able so sell this much”. 
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small-scale resource management (plus training) instead of high-value crops and large-scale 
production. 
Some of these demands were explicitly taken into account by the Fisheries Sector 
Programme, which was run by national and local governments together with contracted NGOs 
and the Asian Development Bank from 1989 to 1999. The programme emphasised integrative 
coastal resource management and generation activities to meet the needs of the poor fisher 
folk. Mangrove areas were reforested and altogether 52 fish sanctuaries and 3000 artificial 
reefs established. None the less, the coastal resource management initiative was not successful 
in opening up new livelihood options to the fisher folk. Summarising the impediments: The 
programme’s components were planned too complex and unrealistically; too many 
stakeholders took over responsibilities; communication and transparency of interaction was 
not adequate and tasks not clearly distributed; the involved LGUs lacked funding; 
administrative and technical resources were too weak to enforce laws on illegal fishing, 
municipal fishery ordinances, and the delineation of municipal waters. Partner-NGOs did not 
successfully find access into local fisher folk communities and when they left, most projects 
were abandoned (see ADB 1999: 1-4; IV 13-17). This example shows firstly, that many of the 
previously noted constraints may interrelate with each other, secondly, that not necessarily 
sector-inherent problems but rather administrative and cooperative aspects pose the major 
impediments, and thirdly, that comprehensive, participatory, and integrative policy 
approaches may be needed as a response. 
Land reform: Success of failure?  
One major impediment to effective implementation of more sustainable resource management 
practices is the landlessness of most Boholano farmers and fishermen, which causes them not 
to pay much interest in long-term resource management but rather to care for immediate 
outputs. This includes not looking after the free seeds given to them by the government as 
well as not caring about dynamite and cyanide fishing methods (compare Cramb et al 2000 
for similar experiences in Palawan, Illoilo, and Cebu). As expert interview 10 explains the 
fishermen of Pamilacan historically used to run their fishing businesses independently and 
autarkly. There was neither need to collaborate with others nor for alternative livelihood 
activities. This perspective is continuously reflected in the difficulties policy stakeholder face 
when attempting to organise those occupied in agriculture and fishery into advocacy or 
support networks, or to train them about alternative income opportunities (expert interview 3). 
Obviously, inclusive and participatory policy-making is generally hardly feasible in this 
environment (compare Ross, White, Menguito 2000 for similar experiences and inference in 
community-based activities in marine protected areas out off Cebu; chapter 9.3.1) 
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Figure 8.5 shows the Agricultural Reform Communities (ARCs), which were launched in 
Bohol between 1996 and 2001/2002. In terms of spatial outreach, the map illuminates that the 
land reform policy indeed successfully addressed those areas of Bohol, which are considered 
to be the poorest and agricultural peripheries. Former owners of the land usually give up their 
land voluntarily or receive compensation by the government. According to the provincial 
government (2003b) the ARCs have been provided with farm-to-market roads, bridges, 
irrigation systems and post harvest facilities, water and power supply, education and health 
services since. The total cost of all the projects implemented by the end of 2003 (including 
ongoing projects) in the ARCs totals 309,254,236 Philippine Pesos.  
However, the success rate in 
transferring landownership, 
that means the most 
significant aspect of the 
ARCs, is not documented. 
Interviewee 3 claims that 
CARP is almost completed 
in Bohol. Counter-arguments 
stress that, for example, land 
in places like Pamilacan is 
still owned by two or three 
landowners who are 
moreover no Pamilacanos 
but absentee owners (expert 
interview 10). Another 
counterargument asserts that 
paradoxically, the CARP 
reform makes it actually 
more difficult for tenants to 
acquire land. Precisely, 
under CARP a tenant can now lay claim on a piece of land after having cultivated it for three 
years. Consequently, absentee owners increasingly withdraw from employing tenants. The 
land available to poorer farmers is effectively reduced (Ulrich 2003: 170). Hence, the ‘social 
boundaries’ between landowner elite and the landless have hardened through CARP – in 
contradiction to its objectives. These social boundaries may also have some impact on what 
expert interviewee 7 reports to be a common phenomenon in Bohol: Many of the tenants who 
receive some land through the reforms actually sell it back to their former landowner – 
according to the expert for reasons to earn some money and/or due to long-established 
reciprocal obligations. In other country-wide reported cases, landowners’ resistance lead to a 
Figure 8.5: Agrarian Reform Communities 1996-2002 
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situation where beneficiaries cannot occupy the land. It may be for these difficult social 
boundaries and informal power relations that public lands make up two thirds of the totally 
redistributed land in the Philippines in 2001 (Borras 2003: 1052; chapter 9.2.2 for follow up).   
Figure 8.6 provides a comparative account on outcomes of the CARP reforms at national 
scale. The map illuminates that, in national comparison, less land has been redistributed in the 
Central Visayas including Bohol than in most other regions. The ARMM shows the least 
outcome of CARP so far, while Cagayan de Oro, Southern Tagalog and Central Mindanao the 
most. Referring back to findings of chapter 6 this means that some agricultural peripheries –
which are generally assumed to be in greater need for land reform – are reached out to while 
others are not. Partly, the small coverage in the ARMM may be related to their regional 
autonomy status. It partly, however, also reflects the ARMM’s already more or less excluded 
position in the country (see chapter 6.3). When looking at what proportion of overall plans 
(from 1987 to 2008) have been implemented by 2001 (part C in figure) similar spatial 
distribution patterns are evident. Interestingly, with regard to CARP outcome in Bohol 
achievement rates have so far only been very low ranging from 41 to 53% – underlining the 
critique voiced by some experts in the previous section.  
To conclude this chapter, the sectors, areas and people engaged in the primary sector are 
defined by the provincial government to be tackled mainly with growth- and productivity 
oriented measures, which are to pay attention to questions of more balanced assets and access 
to markets. In terms of concrete policy, the Provincial Agriculturalist is successful in reaching 
out to the poor agricultural areas, with the exceptions of some municipalities in the far North. 
In addition, the targets of productivity enhancement are met by applying the majority of 
resources on these issues. Then overall, the provincial activity plans correspond with their 
decentralised responsibilities.  
None the less, the sectoral approach aiming at the large-scale commercialisation of the 
primary sector, partly through the establishment of SEZ, processing plants, high-value crops 
and aquaculture, proves difficult and unrealistic in the face of the subsistence character 
prevalent in the sector. Especially no or little consideration of local conditions, participation 
and knowledge, and the demand for training accompanying service delivery constrain an 
effective policy implementation. Too little internal capabilities to execute legislations like sea 
delineations also play a role. Land reform implementation in the province is assessed 
sceptically, too. Generally, the prevailing lack of landownership and historically grown 
symbolic values and unequal power relationships cause a certain restriction of many 
Boholanos towards active engagement in long-term resource management activities, 
cooperative actions, and land reform. Ultimately, such social environment and conception of 
policy-induced transformation make the already existing complications in participatory and 
sustainable policy-making even more difficult. 
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Figure 8.6: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme: National accomplishments 
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8.4.4  Anti-poverty policies  
This chapter profiles steps for implementation and accomplishments of the two anti-poverty 
policies ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’ under investigation. What has already been hinted at in 
chapter 8.3.3 now becomes obvious: Although they ought to become partners under the Bohol 
Poverty Reduction Framework the ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’ have profoundly different 
understandings and approaches, yet sometimes encounter similar difficulties. None the less, 
they perceive each other more or less as competitors, at least in early 2004. 
Figure 8.7 illustrates ‘Abante Bohol’s activities and their spatial and partly sectoral outreach. 
In a comparison with figure 8.3, broadly speaking, it shows that the project meets its objective 
to tackle those areas under NPA influence. As a result, the BPRMO sees the NPA’s influence 
sphere waning, in contrast to the BLDF, which claims that it either stagnates or possibly, as 
inequality grows in the province, is even on the rise. Whether waning or not, the impressions 
compiled during field research, as noted in chapter 8.3.4, indicate that the NPA still 
profoundly affects social-economic developments, social constructions, security situation and 
policy-making on the island. However, it should be considered that most of the NPA 
representatives who are active in Bohol are – and this is atypically in the Philippines – not 
Boholanos but enter the island from Samar/Leyte or Negros – strongholds of the national 
movement. This implies, that despite their vast sphere of influence their activities in Bohol 
may be of less intensity and vehemence than in other regions of the Philippines (expert 
interview 5). 
The ‘SLGP’ declares to tackle puroks in the 17 poorest municipalities as defined by the 
poverty index of the PPDO survey, which is illustrated in figure 7.7 (see PPDO 2004b: 1-2; 
note that the survey does not cover barangay information). ‘SLGP’s projects plans to target 
the five poorest municipalities of district 1 and 2 and seven of district 3 (because this district 
consists of more municipalities). Figure 8.8 and table 8.4 visualise those barangays and 
municipalities, which are de-facto reached out to by ‘SLGP’ and clarify that their majority do 
not correspond with the poorest areas classified by the PPDO poverty index. For example, not 
a single project site is located in the poor North and the three poorest municipalities, here 
Pres. Garcia, Ubay, Bien Unido (see table 7.1) are ignored. Out of those municipalities listed 
in the highest poverty quartile in fact only Pilar, Alicia, and Inabanga are included in the 
‘SLGP’. At the same time, the relatively wealthy San Isidro and Calape are incorporated. All 
in all, most of ‘SLGP’s factual outreach areas represent comparatively medium poor or 
medium wealthy municipalities. On a positive note, the ‘SLGP’ successfully targets some of 
the marginalised and peripheral small islands off the West coast – the first LGU project to do 
so. None the less, the project mostly fails to achieve its spatial outreach goals. 
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Figure 8.7: Policy outreach of ‘Abante Bohol’ anti-poverty project  
 
 
Difficult accessibility and infrastructure may (again) explain difficulties in policy 
interventions in the far North. Already in the interior and Northwest “the access roads to 
these barangays [are] terrible, terrible when it rains, and terrible when the sand is wet” 
(expert interview 4). However, it is more likely that the continuing neglect of these 
municipalities by governmental as well as by NGO policy interest and activities cause a 
vicious cycle of accumulating exclusion (see chapter 8.3.1). The relative and material distance 
of these areas and their inhabitants from the decision-making centres are aggravated, which in 
turn, makes it increasingly challenging to intervene there because respective awareness, 
partners, funding, and possibly local acceptance are difficult to find. This situation becomes 
even more problematic and is a likely path into even deeper poverty for those excluded 
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municipalities that show exceptionally high population growth rates and density like Bien 
Unido. 
 
Sectoral outreach: An issue of participation, acceptance, and partnership 
The declared activity foci of ‘Abante Bohol’ aims at interventions that promote community- 
organisations, entrepreneurship, sustainable livelihood, environmental management, food 
security, and socio-cultural values (see again table 8.3). Figure 8.7 gives an overview of the 
sectoral accomplishments after the first two years of project implementation. Accordingly, 
more than two thirds of available money is utilised for purposes of livestock, crop dispersal 
and productivity enhancement (dispersal of chicken, corn and rice seeds, tree seedlings, 
hybrid rice commercialisation etc). The remaining third of financial assets goes into – listed 
by priority – technical and infrastructure assistance (water resources, electrification, capacity 
building (organisation of cooperatives), and livelihood and social services. Overall, therefore, 
the declared objectives are accomplished, yet thereby sectoral activity foci – similar to the 
Provincial Agriculturalist – strongly pursue pure service delivery without management 
training and community organisation. This may partly be due to national influence on the 
Figure 8.8: Policy outreach of the Strengthening Local 
Governance Project (‘SLGP’) 
 
 
Table 8.4: Discrepancies in 
assessing poverty in Bohol 
Poorest five (seven) 
municipalities by district 
Targeted by 
‘SLGP’  
claimed to be 
derived from 
PPDO survey  
Official 
poverty index  
after PPDO 
survey  
(see table 7.1) 
District 1 
Loon Loon 
Catigbian Catigbian 
Albuquerque * Albuquerque 
Maribojoc * Cortes  
Tubigon * Tubigon 
District 2 
Clarin Pres. Garcia 
Dagohoy Ubay 
Sagbayan Bien Unido 
Inabanga Inabanga 
San Isidro San Miguel 
District 3 
Alicia Alicia 
Loboc Pilar 
Anda Anda 
Sierra Bullones  Sierra Bullones 
Batuan  Batuan 
Bilar  Duero 
Sevilla  Candijay 
* not among 20 poorest municipalities; 
see table xxx; fat letters indicate 
discrepancy 
Source: PPDO 2004b; Provincial 
Government Bohol 2003 
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project and its relevance for national peace and order interests. National government’s long-
term planning emphasises the crucial role of prosperous and productive agricultural 
communities for “sustaining peace in the countryside. An equity led growth that is felt at the 
grassroots level would renew the trust and confidence of the rural population to the 
government and undermine the issue of armed conflict, which are based on agrarian issues” 
(NEDA 2001: 168)  – and governmental agricultural policy in Bohol is, as illustrated, 
foremost about service delivery.  
Like agricultural policy, some of the projects under ‘Abante Bohol’ are not adjusted to local 
conditions or needs: “It is funny, the chicken we gave to them to raise, they are so huge that 
when they bring them to the market, nobody buys. Yeah. Seven kilos” (expert interview 4). 
Never the less, in the expert’s perception, ‘Abante Bohol’ not only successfully targets NPA 
influence areas but also wins the ‘battle for the hearts and minds of the people’. Precisely with 
regard to the people living in NPA affected areas he claims “in the last two years they are 
beginning to open up, they are beginning to smile at our people, whereas before they were 
just watching. So that is already a behavioural indicator of acceptance” (expert interview 4). 
Representatives of the SLDP doubt this success of ‘Abante Bohol’ and criticise: “That project 
that really works for those delivering chickens and all that stuff etc. They, they are not, I 
think, so effective in the ideological field like because they lack the training, they lack the 
conviction. Whereas the other side has done the conviction to […] like how do we really build 
up a volunteers” (expert interview 7; see also expert interviews 5). This criticism relates back 
to an argument already raised with regard to the Provincial Agriculturalist: The people are 
happy to accept the goods and materials handed out to them, however, either cannot use them 
properly due to a lack of training back-ups and/or do not change their sympathy with the NPA 
thereafter.  
Figure 8.7 also shows a discrepancy between planned and implemented activities. Given that 
‘Abante Bohol’ was meant to run from 2002 until 2005, early 2004 only about 30% of 
projects are actually been initiated in the majority of target areas. This delay may partly root 
in preparation time needed to set up projects, yet partly also derives from general project 
management difficulties and problematic cooperation with local LGUs. Expert interviewee 4 
reports that sometimes ‘Abante Bohol’ faces opposition not only by NPA representatives but 
also by municipal and barangay governments. The BPRMO responds with drastic measures as 
the following quote demonstrates  
“If the barangay […], they don’t like us to get there […] We ask the people. So the 
barangay captain cannot do anything anymore. The people want it. But there are 
barangay captains who are really, you know, the landlord side, nothing much happens 
without them. So we bring along the military and tell this barangay captain your task is 
democracy” (expert interview 4). 
 170
The ‘SLGP’ similarly reports to sometimes encounter unwelcoming reactions by municipal 
and barangay LGUs. None the less, the ‘SLGP’s representatives strongly oppose armed 
reactions to existing conflicts. They call for peaceful approaches instead which aim to help 
distribute participatory governance and trust in government: 
“What I am only saying is that government should have a more effective way to deal 
with it rather than arms, or rather than bribery, like giving chickens and all that. But 
this will not solve the problems but listening to their complaints to why they are there 
on that side. But you can not threaten them, use like fear in the area and all that, using 
military means. What I am saying is that through the power of the community also they 
can device some ways so that everyone can live harmoniously” (expert interview 7). 
Sector-wise the ‘SLGP’ practically focuses – according to its objectives – on institutional 
change and establishing partnerships in the fields of identification of poverty, training of 
Boholanos in decision-making procedures, various self-help initiatives, and financial matters 
(micro-credit system). As of early 2004 the identification of poverty and training in decision-
making were almost completed – actually prematurely to the official start of project as funded 
through LGU resources. However, in order to pursue their activities both policy initiatives are 
dependent on the cooperation of municipal and barangay LGUs – despite their official 
supervisory role over these LGUs (see chapter 5.2, Valdellon 1999). As shown, this implies 
firstly, that the PPDO-BLDF and the BPRMO have to visit the LGUs and ‘sell’ their projects.  
Secondly, despite participatory approaches and targeting local people, local LGU 
representatives tend to retain an exceptionally powerful position in the course of the policy 
process, which thirdly, opens up windows for biased decision-making and even corruption. 
For example, the first purok assembly I visited during field visit 3 took place without the 
barangay captain (only the purok President was present), in the second purok assembly (in a 
different purok within the same barangay) the barangay captain was present. Communication 
was completely different in the two cases. During purok assembly I all attendants contributed 
to the discussion and seemingly openly uttered their opinions. In contrast, during purok 
assembly II the barangay captain took over more than ¾ of the talking and besides, only two 
or three other attendants who held some higher functions in the community spoke as well. 
Moreover, the barangay captain openly suggested that her barangay should receive 
exceptionally many ‘SLGP’ project resources because of her good personal relationships with 
the President of the BLDF and the Mayor of Baclayon. She reacted surprised when told that 
the target areas are provided with resources depending on their poverty status. This incidence 
implicitly hints at the extraordinary input and significance of informal social networks in 
policy-making in the Philippines – which sometimes are more decisive than factual reasoning 
and arguments. These illustration also show, that although the idea of targeting puroks for 
policy-making sounds promising and innovative, even at this ‘informal’ level the features of 
what is called ‘traditional Philippine politics’ based on reciprocal social ties may impede 
policy effect(iveness). Chapter 9 continues to clarify these issues in more detail.  
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To summarise, the decentralised anti-poverty endeavours by the provincial government of 
Bohol demonstrate innovative initiatives in the context of the entire Philippines. Both policies 
under investigation, ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’, innovatively incorporate areas where high 
poverty is prevalent and no other governmental policy-maker has operated before. Thereby 
‘Abante Bohol’ meets its objective to tackle those areas under NPA influence, while the 
‘SLGP’ mostly fails to achieve its set spatial targets. Reasons for its limited spatial outreach 
are yet again partially infrastructure and accessibility problems, partially a lack of political 
will, interest, and sometimes competition by other stakeholders.  
Corresponding to its seemingly complete spatial outreach ‘Abante Bohol’ is complete in 
implementing its sectoral targets of service delivery. Similarly, ‘SLGP’ often seems to 
successfully accomplish its envisaged initial steps towards institutional change at purok level 
and capacity building where it operates40. None the less, both projects encounter 
unwelcoming reactions by some barangay and municipal governments, which they respond to 
by military force (‘Abante Bohol’) and negotiations (‘SLGP’) respectively. The exceptionally 
powerful position of these local LGUs in the course of the policy process undermines the 
officially supervisory position of the provincial government over municipalities. It opens up 
windows for biased decision-making and even corruption and gives evidence for the 
difficulties of policy-making across local government scales and in community planning 
models. In addition, training and local adaptation of services are being neglected especially by 
‘Abante Bohol’ and therefore some of its policy interventions prove little effective – similar 
to those of the Provincial Agriculturalist. Therefore, ‘Abante Bohol’s ultimate aim of winning 
the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the local people and resolving the conflict 
between government and NPA remains controversially assessed. 
                                               
40
 Note that final assessments cannot be made as the project was ongoing when visited. 
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8.5  Obstacles to policy outreach and effect(iveness) in summary 
The following factors are identified to constrain policy outreach and effect(iveness) on 
disparities of poverty and wealth in the decentralised setting of provincial Bohol. For 
classification reasons, some obstacles may be illustrated in broader, more generalised terms. 
The listed factors may also overlap and interrelate. 
Spatial policy bias  
Policies tend to most effectively support those areas, which are already wealthier and 
progressive, and not necessarily those most needy or those identified as poverty areas in 
overall plans. To most policies applies what expert interviewee 10 observes for Pamilacan: 
The fishermen in the North of the island feel ‘left alone’ by (tourism) development support 
which concentrates to the South where development is progressed already:  
“Es kriegen immer nur die anderen Unterstützung […] die Leute auf dieser Seite der 
Insel, also die, wo die Touristen sind, und PET, also da wo die Pamilacan Island 
Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation ist“41 (similarly experienced during field 
visits 3, 12, 13). 
This finding applies across scales from within Pamilacan to between municipalities where the 
far North and Northeast as well as many outer islands are largely neglected. Interior uplands 
and some watersheds are only occasionally targeted, while the already wealthier Tagbilaran 
City and Panglao island are almost always reached out to by policy.  
Partially restricted access(ibility) and topographical fragmentation drive the provincial 
government to neglect these areas. However, political ignorance and lack of interest, NPA 
presence and conflicts, profit seeking, and non-conformability between political and 
economic interests also play significant roles. Interestingly, there is a certain spatial policy 
orientation in Western parts of Bohol towards benefiting from the ‘big neighbour’ Cebu, yet 
impacts remain marginal so far.  
Hence, spatial disparities are reflected in policy disparities and vice versa. As a result, the 
marginalised and peripheral seem to be trapped in a vicious cycle of accumulating exclusion. 
The only municipalities that appear to be in a state of complete exclusion are Bien Unido and 
Pres. Garcia and possibly many of the outer islands in the far North.  
                                               
41
 Literal translation in English: “It’s only the others who get supported […] the people on that side of the island, 
where the tourists are and PET, that is, where the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation 
is”. 
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Disparities and political conflict 
There is another dimension to add to the certain reciprocity ‘between ‘the social’ and ‘the 
spatial’ in the Philippines (chapters 2.2, 6.3), namely, the overlap of NPA presence with those 
areas identified as agricultural and poor peripheries with highly unequal landownership 
relations in Bohol. In other words, developmental peripheries and their marginalised 
population are apparently linked to conflicts between government and NPA’s alternative 
‘fields of power’ inscribing into space, society, and politics of Bohol. Similar trends have 
been illuminated for the entire Philippines with regard to the Moro and indigenous 
movements already (see chapter 6.3). These phenomena are, in fact, typical examples of the 
opposition movements for ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ elaborated on from a 
theoretical standpoint in chapter 3.1.1. They can be understood as a response to prevailing 
(social and spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth, and possibly as a pointer to failing 
governmental outreach. 
Sectoral policy bias 
Agro-industrial and (eco)tourism policy are clearly – and adequately – emphasised as the 
major sectors linked to (disparities of) poverty in Bohol. However, governmental policy in 
Bohol (as in other provinces of the Philippines, compare Gauld 2000) often conceives policy 
effectiveness as to enhance productivity. As such, growth- and global market oriented 
approaches are emphasised, here productivity and technical aspects in the primary sector and 
foreign-led investments in tourism development. These are – following neoliberal paradigms 
– then meant to achieve socially and economically balancing outcomes (see chapter 3.2.1). In 
reality, such social and economic effects are often not accomplished, simply because those 
engaged in tourism development foremost pursue purposes of economic profits. The initial 
provincial policy priority of connecting (pro-poor) growth with redistribution is not put into 
practice. 
Deficiencies in policy administration 
Pure sectoral outreach plans are not sufficient to guarantee policy effectiveness. 
Governmental policy in Bohol often fails to meet its own objectives of being “adequate, 
timely, mutually reinforcing, complementary, affordable over time, matching specific needs 
with project services” (compare quote in chapter 8.2.1). Precisely the following problems can 
be defined from the empirical findings: 
¾ Provincial tourism, agriculture, investment, and anti-poverty policy alike show 
discrepancies and inaccuracies between plan and implementation. Typically, policy 
outreach plans are more efficient and complete than their eventual accomplishments.  
¾ Frequently, policy is not effectively implemented because local contexts, knowledge, and 
interests are neglected. This deficit applies even to some of those policies, which 
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explicitly aim at local participation. The plans for large-scale agro-industrial development, 
which ignore de-facto limited market demand and supply in Bohol most vividly display 
this problem. Besides, many of the government’s delivered services are not used by local 
people because they are inadequately trained to do so.  
¾ Different stakeholders in Bohol do not always cooperate ideally to pursue differently 
targeted, yet systematically related policy tasks (see chapter 3.3). Firstly, government’s 
cooperation with NGOs and POs has not progressed equally in all policy fields although 
the decentralisation process requires their incorporation already from the Sangguniang 
onwards (table 5.1). Secondly, unsuccessful negotiations and ‘partnership’ between 
government(s), NGOs, international organisations, and POs across scales frequently result 
in conflict and competition. Opposition by stakeholders to projects can imply that 
corruptive practices are necessary to ‘free’ the path for policy implementation.  
¾ The magnitude of initiatives in all examined sectors at provincial, municipal, and 
barangay LGUs in Bohol indicate that the idea of decentralised policy-making is accepted. 
Yet, especially provincial tourism policy (still) appears to rely heavily on guidelines from 
Metro Manila. Provincial agricultural policy is observed to – somewhat strikingly – 
uncritically follow national endeavours on the one hand, however, on the other be little 
aware of some major national policies like the AFMA. The opposition that both poverty 
programmes, ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’, face from municipal LGUs also shows that the 
formal supervision role of the provincial government over municipalities under the Local 
Government Code is not always accepted in practice. 
To conclude, the insights given in this chapter illuminate that in Bohol “successful economic 
development has been constrained to a large extent by the weakness of political development” 
(Hutchcroft 1998: 4). It remains to analyse in chapter 9 whether and how this political 
weakness it is actually embedded in typical Boholano and Filipino socio-cultural 
characteristics. 
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9.  Political and cultural contexts of policy-making and disparity 
production  
9.1  Socio-cultural environment and academic analysis: Critical 
reflections  
This chapter takes the (in chapter 8 identified) constraints in governmental policy-making on 
disparities of poverty and wealth one step further by analysing them in the light of typical 
features of Boholano and/or Filipino political and cultural environments. Thereby I 
differentiate between the contexts of (a) government’s internal policy administration in 
chapter 9.2, and (b) of its external conflict and cooperation relations with other stakeholders 
in chapter 9.3.  
The analysis in this chapter reflects more than previous ones those constrains in policy-
making it aims at identifying and explaining, because firstly, Filipino political and cultural 
environments of policy-making relate closely to socio-cultural, often informal practices, 
expectations, and constructions. However secondly, manifold socio-cultures and ethno-
linguistics exist concomitantly under the ‘umbrella’ of the Filipino nation, incited by the 
fragmented morphology of the archipelago and the separate historical development of its 
various regions (chapter 5). This diversity makes it difficult for Philippine government(s) to 
strengthen national cohesion and establish the ‘imagined communities of Philippine 
nationality’ (compare chapter 3.1.1). Broadly speaking, governmental measures for nation-
building have centred on providing education in Tagalog and English (and not the local) 
languages, and on ethnocentristic cultural politics focussing on lowland Filipino-Malay 
Christian ‘mainstream’ values (see quote by Horvatich 2003 in chapter 5.2; David 2002; 
Taoshiaki 2002; Buendia 2002). Accordingly, thirdly, (inter)national citations of ‘typical 
Filipino’ features and practices often reflect the same rather crude tendencies. Few accounts 
are available stressing cultural diversity and difference in contrast to an abundance of 
publications on ‘the’ Filipino culture and its relevance to societal processes available in 
Philippine bookshops (field visits 1, 8, 9; see e.g. Jocano 1997, 1999; Pertierra 2002; King 
2002; Ramos Shahani 2003).  
Fourthly then, Boholano socio-culture can be assumed to differ in some and correspond in 
other aspects from these ‘typical’ depictions (Boholanos are mainly of Filipino-Malay decent, 
see chapters 1.2 and 7). Yet, there are no publications available to explicitly clarify these 
differences. Hence, fifthly, this and the previous chapter are caught in a situation where on the 
one hand, empirical findings on constraints for policy-making on disparities are available for 
Bohol and only partially for the entire Philippines. On the other hand, the analysis for their 
socio-cultural embeddedness must use a mixture of so-called ‘typical’ Filipino features and a 
partially dissimilar ‘Boholano’ culture where the differences must be left more or less 
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undefined. Then, sixthly, I cannot rule out that some of the subsequent accounts may reflect 
state governmental constructions of Philippine uniformity. Using interview information, field 
experiences, and the available academic literature I, however, attempt to consistently indicate 
whether sources of information relate specifically to Bohol or the Philippines as a whole.  
9.2  Constraints in policy administration 
9.2.1  Gaps in the policy process  
As inferred from empirical findings in chapter 8.5, almost all policies under investigation 
show discrepancies and inaccuracies between policy plans and implementation. Yet, thorough 
and multi-scalar plans exist for all sorts of policy fields, problems, and potentials in Bohol 
(compare chapter 8.3). Moreover, national and provincial governments’ policy frameworks 
show some similarity in outline, objectives, and measures (see chapters 8.1 and 8.2). 
Therefore, it is too simple to argue, that “this is a developing country context where you don’t 
have this grand plan” (expert interview 2, see also expert interview 11). However, many of 
these plans prove to be unworkable, goals are not achieved, projects stopped and not 
implemented etc. (compare chapter 8.4). Frequently elaborated reasons behind their failure 
include firstly that policies are designed in a way that is disconnected from local customs, 
problems and people. Secondly, they show deficits in long-term planning and engagement. 
Expert interviewee 1 describes for the Philippine Medium Term Development Plan: 
 “The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan […] they were able to present the 
problem adequately in terms of statistics, but the strategies were a wild list. I mean, 
you have about twenty strategies. I mean, how do you prioritise which are durable? 
How do you address the specific problems? […] I mean it’s not a realistic plan” 
(expert interview 1).  
The expert refers to the fact that policy plans are often disconnected from reality, here the 
factual local policy context. This is in so far surprising as it is often assumed that 
Filipinos/Boholanos ‘know what is best for them’ (expert interview 10). This assumption is 
based on comparatively high educational attainments among Filipinos and Boholanos 
(compare chapters 6.2 and 7.2.4). Kelly & Armstrong (1996: 255) report from their research 
in the Visayas that they find policy typically organised along (internationally suggested) 
theoretical lines – that means it is intellectually eloquent – but that it then fails to practically 
adapt to the situation in the field. The Bohol case displays similar incidences as seen 
especially in the cases of agricultural policy and the anti-poverty policy of ‘Abante Bohol’.  
These adverse outcomes are often based on a situation where policy formulation and/or 
implementation are conducted in the absence of local participation. As a matter of fact, the 
extraordinary diversity and fragmentation of the Philippines explicitly calls for and makes the 
integration of ‘endogenous’ local knowledge even more necessary. Governmental policy-
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makers, bureaucratic staff, and not even NGOs because they are mainly urban-and middle-
class based (see chapter 6.1.3) may not always possess such endogenous knowledge, 
especially when foreign consultants are involved in the policy process, as it is the case with 
provincial tourism policy in Bohol. In other words, “in many cases, this lack of adaptability 
to the situation in the barrios can be traced to the Project’s institutional context. Its 
experience demonstrates the drawbacks in attempting to fuse the cultures of academia 
[bureaucracy] and village life” (Gauld 2000: 255, note by A.C.). Indeed, the rather successful 
approach of the ‘SLGP’ towards institutional change may partially be explained by the 
combined endogenous-international knowledge resource embodied in the president of the 
Bohol Local Development Foundation and consultant to Provincial Planning and 
Development Office (expert interviewee 7; see table 4.6).  
All of these observations highlight the need for better monitoring and evaluation tools, and 
improved policy consistency. However, as illustrated for Bohol, monitoring and/or evaluation 
activities are close to non-existing (chapter 8.2.2). Instead, the tendency is to continuously 
replace old plans with new ones leading to policy inconsistency (expert interview 11). 
Interviewee 1 states:  
“And then after five years she’ll come again with another set of plans, you see, 
presenting problems. But the wild list would still be there and nobody has really 
evaluated the extent to which, you know, these strategies have lead to the reduction of 
poverty or improvement of the situation of the population” (expert interview 1). 
Policy plans and programmes are typically superseded as political posts and personnel in 
Metro Manila and Tagbilaran change. This is independent of whether the old ones have been 
fully implemented or not. A prominent 
example is the Social Reform and 
Poverty Alleviation Agenda introduced 
during Ramos’ presidency, which – 
despite successful outcomes and positive 
critiques – was almost completely 
modified when President Estrada took 
over.  
Interestingly, during election periods, 
certain sectoral policies are preferred 
over others because they promise a 
quicker, better visible impact. These are 
then used to point out alleged policy 
consistency and effect(iveness) of the actions achieved by political leaders. Particularly 
infrastructure policies are used for these purposes, as photo 9.1 exemplifies (see also Coronel 
et al 2004: 196-215; chapter 9.2.3 for follow-up). 
Photo 9.1:  Signpost to highlight the 
infrastructure policy engagement of the Arroyo 
government in Bohol 
Clausen 2004
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Hence, for most of the policy cases presented from Bohol in chapter 8, the classic policy cycle 
as presented in figure 3.1 typically lacks monitoring and evaluation activities; it may be 
interrupted and abbreviated; and it focuses too much on planning. Additionally, inadequate 
consideration and incorporation of locally-embedded knowledge often render policies 
disconnected from local contexts. In this setting, policy intervention struggles to induce 
sustainable, long-term, coherent, and contingent changes on disparities of poverty and wealth 
(expert interview 19).  
9.2.2  On patronage and personalised politics 
Policy administration in the Philippines is intertwined with principles of socio-political 
hierarchy, responsibility, and accountability, here issues of leadership and personalised 
politics that structure all sections of everyday life, including political and business matters. 
‘Utang na loob’ and patronage systems 
The principle of ‘utang na loob’ forms the basis for most social interactions among Filipinos. 
Interview partner 4 describes ‘utang na loob’ as politics that is related to “business is you 
know, [Visayan] and then traditional politics, they always play that, ah I give you a tennis 
court, ah, and I give you this back”. More precisely ‘utang na loob’ refers to reciprocal 
obligations of a Filipino to ‘pay back’ any person who has given or done anything for 
him/her, here to a ‘debt of gratitude’. ‘Utang na loob’ means that any person is entangled in a 
dense net of mutually binding ties, here that symbolic capital is the fundament to social 
networks. As hinted at in chapter 8, these informal ties often prove indispensable for 
achieving goals in policy-making and they are very important in times of crisis (Teves 2000; 
see chapters 9.2.3 and 10). They are also the reason behind the difficulties outsiders 
experience when attempting to acquire information from locals (see chapter 4.3.2). ‘Utang na 
loob’ still exists all over the Philippines, however, is stronger in rural than urban areas (expert 
interview 2, compare rural origin of Philippine communities in chapters 5 and 9.3.1).  
Patronage refers to relationships created through ‘utang na loob’ between a patron and his/her 
clients across hierarchical scales. It originated from the traditional landownership relations 
which continue to be persistently unequal (see chapters 6.1.3, 7.2.3, 8.4.3). Since pre-colonial 
times a system has developed where the tenants and agricultural workers can enlarge their 
share of the harvest by investing their labour in the cultivation of land. The wealthy 
landowner (their patron) in turn distributes the surplus harvest among the tenants (clients) in 
order to attain status and expand his/her influence sphere. Usually he also takes care of health 
and education matters for his tenants and is the person they would ask for advice and 
decisions. In the long run these patronage relations appoint more (material) benefits to the 
landowner than to the tenants. However, the latter are usually guaranteed a secure livelihood 
as the landowners would not dare to ‘loose their faces’ by neglecting their tasks in the 
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reciprocal relationship. In fact, the tenants and workers usually do not perceive themselves to 
be in an inferior or disadvantaged position. This may change in cases when the land they 
cultivate is being – as described for contemporary Philippines in chapters 6.1.3 and 7.2.3 – 
taken over by absentee owners or unknown landlords who then do not feel the same reciprocal 
relationship (Ulrich 2003: 167-168). None the less, the incidences of Boholano farmers 
selling the land, which is given to them through CARP land reform, back to its former owner 
and patron (chapter 8.4.3) shows that the ‘traditional’ obligatory relations and patronage 
systems still remain in place until today. 
Personalised politics  
In a society centred on (hierarchical) social networks, personal characters tend to dominate 
policy contents and necessities. In fact, most visited projects in Bohol rely intrinsically on the 
leadership capacities of a single person. “Ich glaube es muss immer mindestens eine Person 
[...] sein, die wirklich dahinter steht, die es wirklich will und weiter durchdrückt, dass es auch 
wirklich passiert. Eine Person mit Einfluss“. This implies, in turn, “wenn die eine Person 
aufhört, ist ganz oft das Projekt zu Ende“42  (expert interview 10) – an observation which may 
provide yet another explanation for the common gap between policy plan and implementation.  
The need for leadership may also be responsible for a common practice observed inside the 
visited governmental offices in Bohol. Here many staff members sit and wait to go home once 
they have finished their explicit tasks defined by a superior. They clearly have difficulties to 
work independently (own observations at several provincial government agencies, confirmed 
by expert interviews 11, 19). Similarly, expert interviewee 10 illustrates that her task as a 
foreign consultant to the municipal government of Baclayon comprises above all the 
organisation of papers, plans and ideas, setting up priorities or distributing responsibilities to 
other staff, because “es nimmt keiner in die Hand [...] absprechen tun sie sich schon [...] die 
hatten dann ein oder zwei Besprechungen aber haben halt gemeint, sie haben sich dann da 
hingesetzt und drumherumgeredet und dann wars wieder vorbei. Und no output weißt Du, no 
outcome. Und dann haben sie sich wieder mal getroffen und alle geredet. Und beim nächsten 
Mal ist keiner mehr gekommen“43. This certain inability to work, decide, and speak out 
independently is also exposed when interview partners frequently hand over and refer to 
allegedly better informed and directly accountable colleagues (see chapter 8.2.2). 
                                               
42
 Literally in English: “I believe there must always be one person who takes it on, who really supports and 
pushes it. Only then it actually works. One person with great influence”. This implies, in turn, “if this one 
person quits the job, often the entire project is cancelled as well”. 
43
  Literally in English: “Nobody takes over the job…They discuss the issues, have one or two consultations. 
However, they told me, there they sit together and talk around without focussing until the meeting is over. And 
no output, you know, no outcome. And some time later they meet again and everybody talks again. The next 
meeting nobody turned up any more” (expert interview 10). 
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The subsequent follow-up story of the two anti-poverty policies of ‘Abante Bohol’ and the 
‘Strengthening local government for effective service delivery  
for poverty reduction’ (‘SLGP’) demonstratively exemplifies the crucial role a single person 
can have in determining the course and content of policy. When investigated in early 2004 the 
two policies pursued partially different policy approaches and goals, in fact they appeared to 
more or less compete with each other (compare chapter 8.3.4). Between early 2004 and 2006 
the situation changed substantially as leading personnel shifted. The precise steps in time 
sequence were: 
¾ The international donor AUSAid – PACAP rejects to financially support the ‘SLGP’ 
project. 
¾ The ‘SLGP’ project stops to exist as a distinct project. 
¾ The post of the head of the Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office (BPRMO) 
(expert interviewee 4) and with it leadership for ‘Abante Bohol’ becomes vacant. 
¾ The president of the Bohol Local Development Foundation and consultant to Provincial 
Planning and Development Office (expert interviewee 7) who has been accountable for 
carrying out the ‘SLGP’ takes over the post of head of BPRMO and is in charge of 
‘Abante Bohol’. 
¾ Some elements of ‘SLGP’ are integrated into ‘Abante Bohol’, such as community 
organisation efforts at purok levels. At the same time some service delivery tasks are 
shifted to cooperation with other sectoral agencies (The Bohol Chronicle 17/11/2004). 
¾ The BLDF applies for foreign funding for a project on community organisation and 
institutional change at purok level that resembles the old ‘SLGP’ 
(http://www.poorfirstpovertycafe.org.ph/; 20/1/2006). 
¾ There are no further updates on ‘Abante Bohol’ available on the Internet, therefore I 
cannot assess whether and how the project is still operating. However, expert interviewee 
7 again changes posts in 2005 and now works for an international NGO.   
While the new integration of both projects may potentially result in more bundled and 
possibly effective policy intervention on poverty, the occurrences give yet another example of 
policy inconsistency alongside changes of personnel (chapter 9.2.1). These events clearly 
underline an inference often made with reference to ‘Filipino-style’ policy-making that “in 
the Philippines politics is a matter of personalities and rhetoric, not of a platform an 
ideology”, concepts, and programmes (Mulder 1999: 7; see also Hutchcroft 1998: 13-15). In 
other words, political parties “no longer look at their candidates’ fitness for office or 
inclination to public service. Their sole concern is ‘winnability’” (David 2002: 148). This 
implies, in turn, that politicians are legitimised to change political parties and policy-makers 
like expert interviewee 7 can swap programmes. Concerning the current and former Boholano 
governor a siumilar picture arises: “This [current] governor used to be a Congress man. So. 
But the one, the opposition, was a former governor. Very young who’s trying to come back as 
a opposition. And ugly enough, maybe you have observed that they used to belong to the same 
party” (expert interview 7, note by A.C.). Siemers (1993: 120) notes that such behaviour can 
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sometimes also be a result of pressure on the politician who, as ‘patron’, is obliged to secure 
access to resources for his followers.  
These interpretations imply “the idea that the ones who are elected are the only ones who can 
practice decision-making. And they earn it through elections. They have the constituency” 
(expert interview 2). For this reason the barangay captains, mayors, and the governor in Bohol 
as well as the senators and congressmen in Metro Manila plus their families are literally 
‘untouchable’ (expert interview 18). For example, the German Development Service together 
with the municipal government of Baclayon has established a bakery operated by a women’s 
cooperative on Pamilacan, which is well accepted among the locals. However, the wife of the 
baranagy captain took the money used as basic capital for running the bakery and spent it in 
Metro Manila. The bakery remained closed until the money was replaced from other sources. 
The  members of the cooperative did not object (field visit 11, expert interview 10). 
Although there is neither great consistency of policy nor of individual leaders in specific 
programmes, the political elite in the Philippines has proven particularly resilient to changes. 
This resilience is based on the fact that “politics in the Philippines is very dominated by some 
families and so on” (expert interview 7). Every Filipino has various godfathers beyond the 
genetic family. Through this godfather system social networks of the family are extended into 
what is often referred to as clans. The most influential clans make up the socio-political and 
simultaneously the economic elite of the country. “Elite Filipino families often perform a 
broad range of economic, social, and political functions” (McCoy 2002: 9). Historically, the 
old-established landlord families have possessed the most symbolic capital since the post-
colonial, independent political system was founded in 1946. Thus, they were most eligible 
and legitimised to take over power. Ever since this legitimacy has replicated itself. Only 
Marcos established his own cronies and added another elite besides the ‘old’ elites (chapter 
5.2). However, after his downfall, Cory Aquino, a landowner herself, took over power and re-
connected to the pre-Marcos elite. Ever since these two oligarchic groups have constituted the 
political and economic elite of the country (Hamilton-Paterson 1998; Hegmanns 1990). 
To give examples of resilient elite families in politics, the mayor of Inabanga municipality in 
Bohol is the wife of the previous mayor who had governed for three terms before his wife 
took over. At national scale Imelda Marcos, the wife of the former President whose 
authoritarian and corruptive presidency was, as noted, ended by ‘people power’ in 1986, 
continues to be a highly recognised personality among many Filipinos until today. In 1995 
she was even elected a member of the national congress as a representative of the first district 
of Leyte (David 2002). Another example, Fidel Ramos, elected President 1992-1998, had 
previously been chief of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the most disreputable units of the 
military under Marcos. Similarly, Joseph Estrada, elected President 1998-2001 was mayor 
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during the Marcos years and said to never have given up his loyalty and admiration for the 
former leader (Carroll 1999).  
As a major consequence, uneven patronage, leadership, and power relations control – hinder – 
many transformations in Bohol and the Philippines, not only in socio-economic but also in 
policy-making terms. Open discussions and opinion sharing are rare in such a policy 
environment, especially when superior leaders are present (compare example of purok 
assembly in chapter 8.4.4). Obviously this lack of transparency may also cause some of the 
locally-disconnected and non-participatory policy approaches detected earlier in chapter 9.2.1 
(expert interview 11). Chapter 9.3.2 looks into the outcomes of such circumstances for state-
society partnerships. 
Moreover, political position becomes a means to economic power and vice versa. Until today, 
Philippine politics is steered by what expert interviewee 18 subsumes under: Socio-political 
power and money depend on and affect each other – however, stem from ‘utang na loob’ 
relations (compare Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999). In other words, “in a society with a long 
history of state and elite predation as well as mass powerlessness, the use of public office has 
been identified with gaining and maintaining economic, political, and social power” (Batalla 
2001: 43, compare notes on corruption in subsequent chapter 9.2.3). Accordingly, the national 
congress resembles “an elite body that defends the interests of the wealthy and the powerful 
while occasionally being open to demands from below – [which] remains essentially 
unchanged” (Coronel et al 2004: viii). Against this background the limited progress and stark 
criticism of CARP policy are not surprising given that the President under which the land 
reform was enacted and many politicians and policy-makers today are landowners 
themselves. Borras (2003: 1062) puts it strongly: “Anti-reform political manipulation by 
landlords and their allies to exclude lands, rather than technical-administrative reasons 
claimed by the government, better explain the excluded” areas under CARP. In addition, 
matters of policy consistency are not overly important for an elite whose legitimacy 
unaffectedly prevails and remains unchallenged for cultural reasons. Generally, the unequal 
concentration of growth and income in the Philippines and in Bohol may not present as much 
of a problem for the elites – unless the disparities induce conflicts like the ones with Moro 
movements or the NPA, which then attack their legitimacy.  
Recently, globalisation has brought impetus for new elite formations and a challenge to old 
ones. Through return migrants, remittance-receiving families, tourists, or entrepreneurs 
earning from uplifting economic sectors like tourism, globalisation creates new socio-
economic elites in centre and peripheries alike. The result is often a conflictual encounter of 
old and new elites as portrayed for the example of Pamilacan in chapter 8.4.2 (compare also 
Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999). Certainly many (peripheral) areas in the Philippines can be 
assumed to experience what Edwards et al describe theoretically: “In traditional rural power 
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structures this [power] was performed through the informal backstage networks of social and 
political elites. However in many rural areas influence has shifted to new groups and proto-
elites, who are without access to the same cross-scale networks” (Edwards et al 2001: 292; 
note by A.C.). Yet, as the previous accounts underline, it is still explicitly these ‘traditional’ 
cross-scale, informal networks that decide on the persistence and acceptance of any groups’ 
and proto-elites’ influence sphere among their fellow Filipinos.  
To conclude, the Philippine socio-cultural environment of political economy processes opens 
wide windows for a deep divide in society between those who decide and possess and those 
who do not, between the politically and socio-economically marginalised and the elite. Long-
established forms of socio-political organisation and power relations, prevalent in Philippine 
society and political economy, are based on endogenously generated, socially defined, and 
locally understood inequalities. These seriously impede effective policy interventions on 
spatial disparities and social inequalities. In fact, they often actively operate to (re)produce 
those Philippine landscapes of disparities of poverty and wealth they formally seek to change. 
Hence, the political and socio-economic elites of the Philippines often fail to meet their 
responsibilities to engage in more balanced development, as suggested in chapter 2.2.2. 
9.2.3  Practice of corruption 
An almost logic result of the prior analysis are open windows for personal enrichment and 
corruption. Expert interviewee 9 strongly criticises that many governmental policy 
interventions do not reach the poor and peripheral because of corruption preventing the 
resources to ‘touch down’ where they are needed and instead end up in the pockets of some 
policy-makers and -executers. There is both, extensive corruption in the administrative 
bureaucracy as well as in high-level political decision-making circles, and it stretches across 
almost all sectors including agriculture, infrastructure, education, disaster management etc. at 
national and local government levels (Coronel 2000). As it is based on patronage relations, 
corruption is historically institutionalised in the Philippines, which makes it more complicated 
to combat (Batalla 2001). Correspondingly, Hutchcroft (1998) depicts the Philippine political 
economy as ‘booty capitalism’ indicating that the political leaders who are in fact the 
economic elite use the state mainly for further self-enrichment and not for political purposes. 
Figure 9.1 shows the distribution of the 20% development fund for the provincial government 
of Bohol in 2004 from which most decentralised policy fields are sponsored44, including the 
examined policy fields of chapter 8. Strikingly, the expenditures on infrastructure 
development exceed all other sectors by large and make up 67%. Although infrastructure 
                                               
44
 Each LGU is required to spend 20% of the finances received from national governments on development 
projects. The plans of spending must be submitted to yet not approved by the Department of Interior and Local 
Government (compare chapter on decentralisation 9.3.4). 
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Figure 9.1: Approved 20% development 
fund distribution for Bohol in 2004 in 
million Pesos (% in brackets) 
 
 
surely needs to be improved in the province, such disproportionate public expenditure pattern 
seems inadequate. One interview partner explains that personal enrichment practices are 
responsible: 
 “Mayors like for instance, confidentially I am saying: Why is it that they are more 
interested in infrastructure than in any other thing? Because they get 10% of the 
contracts! Whereas if you, if you say training and you say building people’s 
organisations and purok, there is no 10% […] So they all ask for market roads even if 
they don’t care whether the farmers really need this road. And then this highway and 
the dams and all this, because they get 10% from the contracts” (expert interview 7; 
see also Coronel et al 2004: 205-207). 
Given the large investment in infrastructure, its 
prevalent bad state in the province (chapters 7.2.4 
and 8) poses further questions for policy 
(in)effect(iveness). At national level, the 
congressmen and senators are given specific 
resources to spend on their home provinces, the 
so-called ‘pork barrel’ money. However, while 
they hold office in the capital in Manila, they get 
their votes from the provinces” (expert interview 
7). Consequently, the money is often used for 
‘visible’ projects as the noted ones into 
infrastructure to guarantee loyalty and support, or 
to buy votes (see photo 9.1). Moreover, 
“politicians implement policies often in favour of 
their own home province or region“ expert 
interview 20). Probably this is the reason behind 
the well-equipped state of roads in Illocos 
province, the home of Ferdinand Marcos (see 
chapter 6.1.3).  
The mentioned family clan tradition in Philippine politics results in another form of 
corruption, here cronyism in the form of the employment of family members, even if they are 
not as well qualified for the job as others. “Many politicians try to transform their electoral 
offices into lasting family assets” (McCoy 2002: 24; compare Hanisch 1995 for similar 
practices at LGU level). Again, social connections, based on genetic relations and symbolic 
representation, appear to determine the setting and therefore possibly the course towards 
ineffective policy-making. Financial capital plays a significant role as well, none the least as a 
major objective for undertaking corruption. The notorious bad pay for government officials 
fuels corruption and little effective work in administration (expert interview 11; Hanisch 
1995). Such conditions date back to colonial times when bureaucrats were already badly paid 
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and spend most of their working time to ‘tax farm’ the local people for their own living 
(Batalla 2001: 43-46; compare accounts on decentralisation chapter 9.3.4). 
Hence, policy-making at all levels in the Philippines tends to be centred on personal 
enrichment opportunities. Thereby however, corruptive practices are a historically embedded 
societal phenomenon. It applies to the Philippines what is expressed in theory: 
“Corruption is not systematically ‘naked self-interest’ but can respond, for example, to 
codes of reciprocity within (neo) patrimonial political systems based on legitimate 
patronage” (Le Billon 2001: 1). 
Never the less, as a result the abuse of government’s autonomy and power as a ‘self-service 
(money) station’ obviously leads to the loss of people’s trust in them: The government does 
not seem to have the power to control itself which is essential for retaining accountability to 
the people (compare theory in chapter 3.2.3). Consequently, material and imagined distances 
and boundaries between government and citizen, and inherently between elite and the residual 
population increase – and effective policy outreach made more complicated. In addition, 
corruptive practices cause investors to be sceptical about the reliability and effectiveness of 
economic policies and to withdraw from investment and/or joint endeavours with 
government. 
Yet, this situation does not automatically stir Filipinos’ protest (compare example of bakery in 
Pamilacan above). Instead, “the ability of powerful local elites to capture the government 
machinery for their own ends” often goes hand in hand with “patronage, threats, and ties of 
clan and obligation to reduce citizen outcry against the elites’ use of public office for private 
gains” (George 1998: 224). Only at a certain stage of ‘saturation’, Filipinos start to actively 
dispute and object. The events of ‘EDSA I’ in 1986 when ‘people power’ ousted the 
authoritative rule of Marcos, as well as ‘EDSA or people power II’ which ended the corrupt 
presidency of Estrada in 2001 are the most popular examples. Possibly current accusations 
and protests against Arroyo in the streets of Metro Manila give further evidence of their 
‘saturation’. Important to consider, the major protests are all directed at leadership changes at 
national government level, while their roots at local levels and in the inherited socio-political 
system remain untackled and unchanged.  
Interestingly, ‘people power’ in the various cases comprise of different segments of the 
population, which intrinsically point at the outreach capabilities of Presidents and their 
acceptance in Filipino society. The events in 1986 probably represent the most integrative and 
inclusive ‘concert of protest action’ in Philippine history. Induced by people from all social 
classes and origins, at a later stage notably the usually apolitical Catholic Church and the 
military stepped in and supported the upheaval (see chapter 9.3.2). In contrast, the ‘people 
power II’ that ousted Estrada involved mainly urban middle-class and elitist Filipinos. As a 
former movie star Estrada is well known and popular with the rural poor. He has been the 
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only non-elitist President elected without the support of the oligarchy – a symbol to some that 
‘traditional political culture’ is weakened and the poor empowered (compare Thompson 
2002). However, while the poor and periheral voted Estrada into office in 1998, they could 
not prevent that Estrada was ousted by the urban-based middle-class- and elitist movements of 
people power II in 2001. The current President herself origins from the urban elite and is not 
very well approved of in the peripheries. Most of all the deprived segments of Filipino society 
are the major force behind current protests against Arroyo. Yet, in spite of several political 
crises, accusations of corruption, and one attempted coup in 2003, Arroyo narrowly defeated 
another film star popular with the rural poor, Fernando Poe, in the presidential elections of 
May 2004. In February 2006 a second alleged coup d’etat plot against Arroyo was uncovered 
and suppressed with force. Ever since rumours of a new coup d’etat and discourses on the 
weakness and/or strength of the Philippine state government and democracy prevail (see 
chapter 10).  
9.3  External relations: Stakeholders’ interactions 
9.3.1  Filipino paradoxes in participatory policy 
Local policy participation is embedded in a paradox historical background in the Philippines. 
On the one hand, Malay-Filipino society is based on local organisations of small ‘barangay’-
village communities (chapter 5.2), and family/clan ties are exceptionally strong. Local, 
participatory support systems have thus a long tradition. In fact, they have helped to face “the 
inability of the state to provide social services to the majority of the population“ (Bankhoff 
2004: 19). The example of elapsed fishermen communities in the Visayas shows that such 
associations of local solidarity operated even across larger distances. The fishermen’s prime 
livelihood strategy was to establish several settlements on various islands and to seasonally 
circulate between them. Through this social networking across space they were able to ideally 
exploit sea resources and diversify subsistence risks (Seki 2000).  
After independence, public recognition of these informal solidarity institutions at grassroot 
level waned over the years. None the less, they show that local cooperation and participation 
in shaping immediate surroundings and deciding on livelihood options, or in more modern 
terms in local participatory policy making, can be viewed as historically grown practice, 
claimed to “have proven extraordinarily resilient and adaptive” until today (Bankoff 2004: 
19). Therefore, the idea of targeting barangay and specifically puroks as the major 
participating units of provincial anti-poverty policy, as done in the case of the ‘SLGP’ in 
Bohol, seems reasonable and promising.  
In this context, however, the question poses why the Provincial Agriculturalist of Bohol has – 
as reported in chapter 8.4.3 – so many problems in attracting fisher folks and agricultural 
workers to community organisations, and why almost all policies in other fields are reported 
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to face more or less difficulties with empowering local people to participate actively in 
policy-making. These findings are probably based on the other side of the ‘Filipino 
participation story’, which is essentially related to the socio-political hierarchies and political 
culture in Philippine society.  
Expert interviewee 2 asserts that in the Philippines local organisation and “participation is 
real challenge. So, so that is some kind of a planning process where they are able to identify 
what they want, instead of the tradition of procedure of accepting just what higher level 
bodies would give them”. In other words, whenever hierarchies and patronage relations are 
involved, particularly when projects are initiated or accompanied by representatives of 
‘higher’ scales and/or ‘outsiders’, any kind of genuine participation, as understood in theory, 
is obstructed. For example, Cramb et al (2000) report from conservation farming projects in 
Palawan, Illoilo, and Cebu that project staff’s authority combined with support from the 
barangay leaders exerted strong pressure on the local people to adopt the suggested 
technologies and land-use practices. With regard to my own authority and hierarchy, I was 
given the advice during my research “don’t ask village people about politics, they are afraid 
to answer. Find answers in discrete way” (expert interview 9; compare chapter 4.3.2). Local 
people often avoid uttering their real opinions and preferably evade any kind of confrontation. 
Instead, their statements may just as well be echoes of dominant discourses, hierarchical 
expectations, and symbolic capital structures.  
During field visits 3 and 5 Boholanos’ (Filipinos’?) reluctance to actively participate in 
policy- making was experienced in yet a different manner. The local people who were asked 
to participate were mainly interested in ultimate results and how these would benefit them. 
They inquired very little about the contents of the projects, the tasks to be done, and their 
potential contribution to it. It seemed that they were reluctant or did not understand that they 
were to take over responsibility and activities themselves. In other words, while many local 
developmental problems exist, little local interest tries to challenge and solve them (expert 
interviews 10, 7). Likewise, Kelly & Armstrong (1996: 255-256) report with regard to their 
investigation of a ‘governanced’ Food System Development Project (FSDP) in the Visayas 
that the local people there, who were asked to become active policy-makers, continuously 
expressed discontent about the scarce material rewards of their participation. They expected 
that the project would provide them with capital grants, infrastructure, or other tangible aid. 
These and the local people attending the purok meetings in Bohol (field visit 3) clearly 
misunderstood the very idea of policy participation as promulgated by the government and 
NGOs. The latter maintain that projects should not offer pure service handouts, but rather 
foster a self-sustaining form of development that is based on ‘empowered’ endogenous 
resources and institutions (see chapters 3.3, 8.2, 8.3).  
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These expectations of automatic material returns and reluctant attitudes towards self-
empowered participation may result from patronage relations where people rely on the 
decision, actions, and rewards of their patron. Participation becomes a way of connecting to a 
‘patron’ (the project leader) in the hope that he/she gives out beneficiaries depending on 
personal relationships (Teves 2000: 54-58). Furthermore, communities have experienced a 
long history of governmental involvement in terms of ‘classic’ non-participatory service 
delivery. Therefore, the people may need time to get used to the new setting of being ‘policy 
shapers’ (see theory in chapter 3.3.3). Finally, local people may be unable to comprehend why 
government and NGO staff do not provide them with the material equipment they need when 
they obviously hold enough money (salary) and material infrastructure (computers, vehicles 
etc.) for themselves.  
A starting point internationally conceptualised for tackling these participation dilemmas may 
be People’s Organisations (POs). Emerging from the localities themselves, the POs’ 
representatives potentially function as an ideal channel for compiling local interests, while 
simultaneously appropriately advocating these local interests to ‘outside’ stakeholders. 
However, as the case of Pamilacan in chapter 8.4.2 illustrates, a new PO can also induce a 
shift of power relations and elite positions to the extent that conflicts develop in lieu of 
cooperation and empowerment (similarly observed during field visit 12). Moreover, as Ulrich 
& Edgecombe (1999: 190-197) point out, access to many community organisations in Bohol 
request membership fees. In other words, the most deprived segments of the local population, 
here those at the very end of the disparity parameter, are again unlikely to become involved in 
policy-making, and their voices are neither heard nor advocated to ‘outside’ stakeholders. Put 
strongly, POs can even become yet another vehicle for further social differentiation and 
polarisation. 
To conclude, participatory policy approaches into peripheries, such as by the ‘SLGP’ or 
‘Abante Bohol’, may establish links with traditional village networks, however, they have to 
consider that the local people are more likely to behave according to traditional societal rules 
(which are frequently reinforced by government and NGO representatives themselves) than 
according to more modern theoretical understanding of participation. Local participation in its 
theoretical understanding is probably not feasible in the Philippines (yet). Thus, participatory 
cooperation policy models like community planning or community leadership have to 
consider these factors if they are to reach out effectively (compare next chapter on 
partnerships; chapters 3.3.3 and 8.4.4). 
Besides the term of ‘traditional Philippine political culture’ may in fact refer to two power 
systems, neighbourhood and family ties on the one hand and patronage-based hierarchical 
networks on the other. It is far more commonly – including in this study – used in the latter 
sense, though. Finally, as participation is always dependent on local acceptance, a lack of 
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participation by local people may, of course, also indicate a non-inclusive or inadequate 
outreach of policies and policy-makers (compare chapter 9.2.1). By all means, therefore, any 
participatory policy initiative requires fundamental and constant discussion, explanation, and 
the determination to reach a common understanding of methods and goals by all affected and 
involved stakeholders. 
9.3.2  Governmental relationships with NGOs: On the understanding of 
partnership and governance 
Figure 9.1 illustrates that initiatives by LGU-NGO partners are provided with large sums of 
the 20% development fund in Bohol. Nationwide, figures show that numbers of NGOs and 
their incorporation in policy-making have rapidly increased since the enactment of the Local 
Government Code in 1991. These NGOs are often believed to be capable of overcoming 
traditional politics and inducing a new political culture of participatory governance in line 
with modern theoretical concepts in the Philippines, for NGOs “tend to be more 
collaborative, less cynical, more willing to take risks, and less office-bound” (George 1998: 
247; compare also Gauld 2000 and theory in chapter 3.3). Yet, prior empirical accounts in 
chapters 8 and 9.3.1 indicate that partnership and governance between state-society 
stakeholders in policy-making is problematic in Bohol (the Philippines?). 
As discussed in chapters 9.2.2 and 9.3.1, interactions within families and clans are the 
fundamental form of social networking in Malay-Filipino society. Keeping this tradition in 
mind, many Filipinos understand the principles of partnership differently from the 
internationally circulating academic and political literature. One interview partner explicates: 
 “The biggest problem I see in the Philippines is the different understanding or 
comprehension of ‘partnership’. The interpretation of the word partnership is different 
to ours. Partnership is based on confidence among the partners. And Filipinos do not 
easily built up confidence to unknown individuals or institutions” (expert interview 20).  
This scepticism towards potential partners is partially founded on the idea, that once formal 
cooperation is set up, it involves mutual obligations according to ‘utang na loob’ (Ulrich & 
Edgecombe 1999). Furthermore, many policy stakeholders in the Philippines nowadays seem 
to prefer what may be termed pragmatic, loose, shifting short-term alliances over engaging in 
such seriously binding reciprocity (compare Eaton 2001; Siemers 1993; Teves 2000). Such 
short-term alliances are frequently determined by personal advantages, however, they (still) 
can, as theoretically argued in chapter 3.2.2, enhance policy outcomes by bundling resources. 
Short-term alliances may fuel existing problems with policy consistency and possibly with 
self-enriching practices.  
During interviews, government and NGO policy stakeholders blamed each other for 
discarding closer and more effective cooperation (expert interviews 3, 7, 8, 16, 19). Notably, 
such claims partially stem from within collaborative LGU-NGO ‘governanced’ projects, like 
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the described tourism programme and the ‘SLGP’ in Bohol. Reference is made essentially to 
their allegedly incompatible approaches and understandings of disparities of poverty and 
respective policy responses. The following non-representative, yet indicative examples 
highlight, however, that despite rhetorical differences, de-facto modes of operation of actors 
from government and NGOs are not that different: 
¾ “Government tend to be sectoral and NGO tend to be target group [oriented] (expert 
interview 7; note by A.C.). The examples of ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ demonstrate that 
this environment may be changing. Yet, it is true that “so far, government and NGOs are 
not trained together in order to allow for a building for a common understanding” (expert 
interview 2).  
¾ The planning officer of the Provincial Agriculturalist in Bohol expresses “we are not like 
the NGO who can stay in the municipality most of the time […] we are only distributing 
the technical assistance during visiting […] there is no conflict but difference is, they can 
stay and see” (expert interview 3). Yet, the examples of the field officers of the BPRMO 
show that also government ‘can stay and see’ – indeed, these difference could also be an 
argument for government to contract out certain localised activities to NGOs (compare 
case of ‘SLGP’; chapter 3.3.3). 
¾ Somewhat in contradiction to the theoretical arguments of George (1998) and Gauld 
(2000) in the first section of this chapter, critics also accuse NGOs to be little active in 
local project implementation but to focus advocacy tasks and media presence. As most 
NGOs are set up by the middle class, which is mostly urban and comprises only about 
30% of Filipino society (chapter 6.1.3), the question arises whether these NGOs are 
actually able to grasp the real needs of the poor and rural/peripheral, and to advocate them 
adequately (expert interview 9; compare presidential changes in chapter 9.2.3). However, 
the examples of the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (SWCF) and the Bohol 
Local Development Foundation give proof that some NGOs succeed to tackle the 
problems of the poor in the rural. The SWCF has located its headquarters in its target area, 
but thereby remains an exception in Bohol. 
¾ Government agencies are claimed to be more restricted by social hierarchies and 
bureaucracy (i.e. corruption) than NGOs (expert interview 19). At the same time, both 
groups of policy-makers have to deal with the same opposition and potential corruption 
met in municipal and barangay governments and bureaucracies throughout the policy 
implementation process (compare cases of ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ in chapter 8.4.4). 
¾ NGOs are declared to see themselves in competition for funds with the government, and 
to only cooperate with the latter in order to survive rather than to improve projects (expert 
interviews 3, 17). Despite being non-representative, the institutional outline of the ‘SLGP’ 
(chapter 8.3.3) indicates differently.   
It can be inferred from these remarks that ‘classic’ government and new governanced policy 
often do not work as dissimilarly and incompatibly in the Philippines as suspected by many 
interview partners and theoretical concepts (chapter 3.3). Do they achieve different outcomes 
on disparities of poverty, then? It is an interesting finding that local communities view both 
types of projects with equal scepticism and reluctance (see chapter 9.3.1). According to them, 
experiences with any ‘outsider’ instigating local policy have proven ineffective, for neither 
LGUs, NGOs, nor joint initiatives keep their promises (field visit 3), only request the locals 
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for their money and resources (field visit 5), prohibit traditional livelihoods (field visit 11; 
expert interview 10), and enforce projects, which only benefit them or investors but not the 
locals (field visits 4, 12). Clearly, local rejection of policy and their makers from ‘outside’ is 
based – once again – on adverse and little effective experiences with participatory and locally 
embedded policy approaches. A factor that should not be ignored, however, is that despite 
their generally negative experiences, local people nowadays have more (institutional) options 
to address when they want to voice their views.  
One major reason for why ‘classic’ government and collaborative policy do not differ more 
strongly is that the principles, which theoretically distinguish government from governance, 
including collaboration, participation, networking, and empowerment are literally so-called 
‘buzz’-words in Bohol (the Philippines?). This means that while the principles of governance 
have entered and shifted the rhetoric and some organisational structures of policy-making, 
they have not substantially altered their contents and practices. Often the premise of receiving 
international funding is a sufficient incentive for formally adopting the principles of 
governance in policy plans and outlines. Never the less the investigated 
partnership/governance initiatives in Bohol remain despite their formal organisation into 
networks, like the government itself, embedded in traditional modes of hierarchical 
regulation. Local people perceive themselves and their ideas to be positioned hierarchically 
lower than the officials and ‘outsiders’ (see chapter 8.4; Gauld 2000: 231-234; Kelly & 
Armstrong 1996: 248).  
It is for these reasons that many of the participatory ‘bottom-up’ policy approaches in Bohol 
do not really reach their target groups. And even if they are planned to, as in the case of the 
‘SLGP’, they still not necessarily accomplish mutual, equal-status participation by the local 
people. Similarly, training enhancement in the case of ‘Abante Bohol’ would not necessarily 
reinforce peoples’ independence and empowerment better than its current strategy of simple 
governmental service delivery with a local focus. More effective outcomes can be achieved 
by ensuring the support of local leaders and patrons for the projects. In Bohol, both ‘Abante 
Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ equally often face the opposition by explicitly them (see chapter 8.4.4). 
To conclude, main obstacles to policy effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty in Bohol (and 
potentially in other parts of the Philippines) may not necessarily ground on the institutional 
differences between those policies run solely by government and those operated by 
collaborative, governanced initiatives. Rather, the individual setting, outline, and processes of 
single policies as well as the socio-cultural and political understandings and practices of 
partnership and participation of all parties involved determine their eventually implemented 
outreach and impact. Thus, arguments of NGOs overcoming ‘traditional Philippine-style 
policy-making’ cannot be confirmed from field experiences. It can be confirmed, however, 
that elements of traditional and new political culture often coexist within and between single 
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policies and their makers. Moreover, the peripheral and marginalised have more (institutional) 
options today to address when they want to voice their views. Unquestionably though,  
Philippine policy discourse, makers, and interventions need to more critically consider “the 
importance of other more informal and indigenous forms of civil society that may be 
especially important to marginalized groups” (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 13). 
Excursus: Church and politics  
The Catholic Church belongs to the most powerful societal players in the Philippines and is 
able to affect (political and policy) developments (expert interview 5). Although so far not 
stressed in this study’s accounts on Bohol, for complementary reasons the special Filipino 
relationship of Church and politics shall be briefly illustrated here, especially so because 
numerous Church-related NGOs are active in the country, among others Couples for Christ-
Gawad Kalinga where expert interviewee 9/16 (see appendices A1, A2) works.  
A popular example for the 
extent of the political influence 
of the church is its engagement 
in the overthrow of Marcos in 
1986 and its involvement in 
setting up a democratic order 
thereafter (chapter 9.2.3; 
Carroll 1999: 31-48). At local 
scale, photo 9.2 pictures what 
can happen if the interests of 
the Catholic Church are not considered and consulted. The buildings on the picture are owned 
by the church and intersect a bridge’s intended path that was meant to cross Loboc river in 
Bohol. Because the government ignored this, the construction of a bridge was never finalised 
and put in use.  
Another policy area where church interests have been very visible is population programmes 
(compare population development in chapter 6.2.1). Since the 1980s Philippine governments 
have given only modest political support to population policy due to the Church’s systematic 
resistance against any kind of population management. Under Marcos the Philippines were 
among the first to launch an official family planning programme in 1970; subsequent 
governments did not follow up the programme. The Presidents Aquino, Estrada and 
contemporarily, Arroyo alternatively focus(sed) on ‘responsible parenthood and informed 
choice’ and reject(ed) artificial birth control (Sison 2003; expert interview 1). Ramos made 
efforts towards a reproductive health scheme, but was stopped by the legislature. Ironically, 
today the neighbouring countries which once took the Philippines as model for population 
Photo 9.2: Policy and the role of the Church in Loboc, 
Bohol 
                                                                                                Clausen 2004
 193
policy have by large overtaken the country in terms of successful population management 
(Orbeta & Pernia 1999). As a result, more and more Filipinos, especially those in the 
peripheries with high-fertility rates, are caught in the population-employment-migration 
dilemma depicted in chapter 6, which consequently aggravates disparities of poverty and 
wealth. 
9.3.3  Government’s interaction with internationals: Aid, dependency,  
abuse, or chance?  
The Local Government Code enables local governments to apply independently to (foreign) 
grants for the first time in Philippine history. As illustrated for Bohol “donor assistance has 
been very helpful for a number of LGUs. Ah, like in the case of Bohol or in the case of Nueva 
Viscaya. Even Bulacan. Because these are areas of ah… these are the areas for, ah, for these 
donor-assisted projects” and “it’s really very important to assess the contribution of these 
donor-assisted projects” (expert interview 2). The majority of these donors are foreign aid or 
international organisations. As demonstrated, besides foreign funding for policy the provincial 
government of Bohol also seeks to attract foreign investors into tourism, as well as foreign 
consultants to LGUs (like expert interviewees 10 and 18). Thus, governmental interaction 
with internationals is situated at the intersection of private as well as public affairs, market 
and state interests, here economic growth and needs for social and spatial balance. 
Bohol’s tourism projects are embedded in such multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder setting 
(see chapters 8.2.1 and 8.3.1). On the one hand, projects are thus never short of funding 
(expert interview 11). On the other hand, if policy becomes dependent on (foreign) funds – as 
it was the case with ‘SLGP’ – it faces the risk of interruption or complete turnover if these are 
not granted (see chapter 9.2.2). Moreover, funding organisations have great influence upon 
the contents and course of policy: The ‘SLGP’ outline was re-written several times in order to 
meet the expectations and criteria of the potential donor, AUSAid-PACAP. At the same time, 
foreign financial aid and human capital input can be a crucial means to making policy work 
effectively, as it is the case with the tourism initiatives in Pamilacan. The example of foreign 
tourist resorts in Anda peninsula demonstrate that even small-scale, private (and officially 
promoted) investments may, however, induce local conflicts if not planned and implemented 
to consider local opinions and spill over effects. Sometimes foreigners simply take advantage 
of the limited LGU outreach, as this ongoing conflict of 2004 demonstrates: Foreign-owned 
diving schools from Panglao take their tourists to the coral reefs of Pamilacan, yet refuse to 
pay the requested fees to enter Pamilacanos’ waters (who would naturally like to profit from 
tourism in their waters as well). The investors continue to ignore postulations by various 
LGUs to comply with the regulations, and it seems that the official arm is not long enough to 
stop them (or, alternatively, that the responsible offices actually do not want to stop them 
because they fear leaving foreign investors more than complaints by Pamilacanos?). 
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Fisher & Ulrich (2000) detect similar abusive practices with the transnational cooperation 
‘Alliance’ that engages in public-private partnership with the provincial government of Bohol 
to develop the Inabanga-Wahid-watershed into a water supply for Cebu City (compare 
chapter 8.3.2). Contrary to official agreements Alliance does not consult or integrate local 
stakeholders in the project, and information dissemination is restricted to the town of 
Inabanga. The more peripheral communities remain un-informed although they are directly 
affected in their agricultural activities by the changes in the watershed. Consequently, “it is 
difficult to see how Alliance could claim to have been interested in Bohol’s development by 
embarking on the BCWSP [Bohol Cebu Water Supply Project], when the Boholanos 
themselves seem to have largely been excluded from the process itself” (Fisher & Ulrich 
2000: 456; explanatory note by A.C.). The authors infer that the corporation is interested only 
in maximising its own profit and, contrary to 
initial plans, the project will eventually benefit 
Cebu City and ‘Alliance’ but not Bohol and its 
citizens.  
A completely different yet significant 
perspective on the Philippine government’s 
relationship with internationals concerns the 
population-employment-migration dilemma. 
Precisely, the migration and ‘brain drain’ from 
peripheries into urban centres is accompanied 
by a ‘brain haemorrhage’ out off the country 
(Newsweek 04/10/2004). Since 1974 national 
governments have sought to demonstrate the 
population-employment dilemma as a benefit in 
the sense that a large pool of redundant workers 
is available ‘to be educated for export’ to global 
labour markets. While cheap and low-educated 
labour force is the major factor used to motivate 
foreign investors to settle in the Philippines, 
professional skill development is promulgated as a profitable means to reinforce migration to 
meet labour shortages in neighbouring Asian countries, the USA and Europe. Higher wages 
abroad, possible remittances and migrant investments make this a favourite policy field for 
national and provincial governments to stimulate development in the Philippines (compare 
return migrants’ investments in Bohol in chapter 8.4.1). The strategy goes as far as to educate 
leaving Filipinos as ‘ambassadors’ of Philippine tourism to make them promote their 
homeland overseas (see figure 9.2).  
 Figure 9.2: Cartoon showing Filipino 
 migrants as tourism promoters 
 
             Source: http://www.inq7.net
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However, studies indicate that the Philippine periphery and with it existing spatial, sectoral, 
and social disparities do not benefit much from the ‘education for export’ strategy of their 
government (compare chapter 6). Most of the development impetus through migrants remains 
(too) small-scaled, and is implemented with little contingency and coherence (Weekley 2003). 
Spatially, the largest number of international labour migrants comes from the urbanised, 
globalised core regions around Metro Manila, because most of the training apparatus and 99% 
of labour recruiters are locate there (Makabenta 2002; Tyner 1999). Peripheries like Bohol are 
involved in the labour circuits when their inhabitants – as Illocanos are known for – take 
advantage of long-established migration networks or through step migration, i.e. when they 
move to centres in the Philippines and from there abroad at a later stage (see chapters 6.2 and 
7.2.4).  
The most popular example of how international relations can shape policy and/on (disparate) 
development at a larger scale in the Philippines is surely the exceptional influence of their 
former colonial power, the USA. Not only benefited Central Luzon, as noted in chapter 6.3, 
from the long presence of US troops, but it also enabled substantial US support for the 
‘American boy’, namely Marcos, and his authoritative regime to survive as long as they did 
(Hamilton-Paterson 1998). Another example, the international events around 9/11/2001, 
discourses of ‘clash of civilisations’, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism have 
(re)invigorated tensions in the conflict region Mindanao. As a result, 660 US troops re-entered 
the Philippines in 2002 and combined efforts with the Philippine government and military 
forces against ‘terrorist cells’ of the Abu Sayaff, which are said to be connected with Al 
Quaida. Most Moro groups plus the majority of Filipino citizens and many politicians 
condemned the US involvement, and accused Arroyo for trying thus to ensure US support for 
her flagging rule (Islam 2003; see chapter 9.2.3). Alongside these events, ethno-cultural 
components of the historical conflict have been highlighted more strongly than its 
redistributive elements (see Siemers 2001). Stronger governmental force upon Muslim 
movements has, however, increased governmental disregard of Islamic cultural and political 
identities through a lens of ‘fundamentalism’, which paradoxically, in turn cause the 
intensification and possibly fundamentalisation of even these identities (compare chapter 5.2). 
As a matter of fact, the strong impact of the USA on Philippine courses of politics and 
political economy has led some scholars to entirely doubt the effect(iveness) of Philippine 
government’s nation building activities as a whole (see Mulder 1999; chapters 3.1.1 and 10).   
To conclude, most examples of government relations with internationals demonstrate an 
asymmetric relationship, which favours the interests of internationals and investors, and 
profit-generating market growth over redistribution interests of Philippine people and 
peripheries. Often, but especially illuminated by the interactions with the USA, this 
asymmetric relationship entails a profoundly conflictual outcome to further disintegrate 
Filipino people and their government. 
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9.3.4  Decentralisation: Inter-scalar competition? 
Decentralisation through the Local Government Code is meant to enable better governmental 
policy outreach to local communities by ways of devolution, deconcentration, and enhanced 
participatory governance in Philippine centres and peripheries. However, its practical 
outcomes in Bohol are, as illustrated, diverse. Rüland’s noted observation of ‘pseudo’ 
decentralisation tendencies do not seem to apply to the Philippines, however, linkages 
between the various levels of government are sometimes too strong and dependent in some 
instances, while too weak and little communicated in others (compare chapter 3.3.2). 
Provincial governors (as well as mayors and barangay captains) have been given the 
administrative authority over provincial (municipal/barangay) finances (Valdellon 1999). 
Never the less according to expert interviewee 2 “the problem is the fiscal, fiscal side […] if 
you have limited resources, there is a limit to what you can do”. This particularly relates to 
LGUs’ dependence on money transfer from national government, here the “internal revenue 
allotment, which the provinces get from the government, the share, is not so much”. This 
internal revenue allotment (IRA) is allocated to LGUs according to population (weighted 
50%), area (weighted 25%) and equal share (weighted 25%). Poverty incidence, socio-
economic development level, and or agglomeration levels are not taken into account. The 
outcome of such procedure is that “there is not much apparent relation between per capita 
transfers and levels of regional poverty in the Philippines” (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 308). In 
other words, those LGUs that are the most needy do not always receive the most. In Bohol, 
for example the Provincial Agriculturalist declares not to be able to fully implement some 
national acts and regulations “because we don’t have the money” (expert interview 3). 
Next to the IRA, however, the LGUs “ need to have other sources of income. So what are the 
sources of income: business permits, real estate taxes. But ah, also the better governments are 
those who are able to get more revenues” (expert interview 2; see chapter 5.2). Yet, local 
taxes often prove rather small because the large informal sector, and in economies driven by 
agricultural subsistence like those of Bohol, only small numbers of businesses are set up. 
A related obstacle lies in “problems with respect to resource transfer, because, ah, with 
decentralisation you transfer the hospitals and everything but you don’t have the doctors 
because they would rather stay in national offices because the salary is higher. And the local 
governments cannot pay the same salaries” (expert interview 2; see also Bird & Rodriguez 
1999: 305). In other words, there is a greater need to decentralise assets and personnel to 
provide service delivery functions from various national government agencies to local 
government units. Better human resources in local administrations could potentially enhance 
the information sharing between administrative and political levels – a procedure that 
admittedly often fails in the decentralised tourism sector in Bohol, according to expert 
interviewee 11 (compare Agriculture and Fisheries Modernisation Act in chapter 8).  
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As to be expected on the basis of previous accounts, decentralised policy-making lacks 
implementation of its objectives of participatory governance (chapters 8.1 and 8.2). So far the 
perception “is that only 25% of the local government units in the country are actually doing it 
properly. By properly meaning there is actual participation by civil society organisation in 
the local special bodies including local development council, local health board” (expert 
interview 2). The expert explains what happens in the residual 75% of cases: “Well, it’s not 
just the convening of the… having a meeting but, ah, not being able to participate 
productively. It’s like just getting their attendance and maybe having a civil society 
representatives who do not represent civil society but, in fact, are relatives of the local 
officials”. Ultimately, then, “the outcome is an enforcement of corruption on LGU level” 
(expert interview 20). Decentralised politics in the Philippines still follows ‘traditional 
Philippine political cultures’. It deals less with substantive debates over multi-scalar and 
cooperative development strategies and all the more with short-term socio-political 
calculations of personalised enrichment (see Eaton 2001). Indeed, there are observations that 
decentralisation may continue to fuel the unequal power relations and resource distribution by 
re-empowering the ‘traditional’ local elites it is supposed to combat (George 1998: 225). 
Findings in this and the previous chapter confirm that the endeavour of decentralisation to 
increase the number of multi-scalar stakeholders actively involved in policy-making, has 
surely been successful, however, with a different outcome on policy outreach and 
effect(iveness) than envisaged. Resource deficits in devolution and deconcentration, socio-
cultural constraints in participative policy and governance, features of patronage and 
corruptive leadership, and problems of inconsistent and locally disconnected policy in some 
way or another interrelate with and affect each other. Together they build up a whole set of 
constraining factors which typically impede effective policy-making on disparities of poverty 
and wealth in Bohol and other parts of the Philippines. These factors lead to the situation 
where many stakeholders engage in policies that concentrate on the very same places and 
areas (usually those which promise the most economic profit, see chapter 9.3.3), while others, 
usually the most needy developmental peripheries are cumulatively neglected. These 
constraints cause firstly, the spatial (sectoral and social) biases of policy-making discussed in 
chapter 8.5. Secondly, they also lead to an institutional ‘chaos’ at those policy sites that are 
reached out to by the various programmes and projects (expert interview 5). 
For example, altogether eight different ‘outsider’ policy-makers are involved in ‘inscribing’ 
the geographies of the Chocolate Hills. As noted in chapter 8.4.2, the Hills has been made a 
protected conservation National Monument area, which is administered through the national 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources together with the provincial Bohol 
Environmental Management Office. The national Department of Public Highways is 
responsible for maintaining the buildings and roads within the area. General planning 
procedures are the responsibility of the PPDO and are influenced by the aspirations of the 
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national Department of Tourism and the Bohol Tourism Office. The BTO also promotes and 
implements the plans. Further, the province owns a restaurant in the Hills, which is however 
leased and managed by the municipality of Carmen. The profits of the restaurant go to 70% 
and 30% to the municipality and province respectively. The local population is rarely been 
consulted in the policy processes (field visit 13). In this setting, adequate policy targeting and 
sensible cooperation are made almost impossible, and the ignorance of local interests has led 
– as reported in chapter 8.4.2 – to the uprising of NPA activists in the area. 
A similar situation exists on Pamilacan island, where in addition to the governmental 
initiatives investigated in this study, also various NGOs, international organisations, and 
university initiatives operate. Considering the multitude of initiatives active there, their 
outcomes are marginal and partially – like arising conflicts – unintended (compare chapter 
8.4.2). Although most of the policy actors know about each other, with the exception of the 
foreign consultant to the municipality of Baclayon, they do not seek cooperation but prefer to 
work on their own. Indeed, they partially compete with each other for acceptance among local 
people who, in turn, try to make most profit by playing off the various projects against each 
other (field visit 11, expert interviews 10, 11).  
Comparable observations are made with regard to decentralised policy-making in the two 
autonomous regions ARMM and CAR: In line with official regulations (chapter 5.2), the 
ARMM regional government has enacted an independent local government code for 
municipalities and barangays within the region in 1993. However, the code and associated 
laws neither are well understood by LGU officials or citizens, nor are they fully implemented. 
Most LGUs in the ARMM still us the national Local Government Code of 1991. Resembling 
findings in Bohol, implementation is constrained mostly by insufficient financial resources, 
weak institutions and administrative processes, and limited human resource capacity (ADB 
2002a). In the CAR the LGC of 1991 plus particularly the Indigenous People’s Right of 1997 
apply to manage the power relations of disparities of poverty and wealth, especially with 
regard to the indigenous minorities. Notwithstanding these legislations, legal and executive 
rights over resources, assets, and access to these continuously remain issues of controversy 
and of overlapping legal and policy spheres by national, local governments, and NGOs. Little 
space and options are left to the actually affected minorities to make their interest heard and 
considered in the debates and their outcomes (Hirtz 2003).  
Hence, in Bohol and other provinces and regions in the country, stakeholders in – and despite 
– a decentralised governance environment continue to ‘operate as mutually exclusive or 
competing geographies’ and not, as theoretically stated, as ‘densely superimposed, 
interdependent forms of territorial organisation’ (see chapter 3.3.3). Thereby, neither the local 
population nor local policy outcomes necessarily benefit from the presence of multiple policy-
makers but may be rendered unimportant in the course of competition among them. 
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10.   Whither Philippines? Concluding remarks on regional 
balance, societal unity, and governmental power  
This chapter closes the chain of arguments introduced in chapter 1 and gives answers to the 
key questions that guided the course of the study. Thus, it identifies the features, patterns, and 
dynamics of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines, and provides explanations to 
and understanding of how these are being (re)produced through constraints to and in 
governmental policy. The elaborated findings are set into the context of regional (im)balance, 
societal (dis)unity, and governmental power – crucial issues determining the development 
path of the Philippines and its people in the 21st century. 
For reasons inherent in the Philippine context (specified subsequently), this study develops an 
analytical and operative framework that is situated at the intersection points of the many 
theories, concepts, and ideological standpoints, which run through discourses on disparities. 
Therefore, disparities of poverty and wealth are in this study simultaneously recognised as 
material imbalances in space and society, the product of policy agency, a source of 
fragmentation, and politically and socio-culturally covered, interpreted and imagined 
constructs. Furthermore, their inter-provincial geographical manifestations in the Philippines 
are found to develop and operate alongside several typical themes, which may vary between 
inter-provincial and intra-provincial scales, shown for the case of the island province of 
Bohol. Spatial disparities, to some extent, overlap and interrelate with social disparities and 
inequalities. Together they reflect spatially-, socially-, and sectorally-biased policy outreach 
and effect(iveness) by national and decentralised provincial governments and vice versa. This 
study argues that these disparities in policy are shaped by their – and their makers’ – uneven 
presence across space, society, time, and context. This presence is increasingly a matter of 
transforming politics of scale between national, global, regional, provincial, and local actors, 
agency, and arenas in times of globalisation. 
Developmental divide between North and South, driven by Metro Manila 
The probably most visible feature of disparities inscribed into the Philippines is the 
demographic and socio-economic pre-eminence of its mega-city capital Metropolitan Manila. 
The city’s role as ‘the’ centre of the country has continually been fostered by the course of the 
political economy since Spanish and American colonisation. Because of Manila’s continuous 
sprawl and gateway function, the adjacent Southern Tagalog-CALABRAZON to the South 
and Central Luzon to the North have turned into similarly powerful core regions of the 
Philippine political economy. Together these three regions cause – crudely speaking – a 
North-South developmental divide that works to the detriment of (most of) the Visayas and 
Mindanao. Precisely, Metro Manila, the CALABRAZON, and most of Central Luzon are 
situated at the upper end of the national developmental disparity parameter. The Autonomous 
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Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Caraga, followed by other parts of Western 
Mindanao, Eastern Visayas, Southern Tagalog-MIMAROPA, and parts of the North of 
Luzon, especially parts of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR), represent its lower end. 
The extreme morphological differentiation of the archipelago works in favour of Metro 
Manila’s dominance. At the same time it creates a natural and imagined distance between the 
capital and the residual regions. These boundaries make socio-economic linkages and policy 
outreach by the national government to the far-away provinces and people more difficult. 
Simultaneously, they enable secondary centres such as Cebu and Davao City to prosper 
independently.  
Developmental gaps between urban and rural, lowland and upland, and 
coastal and interior areas 
In fact, most islands and provinces have a single urban centre, which has typically functioned 
as a gateway to rural hinterlands since pre-colonial times. This centre is usually located in 
lowland coastal areas due to easier accessibility and (sea) trade advantages. It fulfils prime 
centre functions within the province or island that resemble the dominant status of Metro 
Manila for the country. The provincial capital Tagbilaran City and the neighbouring peninsula 
of Panglao take over this role in Bohol.  
Broadly classifying patters of disparities, developmental ‘peripheries’ are typically defined as 
mostly rural and are located in the uplands and/or interiors of islands or provinces. Yet, 
lowlands do not automatically advance into ‘centres of wealth’ as illuminated by cases of 
poor and mainly lowland regions like Central Mindanao and Caraga or the far North and 
Northeast of Bohol. Similarly, the tourism boom of Boracay island as well as recent 
progressive trends in parts of the mountainous CAR show that ‘centres for development’ are 
also found in areas exceptional to the above general classification. In particular issues of 
access(ibility), the state of infrastructure, economic and business preferences, and political 
interests and the (un)successful outreach of policy-making play significant roles in 
determining the status of  developmental ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’.  
Policy emphasis on poverty over disparities and growth over 
redistribution… 
To combat disparate development as such is neither a priority in national nor in provincial 
policies in Bohol. Instead, policies of pro-poor economic growth (nationally) and of combined 
growth-redistribution (in Bohol) set the focus on poverty alleviation. In Bohol this includes an 
explicit identification of spatial policy target areas, social target groups, and sectoral targets in 
overall plans and frameworks. In line with theoretical concepts, the set objective is to render 
territorial, social, and sectoral development administration more effective and inclusive for 
the benefits of the peripheral, marginalised, and most important poverty issues.  
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Accordingly, in Bohol the two anti-poverty policies of ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ address 
areas where severe poverty is prevalent and no other governmental policy-maker has operated 
before. None the less, these and other policies in the fields of tourism and agriculture tend to 
most effectively reach out to and promote those areas, which are already wealthier and more 
progressive. These are not necessarily the most needy or those previously identified as target 
areas but usually the development ‘centres’ as identified above. Most of the provincial 
government agencies in Tagbilaran connect only marginally with more remote municipalities 
and the outer islands – with the exception of nearby Pamilacan island. The very poor North 
and Northeast of Bohol, particularly the municipalities of Bien Unido and President Garcia, 
are not reached out to at all by any of the policies under examination. If any municipalities 
were to be called ‘excluded’, it would be them.  
Generally, developmental spill over from urban centres like Metro Manila or Tagbilaran City 
into directly adjacent hinterlands, such as Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon or the Panglao 
peninsula, has been comparatively successful, however, effects beyond that are marginal. 
However, comparable to Cebu and Davao City at national scale, in Bohol secondary centres 
have evolved in vibrant harbour municipalities in the South and to the West: Jagna maintains 
economic relations with Northern Mindanao, and Tubignon with Cebu City. Astonishingly, 
the overall impact of Cebu City as a development catalyst for Bohol province is probably less 
distinct than expected. 
… Consequent sectoral divide: Industry and services vs. the primary sector 
Growth-oriented policy inevitably generates negotiations between state control and private 
markets over the degree of liberalisation and the ‘classic’ task of state government to provide 
redistributive measures to guarantee security, stability, and equality for its citizens. In the 
Philippines this discourse has resulted in sectorally-biased policy outcomes, induced by a turn 
towards the expansion of industries and services and towards global markets since the early 
1980s. These policy biases reflect upon and work to deteriorate the spatial patterns of 
disparate development: Economic ‘centres’ are typically characterised by growing industry 
and service sectors, but ‘peripheries’ by stagnating agriculture and fisheries. Bohol belongs to 
this category of primary sector ‘peripheries’.  
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Volatility and vulnerabilities within industrial ‘centres’  
Global export-oriented, industrial development tends to be located in isolated (urban) 
enclaves, mainly in and around Metro Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City. These enclaves 
trigger off large-scale migration inflows from the economic ‘peripheries’, which are 
increasingly deprived of their most productive population group. According to theoretical 
arguments, with this ‘brain drain’ the ‘peripheries’ loose an important developmental catalyst. 
However, moving to an (urban) economic centre does not automatically mean for the migrant 
that he/she will ‘move up the ladder’ of development. On the contrary, multi-facetted 
vulnerabilities and insecurities await them, including high socio-economic volatility during 
recession periods, higher rates of job turn-over, underemployment, urban poverty, and the 
absence of social security networks or family bonds to protect them.  
Productivity dilemmas and inappropriate policy design in the primary 
sector 
Notwithstanding this policy focus on industries (and services, see below), the majority of 
Filipinos is occupied in the primary sector. Yet, agriculture and fisheries have largely been 
neglected by policy in the past twenty-five years. Single national and provincial attempts to 
strengthen the sector, and with them many rural and peripheral areas, emphasise – again in 
line with paradigms of globalisation – large-scale agro-industry and export. In Bohol these 
approaches have proven little effective, because they ignore the fact that local agriculture and 
fishery is by and large based on subsistence production. In other words, productivity is low 
and trade as well as the market for processed goods limited. Nationwide, the striking inability 
of the primary sector to provide the Filipino people sufficiently with their major crop food, 
namely rice, highlights the detached and inappropriate outline of policy. Moreover, in Bohol 
many of the services delivered by the Provincial Agriculturalist are not utilised efficiently by 
local people because they are inadequately trained to do so. In addition, inadequate internal 
capabilities to execute municipal sea delineations, local fishing ordinances, and land reform 
also hinder government to profoundly improve the livelihoods of Boholano agricultural 
workers and fishermen (see below). 
Tourism: Untapped potential for development in peripheries  
Tourism is the only sector that holds the potential to combine global markets and growth with 
a possible spatial focus on peripheral ‘unspoilt tropical paradises’. Here tourist destinations 
and facilities as well as related developments may provide alternative livelihoods to the 
(poorer segments of) local population, especially if initiatives are kept connected to local 
conditions and small-scaled. Bohol, as a typical agricultural periphery, is currently 
transforming as its inhabitants and government seek to climb the mobile ladder of 
development in particular by establishing the island as an emergent (inter)national tourism 
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destination. The initiatives have managed to open up alternative livelihood perspectives to 
fishery, for example, on Pamilacan island. Furthermore, Bohol’s exceptionally well-educated 
human resource base provides Boholanos with the potential to take over and gain from many 
of the skilled jobs created through tourism. This is not self-evident as in other tourist 
destinations, like Boracay island, locals and local benefits have been impeded by incoming 
migrants. However, even though tourism policy in Bohol is planned to cover the entire island, 
its outcomes by and large replicate long-established spatial divides of poverty and wealth 
between Tagbilaran/ Panglao and its surroundings versus the residual municipalities.  
Most of all, these dynamics again highlight that preference is given to growth and market and 
tourism is being under-utilised as a pro-poor sector. In Bohol, initiatives in the tourism sector 
as an economically profitable growth sector often serve the interests of the investors rather 
than the purpose of redistribution to the benefit of the local Filipinos. Consequently, firstly, 
investors allocate disproportionately in areas with easier accessibility, better infrastructure 
(airport and main harbour in Tagbilaran), and advantageous economies of scale. Secondly, 
large-scale initiatives – and official promotion of them – exceed small-scale, locally-
embedded tourist establishments. Hence, local participation, socio-economic spill over 
effects, and local profits remain limited. As a consequence and thirdly, new conflicts and 
boundaries of poverty and wealth arise between those benefiting from tourism and those who 
do not.  
The free market requires the state if it is to work towards the poor, 
peripheral, and marginalised 
Theoretical neoliberal voices envisage the withdrawal of governmental regulation from the 
market, and an exclusive focus of governmental policy on social issues like (access to) human 
resources. However, Bohol’s experiences with (disparate) development are mainly related to 
socio-economic issues where agriculture and fishery are the most problematic sectors and 
tourism offers a possible way out. Therefore, Bohol’s provincial government policy 
frameworks adequately prioritise economic over social policy to strengthen pro-poor growth 
and more equitable development. In Bohol – and assumingly in other Philippine agricultural 
‘peripheries’ –  ‘the free market requires the state if it is to work’ to the advantages of all 
Filipinos, all regions, and all sectors (compare chapter 3.3.1). The findings of this study 
illuminate that the negotiations between state and market are, however, not optimised yet and 
need to further consider the marginalised and peripheral in policy plans and particularly in 
their implementation. Deficits in policy implementation are partially due to widespread 
administrative lacks of policy consistency and contingency. Bohol’s poverty statistics, for 
example, are based entirely on socially-derived indicators that stand in stark contrast to the 
economic focus of policy frameworks.  
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Reciprocities between spatial disparities and social inequalities…  
Adding yet another layer of disparity manifestation, social inequalities overlap and interact 
with spatial disparities and with policy shaping them. Firstly, the extraordinary wealth of 
Chinese Filipinos and their tendency to reside and do business in the major cities contributes 
to the rural-urban developmental divide. Secondly, land property rights are highly unequally 
distributed in the Philippines. Historically, social class divides were created between 
landowners on the one hand and tenants and landless on the other. These continue to 
characterise socio-economic power relations particularly in primary sector ‘peripheries’ and 
present a major hindrance to reforming the agricultural sector, and thus to development in 
support of the deprived. In addition, many owners of rural land actually live in the urban 
‘centres’ and further exacerbate the rural-urban divide. Thirdly, there is some reciprocal 
interaction between social and spatial disparities concerning the ARMM, (partially) Western 
and Central Mindanao, and the CAR, all of which are home to a large numbers of Muslim 
(Moro) and/or indigenous minorities. Even though these areas are rich in natural resources, 
the majority of inhabitants belong to the poorest of the Philippines, as profits are mainly being 
transferred to (foreign) investors and Metro Manila. As a matter of fact, especially the 
ARMM has long been in a state of developmental stagnation rather than transformation (as it 
is the case in Bohol). If any region were to be described as ‘excluded’ in the Philippine 
context, it would be the ARMM. 
Filipinos of Malay descent are the largest ethnic group in the Philippines and are 
(stereo)typically defined by a ‘national’ culture of ‘lowland Christian mainstream values’. 
Looking more closely, Filipinos are a socio-religiously and ethno-linguistically exceptionally 
diverse people. This diversity is driven by the morphological fragmentation and largely 
independent, historical development of the single communities, islands, rural and urban areas, 
and regions. While such circumstances obviously complicate the identification of disparities 
of poverty and wealth in this study, they equally imply that policy-making ought to be 
particularly aware of this diversity and target it adequately. Instead, state governments have 
‘imagined’ the Philippine nation on the foundation of the crude constructions of ‘the’ Filipino 
nation as a Tagalog and English-speaking community of Malay-Filipinos with a Christian 
value system.  
… Resulting in armed conflicts in developmental ‘peripheries’ 
This disregard for minority cultures and the deprived together with developmental disparities 
have triggered off various persistent conflicts over socio-economic equality, land 
entitlements, cultural recognition, and political autonomy, and (in some cases) separatism 
between marginalised populations and government(s). Literally those areas identified as 
developmental ‘peripheries’ are strongholds of armed conflicts over what is theoretically 
termed ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ (see chapter 3.1.1). Philippine government(s) 
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and military have fought with various Moro movements in Mindanao and with the communist 
National People’s Army (NPA) in North Luzon, Bicol, and the Visayas, including Bohol, 
since colonial times. These ongoing conflicts provide further explanation for developmental 
stagnation in some of the affected areas. Moreover, they indicate that policy has long failed to 
reach out to the peripheral, marginalised, and most important poverty issues. As matter of 
fact, the conflict regions in Mindanao have been neglected of agricultural reforms (and often 
of private investments) for more than twenty years, and made a new national focus of policy 
intervention only in 2001. In Bohol, the ‘Abante Bohol’ anti-poverty policy aims at winning 
the battle for the hearts and minds of the local people and resolving the conflict between 
government and NPA. Its performance remains controversially assessed, especially because it 
typically engages – similar to agricultural policy – in service delivery that is detached from 
the local contexts. 
Elitist power to control and abuse: On ‘traditional political culture’ 
Indisputably, the previous findings indicate that sound political and policy foundations are 
essential to setting Bohol and the Philippines on a more balanced development path. 
According to theoretical arguments, government must therefore combine its own competence 
and capacity to steer conditions, which frame disparate development with mechanisms, which 
empower other nongovernmental policy-makers and local people in order to act in 
‘participatory partnership concerts’ and in order to control internal abuses of power through 
corruption and cronyism. However, the noted failures of their effective policy outreach 
indicate that Philippine government(s) possess only limited power to control and steer 
structural factors of disparate development. Furthermore, as subsequently argued, politicians’ 
and policy-makers’ long-established elitist positions in society create an environment of  
‘traditional political culture’, which prevents empowered collaborative actions and 
institutionalises power-abusive practices.  
“The Philippines provides a clear-cut example of what kinds of obstacles to capitalist 
development can result when the power of an oligarchic [elite] is never tamed, and there is no 
concerted effort to promote the development of the public sector” (Hutchcroft 1998: 5; note 
by A.C.). For explanation, the old landowner families have traditionally fulfilled roles of 
patrons for tenants and landless workers. The former have historically taken care and ensured 
a livelihood for the latter while in turn being granted ‘utang na loob’ or ‘debt-in gratitude’, 
that means loyalty and full legitimacy to rule. On the basis of these reciprocal patronage 
relations, the landowners naturally became the most legitimate political leaders in the country 
after independence (that is also why many of them live in Metro Manila). Only under Marcos 
another elitist group emerged which consist of his cronies. Ever since, the elites of the 
Philippines have been drawn from these two ‘oligarchic’ groups, which share economic and 
political power among them. 
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This setting implies certain inferences for what is often subsumed to be ‘traditional Philippine 
political culture’. Firstly, politics and policy-making in the Philippines is a matter of 
personalities and rhetoric rather than concepts and ideas (the reason why this study works at 
the intersection points of theories). Secondly, policy is frequently disconnected from local 
contexts and inconsistent. Thirdly, elite families are given plenty of opportunities and engage 
in by-now institutionalised practices of corruption. They abuse their positions in government 
to enlarge their personal wealth. Fourthly, governments are safe to pay little attention to 
redistributive policies and be little concerned about how these reproduce disparities of 
poverty, until disparate development escalates to cause separatist movements which put 
governments and elites at risk (like, for example, in Mindanao). Accordingly, political 
rhetoric and statistical data mainly deal with absolute poverty rather than relative poverty. 
Fifthly, governmental failures and corruption do not automatically translate into protests by 
the Filipino people but is by and large accepted as being an element of socio-culturally 
embedded patronage reciprocity. Therefore, farmers who have been granted land under the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme in order to reduce the imbalanced asset and 
power distribution in the ‘peripheries’, strikingly often sell the land back to its former owner 
and patron.  
‘New political culture’ through globalisation and decentralisation? 
Recently, globalisation has opened new options for social mobility and created new socio-
economic elites composed of return migrants, remittance-receiving families, or entrepreneurs 
and workers earning from uplifting economic sectors like tourism. Many Chinese Filipinos 
belong to the new elites. While formations of these new elites occasionally work to reduce 
adverse impacts of ‘traditional political culture’, they have been found to lead to struggles 
between old and new elites, which potentially work towards further fragmentation and 
disparities within the communities.  
Most of all and in line with theoretical expectations on changing politics of scale, political 
decentralisation in the Philippines has carried hopes to improve governmental policy outreach 
to the peripheral, marginalised and most problematic poverty issues since 1991. In reality, 
significant financial and human resource deficits at the local government units (LGUs) of 
provinces, municipalities and barangays (village) impede the outcomes of deconcentration 
and devolution. By means of enhancing local participation, state-society partnerships and 
governance approaches including peoples’ and non-governmental organisations (POs and 
NGOs) at LGU level, decentralisation, moreover, has been expected to help remove the socio-
culturally embedded constraints to effective policy intervention on disparities in the 
Philippines. Subsequently, the number of NGOs rapidly increased, and mechanisms of 
governance were introduced at all policy-making stages. Participatory policy approaches can 
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also potentially reach out to ‘barangay’ communities, which are said to be the historical 
foundation and origin of Malay-Filipino society.  
In theory, participatory policy approaches mean to aim at self-sustaining ‘bottom-up’ forms of 
development, which empower endogenous resources and institutions, and thereby policy 
effect(iveness) at local levels. In the Philippines, however, such understanding of 
participatory policy is impeded by the extraordinary position of local leaders and elites and 
their hierarchical influence. Accordingly, for example, the lack of landownership restricts the 
interests of many Boholanos for active engagement in participatory policy process and 
cooperative actions. Instead, participation in policy-making becomes a mean for connecting 
with a ‘patron’ (for example, the project leader) in the hope and expectation for material 
benefits. In other words, local participation, the way it is understood as a theoretical concept, 
is probably not feasible in the Philippines (yet).  
Internationally, POs are often seen as an ideal channel for compiling local interests, while 
simultaneously for advocating these local interests to ‘outside’ stakeholders appropriately. 
However, experience in Bohol shows – similarly to experiences with new economic elites – 
that a new PO can also induce shifts of power relations and elite positions to the extent that 
conflicts develop in lieu of cooperation and empowerment. In addition, the most deprived 
segments of the local population are unlikely to become involved in any PO for these usually 
request membership fees. Thus, POs in Bohol – utterly in contrast to theoretical ideas – 
become yet another vehicle to fuel social differentiation and polarisation.  
Similarly, state-society partnerships and governance, the way they are understood 
theoretically, are unable to overcome ‘traditional Philippine-style policy-making’ (yet). 
Government and governance policy stakeholders equally seem to prefer pragmatic, loose, 
shifting and short-term alliances in order not to be bound to long-term ‘utang na loob’ 
reciprocity. These alliances are determined by personal advantages and fuel existing problems 
with policy consistency and possibly with corruptive self-enrichment. Moreover, terms like 
governance, collaboration, participation and empowerment are frequently only used as ‘buzz 
words’ by policy makers and are abandoned in favour of traditional government mechanisms 
in the course of the official policy process. Hence, the principles of governance have entered 
and shifted the rhetoric and some organisational structures of policy-making, yet neither 
substantially altered their contents, hierarchical-style practices, nor ‘traditional Philippine 
political culture’. ‘Traditional’ government and ‘new-style governance’ do not work in as 
dissimilar and incompatible manners in the Philippines as suspected by many theoretical 
concepts. 
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Governmental power deficits 
It remains up to a policy’s individual institutional setting, outline, process, and above all its 
capabilities as well as the power of its policy maker to determine policy effect(iveness). 
Generally, in an environment of Philippine ‘traditional political culture’ in particular symbolic 
power in combination with social capital decide on how well individual policy-makers and 
policies address set objectives in the long run. If networks and hierarchical positions are well 
in place, financial capital is likely to follow. In an environment of globalisation and growth-
orientation, financial power gains significance as a way to social mobility and expanded 
influence. Local governments and their policies, however, tend to rely on finances and assets 
that are disproportionately transferred to them from national government or foreign aid 
organisations. In addition, in this transfer of resources from national to local governments 
patterns of disparities of poverty play a marginal or no role. Thus, the most needy LGUs 
seldomly receive the most resources (and, even if, these may not be available for policy 
implementation because of corruptive practices). On top of that, policy contents are 
sometimes altered in a way that does not fit local policy contexts because requirements by 
foreign funding institutions have to be met. A enhanced human capital base is needed that 
combines local-endogenous and practical with (inter)national, conceptual and theoretical 
knowledge in order to avoid these obstacles as well as common administrative problems with 
locally detached and therefore not accepted policy.  
Spaces of governmental absence and their impact on identity formation 
Resource and power deficits in improving decentralised outreach, socio-cultural constraints in 
participative policy and governance, features of patronage and corruptive leadership, 
problems of inconsistent and locally disconnected policy, and the preference for growth over 
redistribution all interrelate with and affect each other. Together they create a whole set of 
constraining factors which typically impede effective policy-making on disparities of poverty 
and wealth in Bohol and other parts of the Philippines. These constraints result in the spatial, 
sectoral, and social biases of policy-making as discussed. The outcome is a large gap between 
those areas, people, and issues where government and governance is proximate, accessible, 
and, in fact, over-represented, and areas that are neglected by and detached from policies and 
operate mainly within their own local contexts. Thus, governmental and governanced policies 
‘make space not only through the properties of presence, but also through those of absence’ 
(compare chapter 3.2.3) and thereby often (re)produce disparities of poverty.  
Although formal constructions of ‘the’ Filipino nation attempt to disguise the ‘spaces of 
absence’, these instigate Filipinos’ cultural and political identities to focus on their immediate 
surroundings: “Einer von Cebu wird immer erst sagen, er sei Cebuano, bevor er sagt, er ist 
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Filipino1” (expert interview 10). Especially on smaller islands like Bohol there is a 
pronounced island mentality and only little interest by people or policy-makers for any issues 
beyond. In Bohol, a similarly distinct ranking of identities shows in policy-makers on the tiny 
island of Pamilacan – although the island is already comparatively well addressed by 
decentralised policy: “Eine Inselmentalität ist schon sehr ausgeprägt. Und der mayor, der 
Bürgermeister von Baclayon und der barangay captain von Pamilacan verstehen sich wohl 
ziemlich gut, respektieren sich wohl auch, aber der kann eigentlich so sein eigenes Ding 
machen [...] Er [der barangay captain] ist auf jeden Fall Insulaner und denkt so und hat mit 
der LGU [in Balclayon] eigentlich weniger am Hut2“ (expert interview 10, notes by A.C.). 
Similar restrictive perspectives also cause, for example, some municipal and barangay 
governments to oppose the provincial policies of ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’. 
Hence, the fragmented spatiality of cultural and political mentalities offers yet another 
explanation for why policy outreach to and partnership across LGUs may not function as 
conceptually intended. What is more, local and regional (imagined and practical) cohesion 
replace exceptionally weak ‘social relations, shared values and communities of interpretation, 
feelings of a common identity, a sense of belonging to the same Philippine community’, here 
national cohesion (compare chapter 3.1.1).  
Opposition movements like the NPA and the various Moro and indigenous movements try to 
relate explicitly to such local and regional identities and the lack of national cohesion in those 
areas where government is ‘absent’. They present themselves as being the genuine advocators 
of the peripheral and marginalised. One advantage they have over government(s) and NGOs 
is that their representatives often originate from the local communities where they operate 
(not in Bohol). Therefore, local people are more likely not conceive themselves to be 
positioned hierarchically lower. Local participation, acceptance, and the movements’ power to 
control and empower local population may be higher. Moro movements have, contrary to 
what is envisaged, actually been stimulated by the shift of governmental policy to dealing 
with them as an expression of religious-cultural rather than socio-economic disparities since 
11/9/2001.  
                                               
1
 Literally in English: “A person from Cebu would always say that he or she is Cebuano before saying he or she 
is Filipino”. 
2
 Literally in English: “I believe the mentality focus is very much on the island. And the mayor of Baclayon and 
the barangay captain of Pamilacan get on well, and respect each other, however effectively do their own thing 
independently. …He [the barangay captain] defines himself as a islander from Pamilacan, and thinks like that 
and does not really care much about other issues of the LGU [in Baclayon]”. 
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Whither Philippines: Towards a strong or weak rule and does it matter? 
Paradoxically, what governmental constructions of uniformity have not achieved within the 
Philippines, they accomplish overseas: The outside world perceives these ‘many Philippines’ 
as a whole. As an adverse consequence, then conflicts in Mindanao deter tourists from 
visiting the Visayas or Luzon and international investors from relocating their businesses in 
the Philippines. The image of the country is impaired and development impeded. Moreover, 
paradoxically, governmental outreach to the peripheral and marginalised and the construction 
of the imagined communities of Philippine nationality are claimed to have been more 
effective during the authoritative regime of Marcos than under the democratic and 
decentralised system that was set up in 1986: 
“The Marcoses […] had to some extent penetrated village life. No matter how 
physically distant the President has been, some token of his personal voltage had 
seeped through the very last barrio, or village, in the country. In many regions this was 
probably the first time such a thing had ever happened, so remote and aloof could the 
capital feel from elsewhere in the archipelago. […] When Marcos went, the sense of a 
patron or a godfather went too. As Mrs. Aquino took over, that already tenuous central 
government presence withdrew. Her photograph replaced those of the Marcoses in the 
village school and the barangay (village) hall, but that was all. The whole community 
felt as though it had moved further away from the centre of things, back to the old self-
sufficient marginality of pre-Marcos days” (Hamilton-Paterson 1998: xxiii). 
It seems that the Philippines is caught in a situation where, on the one hand, authoritarian rule 
successfully reached out to the ‘peripheries’ and marginalised, however, it neither reinforced 
their development nor weakened traditional self-enriching practices by the political and 
economic elites. Resistance against the regime grew and further pushed disintegrating and 
fragmenting tendencies. The influence of the state government was destabilised and the 
Marcos regime finally dismantled. 
On the other hand, ever since 1986, the new (formally) democratic and decentralised system 
of government has been weak and reliant on neoliberal, free-market development paradigms. 
This approach has achieved growth, yet growth in the very same spaces and places that were 
already more central and progressive and thus has exacerbated disparate development. Again, 
(stronger) differentiations of politics and policy-making, economic and business patterns and 
trends, and of society and mentality have been the consequences. Notions of regional balance, 
societal unity, and with these governmental powers have been put at stake. In addition, the 
status of the NPA and Moro movements inscribing competing geographies into space, society, 
and politics of Bohol and the Philippines has changed. Under the Marcos regime, politics and 
large parts of the public had conceived them in the light of militant opposition guerrillas. 
Nowadays the public and an increasing number of political stakeholders accept, welcome, and 
partially incorporate them (with the exception of the Abu Sayaff) in daily life routines and 
policy-making (in Bohol). NPA and Moro movements hold well-established alternative ‘fields 
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of power’ and ‘shadow governments’ in many Philippine ‘peripheries’. These significantly 
challenge the legitimacy of formal national and local governments.  
Thus, contemporary politics of scale in the Philippines are – in line with theoretical debates – 
caught in an ongoing struggle between national and various regional and local arenas, actors, 
and agency. Contrary to theoretical beliefs, it, however, appears that even if liberal tendencies 
of globalisation, decentralisation and participatory governance expand in the Philippines, they 
eventually pose a risk to regional balance, societal unity, and a threat to the legitimacy of 
government and the nation-state. National government’s increasingly flagging outreach and 
rule are evident in the widespread opposition to both, the previous and current governments 
under Estrada and Arroyo.  
To conclude, in Philippine reality the various – theoretically often separately handled – 
manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth exist in a parallel and overlapping way as 
material imbalances in space and society, the product of policy agency, the source of 
fragmentation, and politically and socio-culturally covered, interpreted and imagined 
constructs. They are that closely interconnected that they mutually instigate the (re)production 
of Philippine landscapes of disparities of poverty and wealth all over again. The glue that 
connects them is firstly, persistent policy preferences for (globalised) growth over 
(re)distribution and too little outreach to local contexts of the peripheries, marginalised, and 
most problematic poverty issues. Secondly, historically established, endogenous institutions 
of hierarchical political culture and elite dominance characterise policy-making by 
government, NGOs and POs alike. They impede any form of sustainable, locally-embedded 
development as well as the outreach capabilities of decentralised policy-making. While 
globalisation surely adds to the problematic development path of the Philippines, the question 
of Filipinos’ future is ultimately to be decided by whether and how these inherent institutions 
of political culture can and will change. The significance and weight of endogenous political 
culture should therefore receive greater attention in theories on policy outreach and 
effectiveness and on (disparate) development in general.  
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12.  Appendix 
A1:  Guided expert interviews by institutional background 
No.of 
inter-
view 
 Taped 
or 
memo 
Date & 
Duration 
Place  
– as chosen by 
interviewee 
 Academic Institutions    
1 Yuchengco Center; De La Salle University  
Manila, President  
taped 20/02/04 
50 min. 
in her closed 
office 
2 La Salle Institute of Governance; De La Salle 
University Manila; Executive Director 
taped 20/02/04 
80 min. 
empty library of 
Yuchengo Center 
 Provincial Government Organisations    
3 Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculturalist; 
Planning Officer  
taped 12/02/04 
80 min. 
in her superior’s 
open-plan office, 
Tagbilaran 
4 Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office 
(BPRMO); Head 
taped 01/03/04 
70 min. 
in open-plan 
BPRMO office, 
Tagbilaran 
5 Provincial Planning and Development Office 
(PPDO); Project Development and Monitoring Unit; 
Head (used to be Head of the forerunner office to 
the BPRMO) 
memo 26/02/04 
~ 30 min. 
in open-plan 
PPDO office in 
Tagbilaran 
6 Bohol Investment Promotion Centre; Office of the 
Governor; Managing Consultant 
memo 01/03/04 
~ 30min. 
in her closed  
office in 
Tagbilaran 
 Non-governmental Organisations    
7 Bohol Local Development Foundation; President 
(two interviews), 
functions as consultant to PPDO and  
representative of LGU anti-poverty project 
taped 10/02/04 
50 min. 
28/02/04 
130 min. 
at his home, 
Baclayon 
8 Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (SWCF); 
Project Manager 
memo  07/03/04 
~ 60 min. 
in closed SWCF 
office in Sierra 
Bullones 
9 Couples for Christ - Gawad Kalinga Initiative; 
Volunteer 
memo 05/02/04 
~ 60 min. 
in café in Cebu 
City 
 International Aid Organisations    
10 Delegate Consultant of German Development 
Service who works for Municipal Gov’t of Baclayon, 
Bohol 
taped 04/03/04 
155 min. 
on Pamilacan 
beach 
11 Delegate Consultant of German Development 
Service who works for Provincial Bohol Tourism 
Office (BTO) 
memo 27/02/04 
~150 min 
in café in 
Tagbilaran 
     
Test interview with randomly selected staff member, Montebello Hotel, Cebu City (04/02/04) 
 236
A2:  Informal expert interviews by institutional background1 
No.of 
inter-
view 
 Date & 
Duration 
Place  
– as chosen by 
interviewee 
 Academic Institutions   
12 Center for Local Governance; Holy Name University 
Bohol (Tagbilaran); President 
27/02/04  
 ~ 20 min 
in her closed office  
 Provincial Government Organisations   
13 Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist; Head 06/02/04   
~ 30 min 
in her open-plan 
office, Tagbilaran 
14 Bohol Provincial Planning and Development Office; 
Head; Provincial Planning and Development  
Coordinator 
26/02/04   
~ 20 min 
in closed PPDO 
office in  
Tagbilaran 
15 Bohol Provincial Planning and Development Office; 
Project Development and GIS Officer 
27/02/04   
~ 40 min 
in open-plan  
PPDO office & in 
café in Tagbilaran 
 Non-governmental Organisations   
16 Couples for Christ - Gawad Kalinga Initiative;  
Volunteer  
06/02/04  
 ~ 20 min. 
in open-plan 
office of NGO in 
Tagbilaran 
17 Bohol Local Development Foundation; President  
(four interviews), functions as consultant to PPDO  
and representative of LGU anti-poverty project 
06/02/04  
  ~ 40 min  
26/02/04   
~ 60 min 
27/02/04 
 ~ 50 min 
in open-plan 
PPDO office in 
Tagbilaran; 
during field visit 5;  
in BLDF office/ 
private home of 
president  
18 Bohol Local Development Foundation; Officer and 
webmaster together with 
Delegate Consultant of Voluntary Service Overseas 
(VSO Britain) who works for Provincial Planning 
Development Office, Bohol  
07/02/04    
~ 20 min. 
in BLDF office/ 
private home of 
president  
 International Aid Organisations   
19 Delegate Consultant of German Development Service 
who works for Provincial Bohol Tourism Office (BTO) 
24/02/04   
~ 30 min 
in BTO open-plan 
office, Tagbilaran 
 Independent Researcher   
20 Foreign researcher who lives about six months each 
year in the Philippines 
various 
occasions 
via email and on 
the phone  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Memos were taken on all interviews. 
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A3:   Abstract of Ph.D. thesis 
In contemporary times of globalisation the manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth 
and the design and implementation of policy responses become ever more complex and 
challenging. It is the conventional task of the (national) government to promote socio-
economic security and equality by reaching out to the peripheral regions, marginalised people, 
and most problematic issues of disparities of poverty and wealth. This Ph.D. thesis argues that 
governmental policy outreach and effect(iveness) are increasingly determined by whether and 
how policy-making considers and integrates liberalised market forces, societal stakeholders, 
and national and decentralised local governments. In the Philippines disparities of poverty and 
wealth particularly disadvantage rural, agricultural peripheries that show a high concentration 
of Muslim and indigenous minorities, and at local scales, of tenants and landless workers. 
Governmental policy-making (re)produces these disparities through spatial and sectoral biases 
on market growth and global integration for the most profitable yet volatile urban coastal 
centres of industries and services. Moreover, endogenous institutions of ‘traditional Philippine 
political culture’ render policy-making ineffective as a means for a sustainable, locally-
embedded, and -empowered form of development. The political elite is more interested in 
(corruptive) self-enrichment practices than long-term objectives of redistribution. Socio-
cultural patronage relations towards them constrain participation of and partnership with local 
populations and non-governmental organisations in policy-making. In lieu of cooperating, 
stakeholders operate mutually exclusive or compete with each other, causing an institutional 
overload and chaos in the most profitable policy sites, while others are entirely neglected. 
Altogether, the interactions between spatial, sectoral disparities, social inequalities, and 
policy-making biases have triggered of persistent armed conflicts over ‘redistributive and 
recognitive justice’ in the developmental peripheries. The conflicts work to exacerbate the 
developmental gap between centres and peripheries, weaken Filipinos’ national cohesion in 
favour of regional and local identities, and threaten the legitimacy of government. Hence, this 
thesis depicts how imbalanced negotiations between state and globalised market on the one 
hand and a persistent endogenous political culture in policy-making on the other can work to 
continually (re)produce manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth to eventually 
undermine government and nation-state. 
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A4:   Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
Disparitäten zwischen Arm und Reich. Eine Analyse über Policy 
Effekt(ivität) auf den Philippinen 
Die Manifestationen von Disparitäten zwischen Arm und Reich sowie die Aufstellung und 
Durchführung von reaktiver und präventiver Policy werden im Zuge der Globalisierung zu 
einer komplexen Herausforderung. Regierungen tragen traditionell die Verantwortung, für 
sozioökonomische Sicherheit und Verteilung innerhalb eines Staates zu sorgen. Die 
vorliegende Dissertation argumentiert, dass die erfolgreiche Ausführung dieser traditionellen 
Rolle vor allem davon abhängt, ob und wie die Regierung und ihre Policy die räumlich 
Ausgegrenzten, sozial Marginalisierten, und dringlichsten Armutsprobleme langfristig 
anspricht und erreicht. Dabei steht die Einflusssphäre der nationalen Regierung immer stärker 
im Wettbewerb mit der globalisierten Wirtschaft, der wachsenden politischen Aktivität 
gesellschaftlicher Akteure, sowie mit den durch Dezentralisierung eigenständiger gewordenen 
lokalen Regierungen. Während diese Konkurrenz zu einer Aushöhlung der Legitimität und 
Autorität der (nationalen) Regierung und des Staatsapparates führen kann, ermöglicht sie 
gleichsam neue, kooperative Policy-Ansätze der ‚Governance’, die verbesserte Reichweite 
und Effektivität in der Bekämpfung von Disparitäten versprechen.  
Vor diesem Hintergrund setzt sich die vorliegende Arbeit die Aufgabe, erstens die 
verschiedenen Ausformungen disparitärer Entwicklungen zwischen Arm und Reich in den 
Philippinen zu identifizieren. Zweitens soll analysiert werden, welche Policies der Regierung 
durch ihre Ineffektivität insbesondere dazu beitragen, Disparitäten zu reproduzieren und 
warum dies so ist. Der Forschungsansatz basiert auf einer kombinierten induktiven-
deduktiven Herangehensweise. Aufgrund ihrer Vielfalt und weil in den Philippinen politische 
Transformationsprozesse mehr von Personen und Rhetorik als von Ideologien und 
Programmen bestimmt werden, vertritt die vorliegende Dissertation keine spezielle Theorie. 
Stattdessen hat sie einen umfassenden konzeptionellen Analyserahmen für die empirische 
Untersuchung an den Schnittstellen der verschiedenen Theorien entwickelt. Diese 
multitheoretische Vorgehensweise beinhaltet unter anderem, dass Disparitäten sowohl als 
strukturelles Ungleichgewicht in Raum und Gesellschaft, als auch als Ergebnis von Policy-
Handlungen, als Quelle von Fragmentierung und Exklusion, sowie als soziokulturell und 
politisch geformte Konstruktion aufgefasst werden.  
Methodisch werden die Manifestationen disparitärer Entwicklungen in den Philippinen und 
innerhalb der Fallstudie der Inselprovinz Bohol durch statistische Analysen und eine 
Kartenserie identifiziert und daraufhin qualitativ interpretiert. Die Policy-Analyse stützt sich 
auf die Profile sieben selektierter, dezentraler Policies der Provinzregierung von Bohol, eine 
qualitative Kartenserie zur Reichweite der einzelnen Policies und ihrer Akteure, sowie auf  
zwanzig qualitative Experteninterviews und ethnologische Beobachtung und Partizipation. 
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Die Ergebnisse liefern bedeutsame Erklärungen für die (Re)Produktion von Disparitäten in 
detaillierter, kontextualisierter, und im engen inneren Zusammenhang stehender Art und 
Weise. Durch komplementäre qualitative Forschung in anderen philippinischen Kontexten 
und einer intensiven Literaturanalyse wird weiterhin der Versuch unternommen, bestimmte 
Erklärungsfaktoren auszudifferenzieren, die über Bohol hinweg in anderen Regionen der 
Philippinen gelten.  
In den Philippinen legen die morphologische Zerklüftung des Archipels, die 
außergewöhnliche ethnische und sprachliche Vielfalt, und getrennte historische Entwicklung 
der einzelnen Inseln, Regionen, und Gemeinschaften den Grundstein für die räumliche und 
gesellschaftliche Differenzierung des Landes und seiner Bewohner. Auf dieser Basis 
manifestieren sich Disparitäten zwischen und innerhalb der philippinischen Provinzen, welche 
insbesondere ländliche, vorwiegend durch Landwirtschaft und Fischerei genutzte, periphere 
Räume und ihre im stagnierenden primären Sektor beschäftigten Einwohner benachteiligen. 
Die peripheren Regionen sind meist im Hochland oder Inland der jeweiligen Inseln oder 
Regionen gelegen, nur marginal infrastrukturell erschlossen. Sie weisen oft – wie z. B. große 
Teile Mindanaos oder der Cordillera Autonomous Region – einen verhältnismäßig hohen 
Anteil an muslimischen oder indigenen Minderheiten auf. 
Das philippinische Regierungssystem ist seit 1991 dezentral organisiert. Die Zentralregierung 
in Metro Manila sowie die Provinzregierung von Bohol in Tagbilaran City reproduzieren 
räumliche, soziale, und sektorale Entwicklungsgefälle durch die Ausrichtung ihrer Policy auf 
das Wirtschaftswachstum in (globalisierten) Industrie und Dienstleistungssektoren urbaner 
Zentren, insbesondere der Haupstädte. Viele der meist in Küstennähe gelegenen städtischen 
Wirtschaftzentren existieren jedoch als relativ isolierte Enklaven mit geringen 
Austauschbeziehungen zum ärmeren Hinterland. Mit der Neuorientierung der philippinischen 
Wirtschaft auf globale Märkte, Wachstum, und Export seit Anfang der 1980er Jahre haben 
sich die externe Isolierung der Enklaven sowie ihre intern wachsende sozioökonomischen 
Disparitäten weiter verstärkt.  
Die Umsetzung von Policies zur Förderung der Peripherien, Marginalisierten, sowie des 
primären Sektors scheitern erstens an der Unvereinbarkeit von Wachstumsprioritäten und 
Umverteilungsinteressen. So kommen die Profite aus denjenigen Peripherien, die reich an 
natürlichen Ressourcenvorkommen sind, wie zum Beispiel Mindanao, vornehmlich nicht der 
lokalen Bevölkerung zu Gute, sondern der Regierung und (ausländischen) Investoren. Auch 
Pläne im Tourismussektor, die eine Marktorientierung mit einer räumlichen Ausrichtung auf 
‚tropische Paradies’-Peripherien ideal verbinden, konzentrieren sich bei ihrer 
Implementierung entweder erneut auf die bereits erschlossenen, zentralen Gebiete oder 
operieren als Enklaven, die aufgrund der geringen lokalen Beteiligung Konflikte verursachen.  
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Zweitens verhindern insbesondere historisch gewachsene informelle Institutionen der 
‚traditionellen philippinischen politischen Kultur’, dass Policy effektiv nachhaltige lokale  
Entwicklung bewirkt. Die polische Elite der Philippinen ist mehr an Selbstbereicherung, unter 
anderem auch durch Korruption, als an langfristigen Umverteilungsprozessen interessiert. 
Soziokulturelle Patronage- Beziehungen unterbinden die Einbindung lokaler 
Bevölkerungsinteressen und damit die praktische Umsetzung theoretischer Konzepte der 
Partizipation und Kollaboration im Rahmen von ‚Governance’ im Policy-Prozeß. Anstatt zu 
kooperieren und auf ein gemeinsames Ziel der Disparitäten- und Armutsbekämpfung 
hinzuarbeiten, stehen die verschiedenen Policy-Akteure im Wettbewerb über finanzielle 
Ressourcen, Humankapital, Status und lokale Akzeptanz zueinander. Letztere sinkt jedoch mit 
jedem misslingenden Programm oder Projekt sowie aufgrund der Tatsache, dass bestimmte 
Räume und Gemeinschaften (oftmals jene in Reichweite der urbanen Zentren) mit Policies 
und ihren konkurrierenden Advokaten überschwemmt, andere, und zwar zumeist die ärmsten 
und abgeschnittensten, vollständig vernachlässigt werden. Schließlich vertieft die 
philippinische Regierung die sozialen Gräben zu den ethnischen Minderheiten im Land durch 
eine ethnozentristische Konstruktion ‚der’ philippinischen Identität. Diese Konstruktion soll 
paradoxerweise eine geeintes philippinisches Nationalgefühl suggerieren und die 
existierenden sozialen Gräben überbrücken helfen; sie basiert jedoch fast ausschließlich auf 
der Tagalog- und Englischsprachigen, katholisch erzogenen Mehrheit der Filipinos 
malayischen Ursprungs und erreicht damit das gesetzte Ziel nicht. 
Die kumulativ interagierenden räumlichen, sozialen, sektoralen, und Policy- induzierten 
Manifestationen der Disparitäten zwischen Arm und Reich haben mehrere muslimische und 
kommunistische Oppositionsbewegungen dazu bewegt, gewaltsame Konflikte über 
Ressourcenumverteilung und Annerkennung der Minderheiten und Benachteiligten in den 
Entwicklungsperipherien Bohols und der Philippinen zu führen. Diese Konflikte vertiefen das 
Entwicklungsgefälle der Peripherien zu den Zentren weiter, indem sie sowohl Policies als 
auch Investoren abschrecken. Dennoch genießen ihre Akteure oftmals so großes Ansehen und 
Gefolgschaft bei der lokalen Bevölkerung, teilweise sogar bei der offiziellen lokalen Politik 
und Verwaltung, daß sie sogenannte ‚Schattenregierungen’ einrichten können. Ihr Ansehen ist 
darauf zurückzuführen, dass sie lokale oder regionale Alternativen zur nationalen 
Identitätskonstruktion anbieten. Für die philippinische Regierung bedeuten diese 
Schattenregierungen und ihre lokale Einbettung eine gefährliche Schwächung nationaler 
Kohäsion und Identität sowie Gefährdung der Legitimität von Regierung und Staat.  
Abschließend kann festgehalten werden, daß die vielfältigen – in Theorien oftmals separat 
gehandhabten – Ausformungen von Disparitäten in der philippinischen Realität 
nebeneinander existieren als strukturelle Ungleichgewichte, als Ergebnisse von ineffektiven 
Policy-Handlungen, als Quellen von Fragmentierung sowie als soziokulturell und politisch 
geformte Konstruktionen und sich wechselseitig beeinflussen, ja oftmals gegenseitig 
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verstärken. Die Konsequenzen von Globalisierung in Politik und Wirtschaft beeinflussen 
dabei den zukünftigen Entwicklungsweg. Dezentralisierte ‚Governance’-Ansätze erfüllen 
jedoch nicht die mit ihnen verbundenen theoretischen Hoffnungen auf effektivere und 
weitreichendere Policy, da endogen gewachsene Institutionen sie nach denselben Prinzipien 
ausrichten wie traditionelle Regierungsansätze. Die Zukunft disparitärer Entwicklungen in 
den Philippinen wird insbesondere vom Veränderungspotential dieser endogenen Institutionen 
abhängen. Die Bedeutung endogener politischer Kultur sollte deswegen künftig stärkere 
Berücksichtigung finden in Theorien zu Policy Effektivität und (disparitären) Entwicklungen.  
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